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 CHAPTER ONE 
 
TOWARD A STEINIAN ETHIC 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Edith Stein (1891-1942) was born of Jewish parents in Germany, studied 
philosophy under the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, converted to Catholicism, and 
spent the last nine years of her life in the enclosure of a Carmelite monastery as Sister 
Teresa Benedicta of the Cross.  She was arrested by Gestapo officers at a monastery in 
Echt, Holland, on August 2, 1942, transported to German-occupied Poland, and killed in 
Auschwitz seven days later.   
Julias Marcan, an eyewitness at the Drente-Westerbork Detention Camp in 
Holland, recalled that he saw Edith Stein calmly comforting children days before she and 
her sister were gassed in the ovens of Auschwitz.  Marcan, a Jewish member of the 
Cologne business community, had opportunity to notice Stein, since he and his wife were 
put in charge of the prisoners.  He recounts:  
Amongst the prisoners who were brought in on the 5th of August Sister 
Benedicta stood out on account of her calmness and composure.  The 
distress in the barracks, and the stir caused by the new arrivals, was 
indescribable.  Sister Benedicta was just like an angel, going around 
amongst the women, comforting them, helping them and calming them.  
Many of the mothers were near to distraction; they had not bothered about 
their children the whole day long, but just sat brooding in dumb despair.  
Sister Benedicta took care of the little children, washed them and combed 
them, looked after their feeding and their other needs.  During the whole 
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of her stay there she washed and cleaned for people, following one act of 
charity with another until everyone wondered at her goodness.1    
Facing inevitable extermination, how could Stein remain calm?  How could she comfort 
others?  What kept her from slipping into despair or insanity, seemingly reasonable 
responses, given the futile circumstances of Nazi Germany in August 1942 and the more 
immediately desperate conditions of the Drente-Westerbork Detention Camp?  
Prior to this phenomenon of caring in the camp, Edith Stein had been one of the 
first German women to complete a doctorate in philosophy.  She had studied with the 
founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), and received her degree 
summa cum laude.  She had actively participated in the group of phenomenologists 
known as the Göttingen Circle, and she had worked as Husserl’s assistant for eighteen 
months. But these outstanding credentials were not enough to overcome prejudice against 
a woman academic, and she was denied teaching positions in the universities.  Stein spent 
eight years teaching novices and would-be teachers in the Dominican Teachers’ College 
in Speyer.  As a convert to Catholicism at age thirty-one, Stein became a prominent 
speaker in the Catholic Women’s Movement.  She worked as a lecturer and curriculum 
planner at the German Institute for Scientific Pedagogy in Münster before laws against 
non-Aryans forced her dismissal.  Barred from her job at the Pedagogical Institute 
because she was of Jewish ethnicity, Stein, at age forty-two, realized a long-time 
aspiration and entered the Carmelite Order of Catholic cloistered women in Cologne.  In 
the cloister, Stein was able to work and pray as she gradually resumed philosophical 
                                                 
1 Qtd. in Teresia Renata de Spiritu Sancto Posselt, Edith Stein, trans. Cecily Hastings and Donald 
Nicholl (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952) 217.  See also Emmanuel Charles McCarthy, Some Guiding 
Reflections on the Icon of the Servant of Yahweh Blessed Teresia Benedicta of the Cross (Auschwitz, 
1992) 5. 
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work.  However, the horror of Kristallnacht2 made her realize that she was jeopardizing 
the safety of the Aryan sisters with whom she lived, and she asked to be transferred to 
Holland.  The German invasion of Holland in May 1940 necessitated another move for 
Stein, but Nazi policies interfered with her transfer to a Carmelite monastery in Le 
Pâquier, Switzerland.  When the Dutch Catholic Bishops publicly denounced the 
deportation of Jews, the Gestapo gathered up all Catholics of Jewish descent.  Stein and 
her sister Rosa, a tertiary of the Carmelites,3 were transported to the Drente-Westerbork 
Detention Camp and eventually to Auschwitz, where they were gassed on August 9, 
1942.  The Netherlands Red Cross officially confirmed the Stein sisters’ deaths in 1950, 
seven and a half years after the fact.4     
When the Catholic Church moved to beatify Stein in 1987 and then again when 
the Church canonized her in 1998, raising her to a preeminent status few achieve but 
many admire within the Church, the floodgates of animosity broke.   Members of the 
Jewish community accused the Church of centuries of anti-Semitism, of appropriating the 
Shoah5 to itself, and of using Stein as a model for the conversion of Jews to  
                                                 
              2 Kristallnacht was an orchestrated night of intimidation of the Jewish people, initiated by the Nazi 
officials on November 9-10, 1938, and so called for the smashing of glass and crystal during the destruction 
of Jewish synagogues, businesses, and homes.  John K. Roth and Michael Berenbaum, eds., Holocaust:  
Religious and Philosophical Implications (St. Paul:  Paragon House, 1989) xxi.  
 
              3 Pat Lyne, Edith Stein Discovered:  A Personal Portrait (Springfield: Templegate, 2000) 83. 
  
4Noted in Edith Stein, Life in a Jewish Family (Washington:  ICS, 1989) 432.  Hereafter referred 
to as Life. 
5 Shoah is the name given to the disaster and chaos that Hitler and National Socialism wreaked on 
the Jewish people.  The word Shoah is used in preference to the word Holocaust which contains a 
connotation of sacrifice.  In his essay, “The Jews Did Not Want to Bring Burnt Offerings,” Ernst Ludwig 
Ehrlich deems the use of the word holocaust inappropriate:  “The Jews who had been plundered and 
murdered by the Nazis did not want to bring a ‘sacrifice,’ neither a sin offering, a burnt offering, nor any 
other kind of offering!  These millions of murdered Jews wanted to live.  If they were religious, they 
wanted to serve their God as living Jews, not dead ones.  If they called upon the name of God in the 
extermination camps and prayed, they were not offering themselves to God as a sacrifice, but crying out 
from instinctual piety.”  Ehrlich’s essay is found in: Waltraud Herbstrith, ed., Never Forget:  Christian and 
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Catholicism.6  Others saw the act as yet another example of the Church’s flagrant 
arrogance, triumphalism, and insensitivity.  Some Jewish members of the Stein family 
refused to attend the beatification ceremonies in Cologne, Germany; Stein’s niece, 
Susanne Batzdorff, points out the irony that another aunt, Rosa, also a convert to 
Catholicism, had been killed with Edith, but had been declared neither a martyr nor a 
saint.7 
This rancor is justified and deserves the attention given it in the works of the 
Shoah scholar, Henry James Cargas; the critics, Garry Wills and James Carroll; Dr. 
Eugene Fisher; Rabbi Daniel Polish; and others.8   However, this discussion of the 
“problem of Edith Stein” detracts from the merits of Stein as a philosopher, teacher, and 
lecturer who tried to live the “examined life” in a time when the Nazis’ focus on “the 
Jewish Question” and “the Woman Question”9 stripped Jews of life, and women of their 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jewish Perspectives on Edith Stein (Washington:  ICS, 1989) 130.  In this study, Shoah will be used unless 
Holocaust is used within a direct quotation. 
     
              6 Harry James Cargas, ed., The Unnecessary Problem of Edith Stein (New York:  UPA, 1994) 13-
16. 
 
7 Susanne M. Batzdorff, Edith Stein:  Selected Writings (Springfield:  Templegate, 1990) 117.  
Batzdorff comments:  “In my family the truth jumps out at me dramatically, because Edith was not the only 
one of her family that was murdered in the Holocaust.  With her was her sister Rosa (like Edith a convert to 
Catholicism, like her, arrested in the Carmelite monastery of Echt, Holland, deported and killed in 
Auschwitz on the same day as her sister, but rarely mentioned by the church) and besides these two, her 
brother Paul and his wife, her sister Frieda, and her niece Eva were likewise slaughtered.”  
 
              8 In The Unnecessary Problem of Edith Stein, editor, Harry James Cargas presents ten essays 
voicing different interpretations of the Catholic Church’s move to elevate Stein to sainthood.  Cargas 
pronounces the Church’s attempt “inappropriate”; Rabbi Polish accuses the Church of trying to appropriate 
the Shoah to itself; and Dr. Fisher, in replying to Dr. Polish, denies any malfeasance on the part of the 
Church.  In his book, Papal Sin:  Structures of Deceit, Garry Wills cites Stein’s canonization as a 
“usurping” of the Shoah.  Wills, however, pays tribute to Stein:  “Edith Stein . . . lived one of the most 
intellectually adventurous lives of the twentieth century.  She is, by any measure, a giant— profound in 
thought, dedicated in service, challenging in originality.”  Garry Wills, Papal Sin:  Structures of Deceit 
(New York:  Image Books, 2000) 47.  See also the varied perspectives concerning Stein’s beatification 
found in Herbstrith, Never Forget.  
 
9 Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland:  Women, the Family and Nazi Politics (New York:  
St. Martin’s, 1987) 22.  
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dignity.  Edith Stein considered herself a German woman of Jewish descent, and when 
the Nazis applied these “questions” to her, she had to answer with no less than her life.   
In this study, the term “ethical life” will be used in preference to the term 
“examined life.”  The ethical life refers to a human being’s conscious existence in the 
physical world and an ongoing reflection on his or her actions, attitudes, and beliefs in 
that world.  It designates the manner in which a person conducts affairs within his/her 
given life world.  “Life world,” as used in this study, means “[t]he world inhabited by the 
self . . . within which [one] immediately experience[s] the things around [him/her].”10   
While a person might serendipitously lead a good life, it seems probable that 
some sort of plan, no matter how formal or informal, is needed.  For example, Socrates’ 
(469-399 BCE) examined life involved a method of inquiry that required a certain 
reflection and dialogue:  an examination of self, combined with the interplay of 
questioning/being questioned by others, and always striving for truth.  The German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) ethic appears more structured and takes into 
account ideas of means, ends, autonomy, and duty.11  If a person’s living of the ethical 
life presumes a plan, whether formally enunciated or not, there ought to be some 
evidence in the person’s life of this structure (letters, lists, consistencies in actions, etc.).  
Edith Stein did not leave a written or verbal ethic, per se, but she did leave a record 
(albeit incomplete) of her lived experiences, and it is this body of writing — her personal 
and autobiographical works — that this study seeks to link with her particular manner of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 2000) 6.  
Sokolowski’s definition of life world is used here in preference to Husserl’s evolving meanings of 
lifeworld. 
 
11 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge:  
Cambridge UP, 1997). 
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living an ethical life.  Stein’s philosophical writings both reflect and foster her ethical 
stance toward life and contribute to an understanding of her actions. 
In her doctoral dissertation, On The Problem of Empathy, Stein, echoing her 
teacher, Edmund Husserl, states:  “The averted and interior sides of a spatial thing are co-
given with its seen sides.  In short, the whole thing is ‘seen.’  But . . . this givenness of 
the one side implies tendencies to advance to new givennesses.”12  Through this study, it 
is hoped that a careful reading of Stein’s writings will lead to “new givennesses” — to a 
discovery of her interior side, or the impetus of her ethical life.  By examining Stein’s 
own comments, actions, and aspirations in her personal and autobiographical works and 
linking them to her phenomenological understanding of the psychophysical human being, 
this research will contribute to evidence of a lived ethic, showing Stein both as a 
practitioner and promoter of the ethical life. 
As a teacher and practitioner of philosophy, Stein studied the discipline of ethics.  
As a student, she studied the work of Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and was especially 
fond of his Ethics.13   Later, she was captivated by the lectures and writings of the 
German phenomenologist, Max Scheler (1874-1928).14  Stein specifically mentions 
studying Scheler’s works, Phenomenology and Theory of the Feelings of Sympathy and 
Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, and she praises him for 
presenting “topics of vital personal importance to his young listeners,” a trait that 
endeared him to and energized his students.15  While informed by Catholic teaching, 
                                                 
12 Edith Stein, On The Problem of Empathy, trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington:  ICS, 1989) 57. 
 
13 Stein, Life 260.    
 
14 Stein, Life 259. 
 
15 Stein, Life 258-59. 
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tradition, and literature, Stein seems also to be formed, in great part, by the “ethical 
personalism” and “coresponsibility” advanced by Scheler.  In her comments, Stein often 
mentions the impact that others had on her; she seems fascinated by how others lived and 
acted.  The development of her own ethical scheme was within her scope and ability and 
seems a likely project had she lived longer.  Her philosophical works, especially those on 
empathy, the human person, and community attest to this. 
Within the Catholic Church, the term “saint” refers to those men and women who 
“practiced heroic virtue and lived in fidelity to God’s grace” and who are recommended 
to fellow believers as models and intercessors.16  Given Stein’s status as saint within the 
Roman Catholic Church, it might be assumed that any ethic ascribed to her would be 
based strictly on faith and reflect the tenets of the Catholic Church.  Because of Stein’s 
background in philosophy, however, I will suggest that her ethic relies as heavily on 
reason as it does on faith and that to bracket either reason or faith in studying Stein is to 
misrepresent her and her living of the ethical life. 
This interplay of reason and faith is not new; Stein joins a rich tradition wherein 
the two are combined, such as in the works of Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas —
philosophers who bear the Catholic Church’s designation of saint.  While attracted by this 
relationship of faith and reason, Stein’s affinity to reason and the study of philosophy 
came first in time.  Stein gives a uniquely phenomenological and feminine expression to 
her linking of faith and reason, an expression that has its roots in as well as enriches the 
twentieth century and beyond. 
  In addition to exploring Stein’s writings for evidence of a lived ethic, it will be 
interesting to note how this living of the ethical life takes on different expressions when 
                                                 
16 Catechism of the Catholic Church (New York:  Catholic Book Publishing, 1994) #828, 219. 
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Stein moves through different phases of life, i.e., her pre-conversion and World War I 
period, her teaching and lecturing period, and her time as a Carmelite.  What, if anything, 
of Stein’s ethic remains unchanged throughout these periods?   It is proposed in this study 
that the essence of Stein’s ethic, that which is “common to all possible instances”17 of the 
living of this ethic, is the dynamic of searching for truth while in relationship with and 
responsible to God, self, and others.  
Edith Stein, whether heralded by Catholics, despised by Jews, dismissed by 
philosophers, or simply ignored by the general public, deserves to be studied because of 
her courage and persistence in living an ethical life. 
 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
 This study begins with the premise that philosopher Edith Stein’s seemingly 
praiseworthy action of comforting women and children signals her characteristic stance 
toward the world.  This caring for other human beings is not an isolated, meritorious act, 
but rather the conscious effort to blend thought and belief, giving them concrete 
expression in outward actions.  The research project will investigate this “Steinian 
stance” toward the world and elucidate other elements of this stance. Specifically, the 
project seeks to answer the question:  How did Stein live the ethical life?  More than an 
isolated act of kindness while facing death, Stein’s comforting of other human beings 
points to a dynamic, ever-evolving ethic, based on reason and faith, and lived out in 
relationship and responsibility to others. 
                                                 
17 Marianne Sawicki has done research on Stein’s hermeneutic theory and practices.   She defines 
the “essential” as that which is “common to all possible instances of this kind of object.” Marianne 
Sawicki, Body, Text, and Science:  The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of 
Edith Stein (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic P, 1997) 20. 
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Preliminary research points to a correlation in Stein’s ethic between relationship 
and responsibility.  Stein’s relationships can be traced in her writings and her comments 
about relatives, friends, and other people, to reveal a connection or bond, first explored in 
experience, and then more philosophically, in her dissertation on empathy.  In addition to 
realizing her own connection with others, Stein writes about the responsibility that people 
have to God, self, and one another, precisely because of their connection.   
Especially in her letters,18  Stein makes it clear that she considers her relationships 
with others as sacred trusts which entail responsibility.  In a letter to her friend and 
former student, Sister Adelgundis Jaegerschmid, OSB, for example, Stein states that she 
is “convinced that God calls no one for one’s own sake” (#262).  She cautions Sister 
Adelgundis about speaking to the dying Husserl about the last things in life (death, 
judgment, heaven, and hell) unless she is fully aware that such discussion “heightens his 
[Husserl’s] responsibility as well as our responsibility for him” (#52).  Stein’s letters 
confirm the fact that she deliberately maintains her responsibility to family, friends, and 
colleagues. 
After entering the cloister, Stein realized that when relationships are modified in 
terms of physical proximity, the bonds intensify.  Stein writes to Sister Callista:  “[E]ven 
in the contemplative life, one may not sever the connection with the world.  I even 
believe that the deeper one is drawn to God, the more one must ‘go out of oneself’; that 
is, one must go to the world in order to carry the divine life into it” (#45).  Stein comforts 
the author, Gertrud von le Fort,19 who is afraid that Stein’s entrance into Carmel will 
                                                 
18 Edith Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters, 1916-1942 (Washington:  ICS, 1993). 
   
19 Gertrud, Baroness von le Fort (1876-1971) was a novelist and poet whom Edith Stein much 
admired.  Von le Fort converted to Catholicism in 1926, and Stein and she shared an appreciation of 
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affect their friendship:  “You must not believe that you will lose anything at all.  
Everyone who has a place in my heart and in my prayers can only gain” (#156).  And 
Stein assures her friend and colleague, Fritz Kaufmann, from behind cloistered walls:  “I 
have other ways and means of keeping the bonds alive” (#93a).20  This 
relationship/responsibility dynamic is a recurring theme in Stein’s life and writings.  
While initially this bond might be thought of as stemming from faith, Stein envisions a 
universal link that transcends race, culture, religion — a relationship that is the privilege 
and thus the responsibility of human beings.21   
As a phenomenologist, Stein appreciates the difference of each person’s 
experience and she respects the different paths that individual persons follow in pursuit of 
truth.  For example, she tells Sister Adelgundis, who is taking care of the dying Edmund 
Husserl:  “I am not at all worried about my dear Master.  It has always been far from me 
to think that God’s mercy allows itself to be circumscribed by the visible church’s 
boundaries.  God is truth.  All who seek truth seek God, whether this is clear to them or 
                                                                                                                                                 
Catholic and Carmelite traditions, as well as an interest in women’s studies.  Von le Fort’s novella, Song at 
the Scaffold (1933), which describes the martyrdom of sixteen Carmelite nuns during the Reign of Terror, 
inspired writer Georges Bernanos (1888-1948), whose film script, Dialogues des Carmélites, in turn 
influenced Francis Poulenc’s (1899-1963) opera, “Dialogue of the Carmelites.”   See Josephine Koeppel, 
Edith Stein:  Philosopher and Mystic (Collegeville:  Liturgical P, 1990) 78 and Gertrud von le Fort, The 
Song at the Scaffold (Long Prairie: Neumann P, 1993). 
 
20 Stein’s contemporary, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) expresses a similar view of the 
existence and strength of nonphysical bonds.  Bonhoeffer, a Lutheran minister who died for his role in 
conspiring to kill Hitler, wrote to his fiancée from prison:  “These will be quiet days in our homes, but I 
have had the experience over and over again that the quieter it is around me, the clearer do I feel the 
connection to you.  It is as though in solitude the soul develops senses which we hardly know in everyday 
life.”  Qtd. in Malcolm Muggeridge, A Third Testament (Farmington:  Plough P, 1976) 162.  
  
21 Stein’s thoughts on relationship and responsibility reflect the influence of Max Scheler.  This 
connection between Stein and Scheler will be elucidated in Chapter Two.  
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not.”22  When told of her mother’s deathbed conversion to Catholicism, Stein was 
vehement in her response.  In a letter to Sister Callista Kopf, OP, Stein writes:  
The news of her [my mother’s] conversion was a totally unfounded rumor. 
I have no idea who made it up.  My mother held to her faith to the last.  
The faith and firm confidence she had in her God from her earliest 
childhood until her 87th year remained steadfast, and were the last things 
that stayed alive in her during the final difficult agony.  Therefore, I have 
the firm belief that she found a very merciful judge and is now my most 
faithful helper on my way, so that I, too, may reach my goal.23 
Stein holds herself in relationship to and therefore responsible for others, but she allows 
each person to find his/her own way to truth.   
In her stance toward the life world, Stein likewise realizes a connectedness with 
others and an attendant responsibility.  In 1917, while Germany was engaging in World 
War I, Stein considered her course of action.  In a letter to her colleague and friend, 
Roman Ingarden, she expresses an early version of this notion of relationship and 
responsibility: 
Peoples are “persons” who have life, who are born, who grow, and who 
pass away.  It is a life beyond our own, although it includes ours.  
Therefore, one cannot reasonably inquire whether they “should” be great 
or small; i.e., whether we ought to do something about it, for we have as 
little power within that sphere as cells have in deciding whether the 
                                                 
22 Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters page 272, letter 259, hereafter noted as 272, #259.   
 
23 Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 238, #227.  
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organism they constitute should grow or decrease.  However, we are not 
merely used up as cells are, but we can become aware of our relationship 
with the wholes to which we belong . . . and can voluntarily submit to 
them.  The more lively and powerful such a consciousness becomes in a 
people, the more it forms itself into a “state” and this formation is its 
organization.  The state is a self-confident people that disciplines its 
functions.24 
Stein would develop these ideas later in her essays on community and the state but the 
content of this letter and her early writings indicate her recurring interest with these 
themes.  
 Later, in 1932, while Germany headed toward World War II (after Stein had 
become a Catholic but prior to her becoming a Carmelite nun), she again made reference 
to this relationship/responsibility dynamic in words of advice to her former student, Sister 
Callista Kopf, OP.  Stein advocates communication and perseverance in an effort to 
understand and help the youth.  To Sister Callista, then teaching at College Marianum in 
Münster, Stein writes:  “[I]t is necessary to keep up contacts.  Today’s young generation 
has passed through so many crises — it can no longer understand us, but we must make 
the effort to understand them; then perhaps we may yet be able to be of some help to 
them.”25 
 While not all people would agree with or emulate Stein’s decisions or actions (nor 
should they, if they are leading their own, respective ethical lives), it is the process of 
                                                 
24 Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 9, #7.  
 
25 Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 123, #123. 
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engaging in life that is important and bears study.  Stein’s philosophical works, especially 
On The Problem of Empathy and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, 
elucidate her concepts of empathy and of the human person.  Present day philosophers, 
Kathleen Haney26 and Michael Andrews, see a link between Stein’s version of empathy 
and an ethic.  Haney considers Stein’s work on empathy to be a catalyst for moral action 
and she writes:  “The essential grasp of human nature, for which empathy provides 
experience, suggests further ramifications for ethical theory.  Empathy is a means to 
knowledge of the human nature; knowledge of the human nature enlivens and encourages 
empathy.  On such a basis, ethics is possible.”27  Haney’s work supports my thesis that 
Stein’s ethic involves relationship and responsibility.  However, in this paper, I will stress 
the origins of that relationship as coming from faith and reason, not solely from empathy.   
Michael Andrews sees a paradox in Stein’s concept of empathy as it “supplies the 
condition which gives me the Other while at the same time withholds the Other from 
me.” 28  Andrews questions whether “the integrity of the Other”29 is violated in the claim 
                                                 
26 Kathleen Haney, “Empathy and Ethics,” Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (1994):  57-65. 
Husserlian scholar Kathleen Haney explores empathy as “an essential ingredient in ethical thinking” (57) 
and finds Husserl’s fifth Cartesian Meditation and Stein’s dissertation on empathy instructive.  Haney 
explains Stein’s idea that empathy is another sense, dependent on all other senses, that allows one to know 
another person’s emotional state through consciousness of his/her presence and an interpretation of his/her 
verbal and gestural meanings.  Haney reminds readers that for Stein, empathy is sui generis, i.e., 
constituting a class alone, of its own kind, that presumes experience of the self and allows for the presence 
of the other.  Citing the work of Emmanuel Levinas, Haney brings out the relationship of empathy and 
ethics, stating that empathy becomes a precondition for ethical responsibility (61), as “the Other” demands 
a response.   
 
27 Haney, “Empathy and Ethics” 64. 
 
28 Michael Andrews, “Contributions to the Phenomenology of Empathy:  Edmund Husserl, Edith 
Stein, and Emmanuel Levinas,” diss., Villanova U, 2002, 11.  
 
29 Andrews, “Contributions” 18.    
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to know an Other.  This paradox will be considered in Chapter Three when I examine 
Stein’s four levels of the psychophysical person.30   
Marianne Sawicki31 posits that Stein’s writings are “texts” that help one to “read” 
and interpret her.  Hebrew literature scholar, Rachel Feldhay Brenner focuses on Stein’s 
Life in a Jewish Family as containing her stance against National Socialism.  In her work, 
Writing as Resistance:  Four Women Confronting the Holocaust, Brenner considers the 
writings of Stein, Simone Weil, Anne Frank, and Etty Hillesum as deliberate actions 
taken against Hitler and the Nazi government.32  Brenner’s exposition of Stein’s act of 
resistance supports the claim made in this study that Stein lived an ethical life.  
To date, however, there is no study linking Stein’s ethical system based on reason 
and faith with the conscious choices she makes in her practical life.  This study proposes 
to show how Stein’s empathetic understanding of the other helped her to lead and to 
promote an ethical life.  A key dynamic of Stein’s ethic is the connection between 
relationship and responsibility, which will be shown in her lived experience by using her 
personal and autobiographical works, specifically, Life in a Jewish Family, Self-Portrait 
in Letters, and Essays on Woman.  In her classes, letters, lectures, and essays, Stein 
encouraged others to lead ethical lives, mindful as a phenomenologist that each person’s 
experiences would vary.  Her own manner by which she decided upon a course of action 
resonated throughout her life.  It is this movement toward an ethic (found in her 
                                                 
30 Stein posits that a person can be known and understood on the physical, sentient, and mental 
levels, but that the personal level of the psychophysical person is known only to that individual and to God. 
 
31 Sawicki, Body, Text, and Science.   
 
32 Rachel Feldhay Brenner, Writing as Resistance:  Four Women Confronting the Holocaust 
(University Park:  Pennsylvania State UP, 1997).  
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philosophical works) and its lived reality of relationships and responsibilities (found in 
her autobiographical works) that this study delineates. 
It is proposed in this analysis that the seemingly insignificant action of comforting 
a child in the face of death gives evidence of an ethic by which Edith Stein persistently 
and resolutely lived.  It is assumed that this action presupposes a system within which a 
person acts and evaluates his/her actions (however formally or informally it is 
enunciated), and that the process of forming an ethic is dynamic, i.e., it develops with the 
growth of the individual as well as with the fluctuations of human life.  Edith Stein’s 
thoughts regarding a manner of action, based on empathy as found in her philosophical 
works, On The Problem of Empathy and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, 
will be linked with the living out of this ethic, by using her autobiographical works, Life 
in a Jewish Family and Self-Portrait in Letters; the essay, “How I Came to the Cologne 
Carmel”; her 1933 Letter to Pope Pius XI; and Essays on Woman.  It will be shown that 
Stein personally valued the importance of relationships in her life and realized that her 
association with others required an attendant response, thereby giving living expression 
to her idea that a person is in relationship and is therefore responsible.  This connection 
between relationship and responsibility will be explored to ascertain the role that reason 
and faith played in the shaping of Stein’s ethic. 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF THE PROBLEM 
Primary and Secondary Literature 
  As a philosopher, Edith Stein used her considerable talents in many ways.  Early 
in her philosophical career, she heard her professor and mentor, Edmund Husserl, explain 
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that “an objective outer world could only be experienced subjectively, i.e., through a 
plurality of perceiving individuals who relate in a mutual exchange of information.”33  
Noting that Husserl was following Theodor Lipps in calling this experience of others 
Einfühlung, she also realized that neither Lipps nor Husserl had fully explained this idea 
of empathy.34  It is important to note that in her dissertation Stein uses the German 
Einfühlung in the sense of “to put oneself in someone’s position”35 and not in the sense of 
the English “empathy” that sometimes contains a stronger connotation of emotion or 
“sympathy.”36  While Stein would develop her understanding of empathy and later deem 
it impossible to physically take a person’s position, explaining that empathy comes at the 
emotive and mental levels of the psychophysical person, she would favor the German 
rather than the English definition of empathy.  Thus, Einfühlung became the focus of 
Stein’s dissertation, later published as Zum Problem der Einfühlung (1917).   
After completing her doctoral degree, Stein worked as Edmund Husserl’s 
assistant for eighteen months during 1916-1918, transcribing and compiling his notes for 
eventual publication.  She resigned from this position when she realized that Husserl’s 
reworking of earlier projects to the neglect of new tasks frustrated her and hindered her 
own philosophical work.37  Her attempts to secure a university teaching position were 
                                                 
33 Stein, Life 269. 
 
34 Stein, Life 269.  See also Sawicki, Body, Text and Science 1-2. 
 
35 “Einfühlung,” Langenscheidt’s New College German Dictionary, 1995 ed. 
  
36 “Empathy,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 1996 ed. 
 
37 Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 23, #21.  On March 10, 1918, Stein wrote from Breslau to Fritz 
Kaufmann, in a barracks in Romania:  “As far as my activity as assistant is concerned I must inform you 
that I have asked Husserl to dispense me from it for the time being.  Putting manuscripts in order, which 
was all my work consisted of for months, was gradually getting to be unbearable for me, nor does it seem 
to me to be so necessary that, for its sake, I should have to renounce doing anything on my own.”  
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also in vain since few appointments were granted to women professors in Germany in the 
early 1920s.38  Subsequently, Stein spent the rest of her life pursuing various 
philosophical projects.  She commented on works of Dionysius the Areopagite, lectured 
on the nature of woman, taught philosophy to individual undergraduates, and translated 
works by John Henry Newman and Thomas Aquinas into German.  Stein’s work in 
phenomenology, empathy, scholasticism, feminism, education, and other areas therefore 
provides a rich field for exploration. 
Since Stein’s canonization in 1998 and the subsequent translation of her works 
from German to English and other languages, a greater population has had access to 
Stein’s works.  In order to understand better the literature that exists regarding Edith 
Stein and her work, it is helpful to consider primary and secondary texts.  A brief 
overview of the primary texts, which include Stein’s personal, professional, and 
philosophical works, followed by a review of major secondary texts, which include 
literature about Stein and her philosophical works, will facilitate greater understanding of 
Stein and of the resources available. 
 
Stein’s Written Works — An Overview 
For the purposes of this study, Stein’s literary legacy can be divided into her 
personal, professional, and philosophical works.  Stein’s personal works include her 
memoirs, Life in a Jewish Family, her letters published posthumously as Self-Portrait in 
Letters, an essay explaining her decision to enter the Carmelites (“How I Came to the 
                                                 
38 Sarah Borden notes Husserl’s praise of Stein as a philosopher but his doubt about women in 
academia.  Borden writes:  “Husserl had written a letter of recommendation that, after great praise, ended 
with, ‘[s]hould the academic profession become open to women, I would recommend Dr. Stein 
immediately and most warmly for qualification as a university lecturer.’ ”  Sarah Borden, Edith Stein (New 
York:  Continuum, 2003) 8.   
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Cologne Carmel”), and her letter to Pope Pius XI urging him to speak out against 
National Socialism.  Stein’s professional works consist of her lectures to women, 
published as Essays on Woman.  Of her philosophical works, Stein’s dissertation, On the 
Problem of Empathy, and her habilitation treatises, “Sentient Causality” and “On 
Community,” found in the work, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, will be 
considered.  While Stein’s theological and hagiographic writings and her translations of 
works by John Henry Newman and Thomas of Aquinas are insightful, they are not 
germane to the particular topic of Stein and her ethic. 
 
Stein’s Philosophical Works 
On The Problem of Empathy 
Stein’s doctoral dissertation, On the Problem of Empathy, was her first published 
work and in it she considers the possibility of entering into another person’s experiences 
from a phenomenological perspective.  Stein concludes that it is possible to “empathize,” 
i.e., to “sense in” another person even though one does not experience primordially what 
the other undergoes.  Stein explains:  “Empathy in our strictly defined sense as the 
experience of foreign consciousness can only be the non-primordial experience which 
announces a primordial one.”39   
Stein presented her dissertation, “On the Problem of Empathy,” and was awarded 
her doctoral degree summa cum laude in 1916, with her work being published in 1917.  
The first chapter of Stein’s dissertation, which dealt with an historical presentation of 
                                                 
39 Stein, Empathy, 14. 
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empathy, was omitted in publishing and is no longer extant.40  In the remaining three 
chapters, Stein considers the essence of acts of empathy, the constitution of the 
psychophysical41 individual, and empathy as the understanding of spiritual persons. 
In Chapter 3 of her dissertation, Stein delineates the constitution of the 
psychophysical individual.  Steinian scholar, Mary Catherine Baseheart posits that Stein 
was convinced that phenomenology, the study and description of the essence of an object, 
is “the most appropriate approach to the investigation of the structure of the human 
person.”42  Noting that the philosopher Theodor Lipps had done important work on 
empathy, but that he had not treated empathy as a problem of constitution, Stein sets out 
to describe how empathy is constituted within the psychophysical individual.43  First, 
though, Stein describes the psychophysical individual.  
For Stein, the psychophysical person experiences self in two ways:  directly and 
indirectly.  Self-perception is immediate.  Stein defines “the Pure I” as the “indescribable, 
quality-less subject of experience”44 that perceives itself primordially, i.e., immediately, 
all at once.  In an indirect way, an “other” helps the psychophysical person to perceive 
him/herself, too.  Michael Andrews points out that Stein, prefiguring Husserl’s later 
student, Emmanuel Levinas, posits the subjective I as recognizing itself as another 
individual or group of individuals faces it.  Stein explains that the I is “brought into relief 
                                                 
40 Stein, Empathy, Waltraut Stein’s Preface, xiii. 
 
41 In the Waltraut Stein translation of Stein’s dissertation, psycho-physical is hyphenated.  Only 
when quoting Edith Stein’s work, will the hyphenation be retained.     
 
42 Mary Catherine Baseheart in Foreword of Stein, Empathy x. 
 
43 Stein, Empathy 37.  
 
44 Stein, Empathy 38. 
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in contrast with the otherness of the other.”45  Thus, the “other” is needed in order to 
know the self. 46    
According to Stein, the Pure I does not experience an “other” psychophysical 
individual in the same manner in which it perceives its own self.  Rather, the “foreign” 
psychophysical individual is always “other” than the Pure I and is not experienced 
primordially.   
 In order to delve more deeply into this psychophysical constitution of the person, 
Stein must first define the body.  To describe body in terms of Körper is risky since 
physicality includes outer perception that is limited, at best.  The outward, physical body 
is both perceiving and perceived, but never completely so.  Regarding the physical body 
as partial perceiver, Stein cites the example of viewing the moon: a person perceives the 
moon as a whole, but never completely “sees” the entire moon since the other side is 
always obscured from sight.  Similarly, the subject as physical body is only partially 
perceived.  For example, the subject perceives himself/herself as a whole person while 
only seeing parts or sides of his/her physical body.  
In describing the body as Körper, Stein uses vocabulary similar to that of Husserl 
as she explains the “zero point of orientation.”47  As a zero point of orientation, the 
                                                 
45 Stein, Empathy 38. 
 
46 In Phenomenology of Spirit, Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) expresses a similar argument.  
Hegel writes:  “Active Reason is aware of itself merely as an individual and as such must demand and 
produce its reality in an ‘other.’ ”  G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford:  
Oxford U P, 1977) 211.  
 
47 Stein presented her dissertation in 1916 and it was published in 1917.  While Stein 
acknowledges her indebtedness to Husserl’s “intellectual stimuli,” she claims her doctoral work as her own.   
In the Foreword to On the Problem of Empathy, she writes:  “Since I submitted it [the dissertation] to the 
faculty, I have, in my capacity as private assistant to my respected Professor Husserl, had a look at the 
manuscript of Part II of his “Ideen,” dealing in part with the same question [i.e., empathy].  Thus, naturally, 
should I take up my theme again, I would not be able to refrain from using the new suggestions received.  
Of course, the statement of the problem and my method of work have grown entirely out of intellectual 
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physical body is a locus for the life world.  Husserl begins Ideas II with a description of 
how the physical “I” is situated in this surrounding life world. Husserl explains: 
I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly 
becoming and having endlessly become in time.  I am conscious of it:  that 
signifies, above all, that intuitively I find it immediately, that I experience 
it.  By my seeing, touching, hearing and so forth, and in the different 
modes of sensuous perception, corporeal physical things with some spatial 
distribution are simply there for me, “on hand” in the literal or the 
figurative sense, whether or not I am particularly heedful of them and 
busied with them in my considering, thinking, feeling, or willing.48  
Stein’s zero point of orientation is not a geometrically localized position but is at one 
with the human body.  She explains that “whatever refers to the ‘I’ has no distance from 
the zero point, and all that is given at a distance from the zero point is also given at a 
distance from the ‘I.’”49   
The psychophysical individual is incomplete if only described as Körper, so Stein 
adds the notion of Leib, or living body, to her definition of body.  Leib refers to the locus 
                                                                                                                                                 
stimuli received from Professor Husserl so that in any case what I may claim as my “spiritual property” in 
the following expositions is most questionable.  Nevertheless, I can say that the results I now submit have 
been obtained by my own efforts.  This I could no longer maintain if I now undertook changes.”  Stein, 
Empathy 1-2.  
   
48 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy, trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht:  Kluwer Academic P, 1998) 51, §27.  In Cartesian Meditations, 
134; §58, 161, Husserl speaks of the zero personality in a world of cultures.  Husserl states:  “If we return 
to our case, that of the cultural world, we find that it too, as a world of cultures, is given orientedly on the 
underlying basis of the Nature common to all and on the basis of the spatiotemporal form that gives access 
to Nature and must function also in making the multiplicity of cultural formations and cultures accessible.  
We see that in this fashion the cultural world too is given ‘orientedly,’ in relation to a zero member or a 
<zero> ‘personality.’ ” 
 
49 Stein, Empathy 43. 
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of bodily sensations and the site of “unified givenness.”50  Thus, for Stein, there is a 
“doubled givenness”51 of the physical body, Körper, and the living body, Leib; that is, a 
body is perceived physically and also sensed as alive. 
Having described the body, Stein continues with her description of the human 
person as she introduces the soul.  She states that “the soul together with the living body 
forms the ‘psycho-physical’ individual.”52  She designates feelings and their attendant 
expressions as signs of the connection of the body and the soul.  Stein posits that feelings 
and their expressions are related, not by physical causality, but by nature and meaning, 
and are the result of the will.53  If feelings and their expressions were joined merely by 
physical causality, Stein thinks that a person seeing another person blush would have 
trouble rightly interpreting the noted coloration of the face.  One can readily determine 
that a person is blushing by detecting physical characteristics; however, one knows not 
whether the blush is caused by anger, shame, or exertion.  Thus, not only physical 
causality but also meaning helps a person to rightly interpret the situation.  Feeling 
demands expression,54 according to Stein, and it is this display of feeling that provides 
entry into the world of the psychophysical being. 
Will is vital to Stein’s constitution of the psychophysical individual, and she 
posits that the “whole” of an action, not each step of the action, is willed.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
50 Stein, Empathy 42. 
 
51 Stein, Empathy 43. 
 
52 Stein, Empathy 50. 
 
53 Stein, Empathy 53. 
  
54 Stein, Empathy 53. 
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the psychophysical person’s will is externalized in action.  Stein concludes: “The will is 
the master of the soul as of the living body.”55  Stein defines the human person, then, as  
“a unified object inseparably joining together the conscious unity of an ‘I’ and a physical 
body in such a way that each of them takes on a new character.  The physical body occurs 
as a living body; consciousness occurs as the soul of the unified individual.”56 
Having described and defined the psychophysical individual, Stein considers how 
human beings (subjects) perceive foreign psychophysical beings, that is, how subjects 
perceive other subjects.  Reflecting Husserl’s influence, Stein reiterates a basic tenet of 
phenomenology:  the object — in this case, the “other” subject or the foreign living body 
— is given as a whole, while the subject only physically perceives parts of the whole.  
[This one given angle or profile implies indirectly those other angles not perceived, so 
that the subject perceives a whole through this one angle or profile.]  Consciousness helps 
to fill out the meaning that is given in partial views.  Stein explains:  “The averted and 
interior sides of a spatial thing are co-given with its seen sides.”57  If the data that come 
through a person’s senses help him to perceive a moon, his stream of consciousness 
(memory of other moons, mental pictures of moons, knowledge that the moon is 
spherical and not a one-sided stage prop, imaginings, etc.) enables the person to know the 
object — moon.  So, too, consciousness helps the observer of the blushing person to fill 
out the missing meaning of the blush, enabling the onlooker to empathize with the 
blusher.   
                                                 
55 Stein, Empathy 55. 
 
56 Stein, Empathy 56. 
 
57 Stein, Empathy 57.  
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Experience and meaning unfold new horizons; the givenness of one side leads to 
new givennesses.  Thus, a psychophysical individual can perceive another individual 
physically through the other’s expressions, comportment, etc.  This physical perception 
working in tandem with the Pure I’s own primordial experiences and powers of 
consciousness (remembering, imagining, etc.) help the “I” to know “the other.” 
The objection can be raised that according to Stein’s theory of empathy, a 
subject’s perception of another subject can be flawed and thus the empathic act can be 
inaccurate.  For example, I can perceive another person coming late into the conference 
room.  Conscious of the double givenness of that person’s reddening face and my own 
past experience of being embarrassed when tardy, I can empathize with that person in her 
moment of embarrassment.  However, it is possible that my perception of the lateness of 
the other subject and the attendant blush are hastily linked with my experience of being 
embarrassed when late.  It could be that the tardy person is not embarrassed; the 
reddening face might simply indicate the exertion of hurrying to the meeting.  Stein 
allows for this margin of error and posits that meaning clusters, combining physical 
expressions and manifestations of will, help us to differentiate properly between 
embarrassment and exertion.     
Empathy is possible, says Stein, because sensual empathy or a “sensing-in” is part 
of the makeup of the physical body and its members.  Hence, one can “sense-in” in 
another’s hand being caught in a door, for instance, what one would sense in his/her own 
hand being caught, i.e., pain, although the empathizer does not primordially experience 
the capture of a limb or a physical sensation of pain.  Stein posits that this “sensing-in” 
goes beyond understanding through analogy, to a real understanding of the other through 
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the psychophysical self.  Thus, even if an individual has never had the physical 
experience of getting a hand caught in a door, that individual can “sense” the experience 
of pain.  Furthermore, Stein proposes that a person can only empathize with like types, 
i.e., other human beings.  As a psychophysical human being, a person can only truly 
empathize with other human individuals, although a human person can “project” what a 
dog, whose paw is caught in a door, is sensing.58 
Of special importance in regard to Stein’s notion of empathy and her living of the 
ethical life is the flow of knowledge that takes place between self and others.  Knowledge 
of self augmented by knowledge of others and their values enables a person to see his/her 
values more clearly.  Actions are perceived sides of these values.  Echoing a theme 
common in Max Scheler, Stein states:  
By empathy with differently composed personal structures we become 
clear on what we are not, what we are more or less than others.  Thus 
together with self-knowledge, we also have an important aid to self 
evaluation.  Since the experience of value is basic to our own value, at the 
same time as values are acquired by empathy, our own unfamiliar values 
become visible.  When we empathically run into ranges of value closed to 
us, we become conscious of our own deficiency or disvalue.  Every 
comprehension of different persons can become the basis of understanding 
of value.59 
                                                 
58 Stein, Empathy 59. 
 
59 Stein, Empathy 116.  
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While the acquisition of values through empathy will be considered in more detail 
in Chapters Three and Four, an example from Stein’s life illustrates this point.  Prior to 
Stein’s conversion to Catholicism, she and a friend, Pauline Reinach, went sightseeing in 
Frankfurt60 and stepped into the Catholic cathedral.  Stein had been introduced to fellow 
students who professed Christianity and to the Catholic sensibilities expressed by the 
phenomenologist, Max Scheler.  Within the cathedral she experienced a new 
phenomenon that gave her pause: 
We stopped in at the cathedral for a few minutes; and, while we looked 
around in respectful silence, a woman carrying a market basket came in 
and knelt down in one of the pews to pray briefly.  This was something 
entirely new to me.  To the synagogues or to the Protestant churches that I 
had visited, one went only for services.  But here was someone 
interrupting her everyday shopping errands to come into this church, 
although no other person was in it, as though she were here for an intimate 
conversation.  I could never forget that.61 
Through her perception of the praying woman, Stein became aware of what she was not.  
She realized that the woman had a personal relationship with God, a relationship that 
Stein had consciously terminated when she was a young teenager.62  Stein’s own values 
                                                 
60 Pauline Reinach was Adolf Reinach’s sister.  Pauline converted to Catholicism and became a 
Benedictine nun.  Recounting this event on January 7, 1939, when she resumed her writing of Life in a 
Jewish Family after a four-year hiatus, Stein was not sure of the exact date of her trip with Pauline Reinach.  
It was sometime in 1916 or 1917, at least five years before Stein’s baptism as a Catholic.  Stein, Life 401. 
 
61 Stein, Life 401. 
 
62 In 1906, at age fifteen, Stein ceased going to school and spent ten months in Hamburg with her 
sister and brother-in-law, Else and Max Gordon, helping with their small children and with household 
duties.  In her autobiography she writes:  “Deliberately and consciously, I gave up praying here [Hamburg].  
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became more visible through her observation of the praying woman and the self-
examination triggered by that perception.        
Edith Stein’s dissertation, On Empathy, focuses on an examination of the 
constitution of the “I” as a psychophysical individual.  An individual, made up of 
physical Körper and ensouled Leib, has the ability to perceive other human individuals, 
and thus has a better understanding of self in contradistinction to the other.  Moreover, 
the other can be known to the psychophysical individual through experiences of empathy, 
wherein one consciously participates in another’s experience, not primordially, but 
through “in-feeling.”  More than an analogy or a “putting oneself in that person’s shoes,” 
empathy is an intentional act whereby a person allows another person’s experience to 
occupy his/her consciousness.  When a person is in relationship with another by virtue of 
a psychophysical sameness, the experience of the other through empathy serves as a tool 
for self-examination as well as for re-valuing.   
 In her doctoral dissertation, On Empathy, Edith Stein examines the interpersonal 
as well as the intrapersonal aspects of empathy.  She explains that “the ‘same’ 
meaningful experience could transpire within several persons, and that it would resonate 
across all the phenomenal layers inside each person.”63  Stein admits:  “I felt I needed to 
sketch the composition of the human personality in broad strokes.”64  In her next 
philosophical work, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, she sets out to 
explore the role of causality and motivation within the human person in greater depth.  
                                                                                                                                                 
I took no thought of my future although I continued to live with the conviction that I was destined for 
something great.”  Stein, Life 148. 
 
63 See Sawicki’s Introduction in Edith Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, trans. 
Mary Catherine Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki (Washington: ICS, 2000), Sawicki’s Introduction, xiii.  
   
64 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 1. 
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Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 
 Stein’s Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities was originally written as a 
Habilitationsscrift, or a second dissertation, required to gain a teaching position at the 
University of Göttingen, but as already noted, Stein’s academic bid was thwarted.  Stein 
contributed this work to the 1919 Jahrbuch and dedicated it to Husserl for his sixtieth 
birthday, but economic factors prohibited the publication of this Festschrift issue until 
1922.65  Stein’s second dissertation consisted of two treatises, “Sentient Causality” and 
“The Individual and Community.”  In these treatises, Stein refers to the “sensuous-mental 
essence,” an idea she previously explored in her first dissertation, On the Problem of 
Empathy.  By this “sensuous-mental essence,” Stein identifies the human individual as 
psychophysical, comprised of both Körper and Leib, physical body and ensouled 
existence.  In the first treatise, she considers the roles of causality and motivation within a 
sentient (living, responsive) subject with a sensuous-mental essence and leads to the 
second treatise, which investigates the sentient subject’s relation to “super-individual” 
realities, i.e., community.66 
 Noting that the physical world depends on causality for its structure, order, and 
predictability, Stein wondered if causality is the impetus for all that happens within the 
human person as well.  Her background in psychology and philosophy allowed her to 
dismiss causality as the solitary and simple explanation of the actions of human beings, 
however, and she sought to know the foundation for human actions and their meanings.  
She wondered at the interconnection of the phenomenal realms that represented the layers 
                                                 
65 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, Sawicki’s Introduction xx. 
 
66 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 1. 
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of the human being, namely, the physical, sensory, mental, and personal realms.67  How 
is it, for instance, that something physical, a bowl of soup, for example, nourishes the 
body, but in given circumstances, renews the spirit as well?  In her autobiographical 
work, Life in a Jewish Family, Stein gives an example of this “sensuous-mental” 
connection.  Describing her mother, Frau Augusta Stein, Stein writes:  “[E]ven on bitterly 
cold winter days she would come home with hands so warm that with them she could 
take the chill from mine.  This always symbolized for me that all life and warmth in our 
house came from her.”68  Frau Stein’s warm hands convey physical comfort as well as an 
emotional sense of security.  Stein explores this interconnection. 
Drawing from the works of William Stern, Max Scheler, and Edmund Husserl, 
Stein posits that causality and motivation operate together within the sentient subject to 
generate both a sensuous and mental essence.  By the description, “a sentient subject with 
a sensuous-mental essence,” Stein does not refer to “consciousness” but to a broader 
notion.  She explains:  “In this world, alongside material things and living organisms, we 
also encounter human beings and beasts who, apart from what they have in common with 
things and mere organisms, manifest certain peculiarities that they alone display.  The 
totality of those peculiarities is what we call sentience . . .”69  Sawicki notes that this 
“sensuous-mental essence” is Stein’s attempt to mesh two of the opposing paradigms of 
philosophy, empiricism and idealism, into a kind of working agreement.70  David Hume 
(1711-1776) and the empiricists base epistemology, or the theory of how a person comes 
                                                 
67 Sawicki, Editor’s Introduction in Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities xvi. 
 
68 Stein, Life 58-59. 
 
69 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 7.  
 
70 Sawicki, Editor’s Introduction in Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities xi. 
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to know things, on experience.  Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) posits idealism as the 
foundation of epistemology:  a person knows, not exactly how a thing “is” but how it 
“appears,” and this knowledge of the world of appearances depends, not on experience, 
but on the constructs of the mind.71  Following Husserl, Stein combines the experience of 
the real world with the constructs of the mental world, especially consciousness.  
Stein’s notion of “a sentient subject with a sensuous-mental essence” also reflects 
Max Scheler’s thought that the human being is made up of divisions of “phenomenal 
realms”:  the physical (matter), the sensory (sentience, the living, responsive body), the 
mental (unindividuated mind), and the personal (unique personality).72  For Stein, “the 
human body itself is the interface of matter, sentience, and mind,”73 and matter provides 
the threshold by which individuals with sentient and mental characteristics communicate 
and interact with one another.   
Just as the physical world is constituted by causal relationships, Stein proposes 
that sentience, or the living, responsive body, is constituted in “regulated coherences of 
consciousness.”74  This coherence of consciousness is a “stream of consciousness” that is 
made up of experiences that, in turn, are the “stuff” of psychology.  The origin of this 
stream of consciousness, this “one undivided and indivisible continuum,” lies in 
obscurity, says Stein.  But experiences stand out amidst the flow because of their 
“classifications,” or fields, with objects of experience being able to diminish or intensify 
                                                 
71 Sawicki, Editor’s Introduction in Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities xi, 
footnote 4.  
 
72 Sawicki, Editor’s Introduction in Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities xvi.  
 
73 Sawicki, Editor’s Introduction in Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities xv.  
 
74 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 7.  
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within classifications, but unable to transverse classifications.  Thus, in Stein’s example, 
a human person can remember a tone, and that tone may become louder or softer, but the 
tone cannot change into a color.75   This stream of consciousness goes beyond the 
immediate present moment:  it “lives into the future out of the past . . . feels new life 
bursting out of itself every moment . . . and . . . carries the whole trail of bygones with 
itself.”76  Stein calls this stream of consciousness the “I.” 
Stein pushed forward to find “the point within experience at which causality takes 
hold.”77   In order to do this, though, she distinguished between the “pure ego” or “pure I” 
(that point of radiation of pure experiences) and the “the sentient.”  For Stein, the sentient 
is “the bearer of its properties, as a transcendent reality that comes to givenness by 
manifestation in immanent data but never becomes immanent [as data] itself.”78   
Secondly, there is a distinction then between sensate causality and physical causality, 
with physical causality permeating “the entire network of material nature,” while sensate 
causality touches only the sensory parts of the individual.79 
Stein concludes that the sentient is influenced, not merely by sensate causality, 
but by motivation as well.  Motivation she defines as that which “submits the psyche to 
the dominion of reason.”80  Reason propels the individual to communicate and interact 
with other individuals, thus providing the possibility of “community.”  Stein’s work on 
                                                 
75 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 12. 
 
76 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 13.  
 
77 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 19.  
 
78 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 23.  
 
79 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 25. 
 
80 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 116. 
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empathy, the psychophysical person, and motivation will be explored in greater depth in 
Chapters Three and Four. 
 
Stein’s Personal Works 
Life in a Jewish Family 1891-1916  
In 1933, when Hitler became Chancellor of Germany and began promulgating his 
plans for the extinction of the Jewish people, Edith Stein felt compelled to describe 
Jewish life and culture as she experienced it.  Her collection of memoirs, Life in a Jewish 
Family, is phenomenological in the sense that in it she attempts “to give, simply, a 
straightforward account of my own experience of Jewish life as one testimony to be 
placed alongside others . . .  It is intended as information for anyone wishing to pursue an 
unprejudiced study from original sources.”81  In presenting reminiscences of her mother 
and lessons she learned from her, Stein inevitably reveals something of herself; therefore 
these memoirs are valuable in tracing her ethical thought and moral growth.  Stein began 
this work in 1933 after being dismissed from the German Institute for Scientific 
Pedagogy because of her Jewish ancestry; the last entry describes the passing of her 
doctoral exam in 1916.  The chronology of events appended by the translator, Josephine 
Koeppel, fills in significant facts of Stein’s life until her death in Auschwitz on August 9, 
1942.     
 
Self Portrait in Letters, 1916-1942 
The personal correspondence of Edith Stein to friends, family, and colleagues, 
found in the posthumously published Self Portrait in Letters, 1916-1942, complements 
                                                 
81 Stein, Life 24. 
33 
 
 
Life in a Jewish Family and discloses a side of Stein not revealed in her memoirs nor in 
her philosophical works.  Collated by the Carmelite Sisters after her death, these letters 
point to the importance Stein placed on relationships and on maintaining that sense of 
“connectedness” that seems to be her hallmark.  The reader can sense the tension between 
Stein’s need to remain faithful to her own gifts of grace and vocation while fulfilling her 
responsibilities to others, as her own plight and that of the Jewish people became 
increasingly clear.  The themes of gradual growth, relationship, responsibility, 
connectedness to the physical world and “other worldliness” recur consistently in Stein’s 
messages.       
The letters written by Stein attest to her dedication to family members, friends, 
and colleagues and indicate her serious commitment to fostering and sustaining her 
relationships.  The uncharacteristic pronouncement in her words, “one may not sever the 
connection with the world,”82 indicates the gravity and reverence with which Stein 
considered her relationships.  While Stein’s words, “Come, we are going for our people” 
— spoken to her sister while they were being led away by the SS officers — are often 
interpreted pejoratively as expressing Stein’s condescending wish to “save” the Jewish 
people, Stein’s many written words — especially those found in her letters — reveal her 
solidarity with all peoples of the world, not only with those of Jewish descent.83     
Essays on Woman   
                                                 
82 Emphasis mine. 
 
83 Jan H. Nota, a Jesuit priest who knew Edith Stein, refuted the discounting of Stein’s words 
because they were reported by a woman.  He reported:  “It was said that only one woman in Echt heard 
these words [“Come, we are going for our people”] and [it was said] the testimony of a woman is 
unreliable.  I myself knew this woman, Maria Delsing, well.  She was a friend to the Carmel in Echt and to 
Edith Stein.  Sr. Stanislaus of the Carmel of Echt told me that she, too, heard Edith Stein speak these last 
words on leaving the monastery.”  See “Edith Stein:  Sign of Contradiction, Sign of Reconciliation,” in 
Waltraud Herbstrith, ed., Never Forget 122. 
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As a teacher of young women at the Dominican teacher-training school, St. 
Magdalena’s in Speyer, and as a lecturer for the German Institute for Scientific Pedagogy 
at Münster, Edith Stein addressed women, especially in their educational needs.  Stein’s 
public addresses to women during the period of 1927-1933 are published in a volume 
called, Essays on Woman.  In this collection, Essays on Woman, Stein uses the 
phenomenological approach to describe the “essence” of woman by reflecting on 
woman’s many “sides.”  Of particular importance for an investigation of Stein’s ethic are 
these essays:  “The Ethos of Women’s Professions,” “The Separate Vocations of Man 
and Woman According to Nature and Grace,” “Problems of Women’s Education,” and 
“The Significance of Women’s Intrinsic Value in National Life.”  While these essays 
initially address the need for better developed educational programs for women and seem 
to follow a traditional Catholic understanding of woman as different from but equal to 
man, there is evidence of Stein’s ethic of relationship and responsibility.  Furthermore, 
Stein seems to be using these particular essays as a vehicle to respond to some of the 
Nazi propaganda being spread at the time, especially regarding the role of women in the 
household, in society, and in the Vaterland. 
One example of the growing opposition women faced as the Nazis came to power 
was the presence of women in academic circles.  Historian Jacques R. Pauwels, in his 
work, Women, Nazis, and Universities, reports that after World War I, women made 
measurable advances in academic areas: 
In the years after the First World War, women had made impressive 
inroads into the area of the academic professions.  As of July 11, 1922, for 
instance, women were admitted to the practice of law throughout the 
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Reich, and the number of female lawyers quintupled between 1925 and 
1933.  Women flocked to the teaching profession, mainly at the level of 
elementary and secondary schools but also at the universities; the first 
female university lecturer made her appearance in Munich in 1919, and a 
woman earned an appointment as full professor for the first time in 1923.  
The number of women physicians mushroomed, rising from 195 in 1907 
to 2,572 in 1925 and 4,395 in 1933.  Comparable gains were made in 
dentistry.84 
Initially, Hitler and early National Socialist policies opposed the academic advancement 
of women because universities were overcrowded, the unemployment rate among men 
was high, and the birth rate in Germany was at an all-time low.  Programs and 
propaganda promoting church, children, and household chores were aimed at keeping 
women in more traditional roles. 
 Aware of the Nazi glorification of woman as wife and mother, Edith Stein in her 
speeches and classes for Catholic women from 1927 to 1933, also stressed marriage and 
motherhood — but for different reasons.  A Catholic at this time, Stein saw the natural 
vocation of woman as “companion,” different from but equal to man.  Man and woman, 
thought Stein, were given a three-fold vocation by God: to be image of God, to bring 
forth posterity, and to be stewards of the earth.85  The fulfillment of this goal would be 
brought about by mutual help, respect, and use of one’s natural gifts.  In the essay, 
                                                 
84 Jacques R. Pauwels, Women, Nazis, and Universities:  Female University Students in the Third 
Reich, 1933-1945.  (Westport:  Greenwood Press, 1984) 18. 
  
85 Edith Stein, “The Separate Vocations of Man and Woman According to Nature and Grace,” 
Essays on Woman, trans. Freda Mary Oben, (Washington: ICS, 1996) 61. 
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“Problems of Women’s Education,” written in 1932 at Münster, Stein addresses the Nazi 
idea of woman and the attempt to strip women of the academic advancements already 
made. She writes: 
The actual question which concerns us now is what we think about women 
in contemporary society.  Here as elsewhere we find vacillation or either a 
duality or much divisiveness.  There is still a multitude of thoughtless 
people satisfied with hackneyed expressions concerning the weaker sex or 
even the fair sex. . . .  They do this without ever reflecting more 
profoundly on the nature of the working woman or trying to become 
familiar with already existing feminine achievements. . . .  Curiously, this 
romantic view is connected to that brutal attitude which considers woman 
merely from the biological point of view; indeed, this is the attitude which 
characterizes the political group now in power.  Gains won during the last 
decades are being wiped out because of this romanticist ideology, the use 
of women to bear babies of Aryan stock, and the present economic 
situation.  The woman is being confined to housework and to family.  In 
doing so, the spiritual nature of woman is as little considered as the 
principles of her historical development.86      
Stein’s Essays on Woman show her ability to join philosophical reflection, theological 
belief, and educational expertise with political commentary on the ideology and practices 
of her time.  
 
 
                                                 
86 Stein, “Problems of Women’s Education,” Essays 157. 
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Translations of and Literature about Stein’s Philosophical Works 
Transcripts of Edith Stein’s works, her personal correspondence, and artifacts 
have been collected and archived over the years due greatly to the efforts of Sister 
Teresia Renata Posselt, OCD; Sister Maria Amata, OCD; Sister Waltraud Herbstrith, 
OCD; Dr. Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz; and the Carmelite Sisters of the Cologne 
Carmel in Germany.  The Archivum Carmelitanum Edith Stein in Belgium once housed 
the academic works of Stein that were published under the editorship of Dr. Lucy Gelber; 
Romaeus Leuven, OCD; and Michael Linssen, OCD.   This collection has been moved to 
the Carmelite Carmel in Würzburg, Germany, where, in conjunction with Verlag Herder, 
Edith Steins Werke continues to be studied and published.  The Institute of Carmelite 
Studies in the United States continues to promote the translation of Stein’s writings into 
English and publishes these translated works.   
Sister Mary Catherine Baseheart, SCN, an American pioneer in Steinian research 
and founder of the Edith Stein Center for Study and Research at Spalding University, 
Louisville, Kentucky, was one of the first translators of Stein’s works into English.87 
Baseheart’s doctoral dissertation analyzed Stein’s attempt to link the phenomenology of 
Husserl with the scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas.88 
 Sister Josephine Koeppel, Susanne Batzdorff, Mary Freda Oben, and Marianne 
Sawicki have also contributed to the English translation of Stein’s works from the 
                                                 
87 Mary Catherine Baseheart, SCN, “The Encounter of Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. 
Thomas in Selected Writings of Edith Stein,” diss., U of Notre Dame, 1960. 
 
88  For Edmund Husserl’s seventieth birthday, Stein wrote and imagined dialogue between Husserl and 
Thomas Aquinas.  When she submitted it to Martin Heidegger for the Festschrift Edmund Husserl issue of 
the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung, he suggested that she revise the format.  
Both versions, “What is philosophy?—A Conversation between Edmund Husserl and Thomas Aquinas: 
and “An Attempt to Contrast Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas” are 
found in Edith Stein, Knowledge and Faith, trans. Walter Redmond, (Washington: ICS, 2000). 
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German.  Carmelite scholar, Sister Josephine Koeppel, a native of Switzerland and 
master of the nuances of the German language (her first language), brings added depth 
and understanding to Stein’s writings, especially through her detailed notes.  Koeppel’s 
translations of Life in a Jewish Family, Self-Portrait in Letters, and The Science of the 
Cross have informed much research to date on Stein.  Carmelite Fathers Kieran 
Kavanaugh,89 John Sullivan, and Steven Payne presently write about, lecture on, publish, 
and promote the works of Stein.90  Susanne Batzdorff,91 niece of Stein, has been 
especially helpful in preserving the integrity of Stein’s life and work through her 
translations, writings, and lectures, as well as through her advice to researchers interested 
in the legacy of her aunt.  Grandniece, Waltraud Stein, translated Edith Stein’s doctoral 
dissertation, On the Problem of Empathy, into English.  Freda Mary Oben’s doctoral 
dissertation was published in 1979 as the English translation of Stein’s Essays on 
Woman.92   In 1982, Augusta Spiegelman Gooch completed a translation of Stein’s work, 
Finite and Eternal Being, for her dissertation,93 and Kurt F. Reinhardt’s translation of the 
same text was published in 2002.94  Sarah Borden relied on her own translation as she, 
                                                 
89 Sister Josephine Koeppel notes that Father Kavanaugh’s Introduction in The Science of the 
Cross adds new dimension to Steinian research as Kavanaugh, an authority on St. John of the Cross, 
explains the value of Stein’s work on St. John of the Cross. 
 
90 Fathers Kavanaugh, Sullivan, and Payne work with and have been past editors for The Institute 
of Carmelite Studies in Washington, DC.  
 
91 Susanne M. Batzdorff, Edith Stein:  Selected Writings With Comments, Reminiscences and 
Translations of her Prayers and Poems by her niece.  (Springfield:  Templegate, 1990). 
  
92 Mary Freda Oben, “An Annotated Edition of Edith Stein’s Papers on Woman,” diss., Catholic U 
of A, 1979. 
  
93 Augusta Spiegelman Gooch, “Metaphysical Ordination:  Reflections on Edith Stein’s Endliches 
und Ewiges Sein,” diss., U of Dallas, 1982. 
  
94 Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, trans. Kurt F. Reinhardt, (Washington:  ICS, 2002). 
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too, wrote her dissertation on Finite and Eternal Being.95  Borden’s book, Edith Stein,96 
offers one of the most lucid and comprehensive overviews of Stein’s life and works to 
date. 
Stein was always attracted by the idea of “truth,” and Chantal Beauvais made this 
the focus of her dissertation, “Le Concept Steinien de Verité Transcendantale.”97  Sister 
M. Regina van den Berg and June Verbillion have also contributed to the growing store 
of literature on Stein, with van der Berg elucidating Stein’s ideas on community98 and 
Verbillion analyzing Stein’s theories of education.99  Stein’s work has been included in a 
textbook for educators, Ethics of Educational Leadership; her thoughts on the education 
of women are found in the chapter, “The Issue of Gender and Educational Leadership.”100  
Alonso Alfredo Vargas’ dissertation, “The Application and Validity of the 
Phenomenological Method in Several Areas of Reality in the Thought of Edith Stein,”101 
clarifies Stein’s thoughts on and adherence to the phenomenological approach to 
philosophy.  Antonio Calcagno examines the influence that Martin Heidegger and Edith 
                                                 
95 Sarah Ruth Borden, “An Issue in Edith Stein’s Philosophy of the Person:  The Relation of 
Individual and Universal Form in Endliches und Ewiges Sein,”  diss., Fordham U, 2001. 
  
96 Sarah Borden, Edith Stein (New York:  Continuum, 2003). 
 
97 Chantal Beauvais, “Le Concept Steinien de Verite Transcendantale,” diss., U of Ottawa, 2000.  
               
98 M. Regina van den Berg, “Community in the Thought of Edith Stein,” diss., Catholic U of A, 
2000. 
 
99 June M. Verbillion, “Critical Analysis of the Educational Theories of Edith Stein,” diss., Loyola 
U of Chicago, 1960. 
 
100 Ronald W. Rebore and Debra A. Stolenwerke, eds.  Ethics of Educational Leadership.  (Upper 
Saddle River:  Prentice Hall, 2000). 
 
101 Alonso Alfredo Vargas, “The Application and Validity of the Phenomenological Method in 
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Stein had on each other, especially regarding ontological questions;102 Calcagno has also 
written on Edith Stein’s political philosophy.103   
Steinian scholar Angela Ales Bello has lectured in the United States and Europe 
and continues to contribute to Steinian research.104  Bello considers the important role 
that empathy plays in Stein’s notion of community, a topic that she thinks came naturally 
and was a motif of Stein’s: “In the research interests of young Stein, the concern for the 
human world was already apparent in her openness to the comprehension of the other and 
her attention to the role of the community, attitudes that she would later consider inherent 
to the feminine aspect of the human, even while not referring specifically to herself.”105  
While noting the evident influence of Husserl and Scheler, Bello emphasizes the positive 
and original contributions Stein made, namely, her regard of the human individual as a 
psychophysical being, capable of interaction on a physical plane, but more importantly, 
able to converse on a psychic or spiritual plane, as well. 
 Bello explains how Stein makes the transition from empathy to intersubjective 
relationships and then to the larger world-view of solidarity.  First, empathy for Stein is a 
sui generis act that is unlike any other human action.  By this act of empathy, the 
psychophysical person is aware of another psychophysical being who is undergoing an 
                                                 
102 Antonio Calcagno, “Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger on the Question of Being,” American 
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103 Antonio Calcagno, “Persona Politica:  Unity and Difference in Edith’s Stein’s Political 
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experience.  This initial act of empathy can be the basis for other attendant acts such as 
association, sympathy, or analogy, but empathy remains sui generis, of its own kind, and 
must remain so, if the empathic person is to maintain his/her individuality.  Bello 
explains:   
When someone I see or meet feels joy or sorrow, I can understand what 
the person feels.  Certainly, I cannot feel the person’s joy or sorrow; I can, 
however, have a lived experience, an Erlebnis, of either emotion.  I am 
aware that I am not experiencing the emotion personally — and that it is, 
therefore, not an “originary” experience — yet what is originary for me is 
the feeling that the person is experiencing that emotion.106 
Empathy, therefore, allows a psychophysical being to meet another psychophysical being 
beyond mere physical boundaries, as a physical, concrete experience serves as the 
impetus for a psychic or spiritual meeting.  Thus, a person sees a grief-stricken mother 
and notes the physical pain etched in her face, hears her sobs, etc., but the onlooker 
experiences the woman’s pain on a psychic level through the act of empathy.  Empathy 
may be triggered by the physical encounter but only begins when the empathizer 
consciously acknowledges his/her separateness and “wills” to “understand” the woman’s 
grief.  Empathy, an act that confirms personal identity and the alterity of the other, is 
motivated by the will and results in some concrete action, either positive or negative.  
This action, in turn, is perceived and understood by the other, with the possibility of the 
founding, or the destruction, of community.  For example, the onlooker may be affected 
by the mother’s pain and move to console her in an embrace.  If the action is perceived 
and accepted as genuinely solicitous, then an understanding between the individuals is 
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“struck” and the possibility of community is created.  Conversely, the onlooker can 
perceive the woman’s crying as weakness and remain unmoved physically and 
emotionally; the possibility of a mutual understanding, the forging of a communal bond, 
is ignored.   
Research on Stein as a teacher of young women, a lecturer on the essence of 
woman, and a promoter of the advancement of women through more appropriate 
educational programs, is growing and adds to the consideration of Stein as a contributor 
to feminist studies.  Judy Miles, Jane Kelly Rodeheffer, Sister Mary Anselm Madden, 
Sister Mary Catherine Baseheart, and Linda L. McAlister have all dealt with Stein’s 
analysis of woman and have contributed to women’s studies.  Miles’ dissertation, 
“Simone de Beauvoir and Edith Stein:  A Philosophical Analysis of Feminism,”107 
compares both philosophers while contributing to an understanding of Stein’s concept of 
the essence of woman.  In her lectures to women, Stein stressed the importance of 
physical and spiritual motherhood, and Rodeheffer explores this theme in her article, “On 
Spiritual Maternity:  Edith Stein, Aristotle and the Nature of Woman.”108  Madden 
compares Stein’s educational views with Augustinian themes109 and considers Stein’s 
inclusion of the importance of divine grace in education as a continuation of Saint 
Augustine’s (354-430) approach.  Baseheart associates Stein’s early interest in feminism 
with her ongoing commitment to the improvement of women’s education in her article, 
“Edith Stein’s Philosophy of Woman and of Women’s Education,” published in Linda 
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Lopez McAlister’s Hypatia’s Daughters:  Fifteen Hundred Years of Women 
Philosophers.110   In her own article, “Edith Stein:  Essential Differences,”111 McAlister 
encourages feminists to reconsider Stein’s idea that women are equal and different from 
men, not as a denial of equality, but an allowance of individual differences.    
   On the subject of empathy, Edwin E. Gantt’s doctoral dissertation, “Struggling 
to Empathize:  A Theoretical Reflection on the Meaning of Human Empathy,”112 makes 
use of Stein’s dissertation, as does Debra Lynn Pughe’s “The Space Between Us:  
Empathy and Understanding.”113  In his master’s thesis, “Versions of Empathy:  
Comparing the Intersubjectivities of Edith Stein and Jean-Paul Sartre,”114 Brian Glen 
Barnes traces Stein’s and Sartre’s differences on intersubjectivity to their varying 
interpretations of Husserl’s idea of the human subject.  Barnes proposes that Stein’s 
version of empathy forms a greater basis for social associations than does Sartre’s since 
Stein allows for the “subject’s” recognition of another person as “subject.”  Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s “subject” sees the other person only as “object,” and Barnes concludes that this 
objectification of the other by Sartre makes social associations impossible.  In 
juxtaposing Stein and Sartre’s theory of “the other,” Barnes highlights Stein’s connection 
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between empathy and the creation of a sense of community, a notion that is germane to a 
discussion of Stein’s sense of relationship and responsibility.   
Stein’s work on empathy has also been appropriated in areas of the medical field, 
such as clinical medicine and physical therapy.  In the article, “The Role of Empathy in 
Clinical Practice,” S. Kay Toombs applies Stein’s understanding of empathy to clinical 
medicine, with the hope that physicians will better appreciate and understand patients’ 
self-expression of their problems.  Toombs posits that there is an important correlation 
between empathic understanding and “first-person reports of bodily disorder.”115  Carol 
Marjorie Davis also employs Stein’s ideas in a clinical setting within her dissertation, “A 
Phenomenological Description of Empathy as it Occurs within Physical Therapists for 
their Patients.”116  
Michael Andrews, Kathleen Haney, and Mette Lebech have done the most 
research to date on Edith Stein’s ethic, and their work is especially helpful in showing the 
link between empathy, an understanding of the other, and the ethical relationship 
involved.  In his dissertation,117 Michael Andrews creates an ethical dialogue between 
Husserl’s earlier student, Edith Stein, and his student later in life, Emmanuel Levinas.  
Within Stein’s philosophical works, especially her work on empathy, Andrews detects a 
modification of Husserl’s epistemology that, he asserts, prefigures Levinas’ notion of 
“the other.”  Andrews suggests that epistemology and ethics “co-constitute” the 
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experience of empathy, but that they also testify to the impossibility of knowing the 
“other.”  Andrews posits that it is impossible to understand another human being since 
another person is beyond the limits of comprehension and deserves the autonomy of 
being “self.”118   While the present research project focusing on Stein’s personal living of 
the ethical life and her plan for doing so is different from Andrews’ comparison of Stein 
and Levinas along epistemological and ethical lines, Andrews’ research is enlightening 
and challenging.    
Present day Husserlian and Steinian scholar, Kathleen Haney119 emphasizes 
Stein’s identification of empathy as “a unique faculty of perceptual intuition” that is sui 
generis, i.e., of its own kind, enabling the conscious subject to “read” others via observed 
behaviors.  It is this empathic attention to another person’s gestures, tone, and silences, 
for example, which enables the subject to identify with another individual, who is not 
understood as “identical self” but is understood, to varying degrees, nonetheless.  Haney 
agrees with and reiterates Stein’s claim that empathy is not an understanding of another 
based on analogy since this would strip the other of personhood and would render 
empathy as an exercise in self-projection.  Haney writes:  “I may know myself, but to 
presume an other like me is to beg the question of knowing the other, since the other 
person imagined in this fashion is not really other but merely subject to the same 
motivations and interpretations as I am.”120 
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In addition to being sui generis, empathy is different from and performs a 
different function than the traditional five senses.  Empathy holds out the possibility of 
understanding the other by way of a bond, a relationship.  Haney describes how empathy 
can form this human bond:  “Empathy does not reveal the brute otherness of the other; 
rather, it overcomes the separation between subjects.”121  Moreover, when empathy is 
met with a reciprocal empathic response, Haney posits that there is a “mutual overlap of 
meanings.”  She writes:  “The members of the pair find themselves overtaken by a shared 
world in which they can dwell in the space of things against the mutual horizon extending 
now to the others of the other and their spaces and meanings.”122  Believing this empathic 
understanding that opens up new horizons of meaning is the basis of ethical life, Haney 
concludes:  “Empathic experience, and the rational sympathy derived from it, represent 
ethical value and moral responsibility since we are each one among others in the world 
we share with others.”123 
In her work involving human dignity, Mette Lebech124 agrees with Stein’s 
acceptance of Scheler’s emotive a priorism in which he posits that a human being feels 
values before he cognizes them.  Lebech suggests that Stein’s concept of empathy, 
whereby a person can “feel with” and understand another person’s experience, supports 
the recognition of a dignity that is uniquely human in self and others.  The question of 
whether values are preferred or constituted is not answered by Lebech but she contends 
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that the “value of human dignity stand[s] out as among the highest of the values, or as the 
highest”125 because it fulfills and even exceeds Scheler’s five criteria which comprise the 
hierarchy of values:  durability, divisibility, foundation, depth of satisfaction, and 
relativity.126  Lebech’s work supports my search for Stein’s ethic; however, Lebech views 
an ethic founded on human dignity while I posit that Stein’s ethic is founded on a human 
being’s sharing of pure essence, or soul.  In Chapter Three I will propose that Stein’s 
ethic, founded on this sharing of pure essence or soul, binds a person’s psychophysical 
being together and also binds that person inextricably to God, the source of pure essence, 
and to other persons who are sharers in this essence.   
  In her published doctoral dissertation, Body, Text and Science:  The Literacy of 
Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein, Marianne Sawicki 
contributes to an understanding of Edith Stein’s philosophy in a three-fold way.  First, 
Sawicki gives a detailed, historical description of the advent of phenomenology from 
Munich to Göttingen, from Husserl to Stein.  Secondly, she delineates Stein’s writings, 
especially her dissertation On the Problem of Empathy, in the light of the 
phenomenological movement and with a strict eye to what Stein gleans from other 
philosophers, and what she contributes, usually anonymously, to the common fund.  Stein 
is indebted, for instance, to Husserl and Scheler, but Stein, who worked as Husserl’s 
assistant in collating his works, receives credit only rarely.  Finally, Sawicki contributes 
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to Steinian research by her hermeneutical explanation of Stein as author in three distinct 
but related periods of her life.   
Sawicki classifies Stein’s written works as anonymous, autographed, and 
autobiographical.  Among Stein’s anonymous works are her editorial efforts for Husserl, 
Reinach, and others.  Stein’s autographed works are personally signed and include her 
philosophical and theological writings.  Stein’s autobiographical works reveal her 
identity via “types” and include her Life, Letters, and Essays.127  Sawicki explains Stein’s 
use of empathy in her writings:  “The authoring i, laying out a path of thinking, offers 
itself as the guide for readers to follow — even the vehicle for readers to ride —along 
that path.”128  Noting, too, that “Stein elicits affection and an uncanny sense of rapport” 
with casual readers and serious researchers alike, Sawicki cautions that this “infectious 
rapport” is created through Stein’s intentional use of “type” (the sharing of social 
stereotypes between author and readers, thereby portraying herself as the “right kind” of 
German, Jew, educated woman, etc. to the reader).129  Sawicki posits that this rapport can 
lead the reader into two misguided assumptions:  1) that to know Stein’s life is to know 
her philosophy, and 2) that Stein’s philosophy is “authoritative and beyond question.”130   
Regarding Stein’s autobiographical works, Sawicki further explains how Stein 
acts as a “guiding author,” bringing readers of her Life, Letters, and Essays into her 
empathic “flow” and leading them through expositions to conclusions.  Sawicki writes: 
“She is not writing about herself, but she is exhibiting the flow of her own thinking.  She 
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offers her own reasoning as a map for the coherent flow of thought.  The authorial i 
blazes the trail, and the reading i follows.  The reader is thus afforded a live experience of 
reaching the conclusions that the author has first reached.”131 
Sawicki, in arranging Stein’s literary work, indicates a direction for future 
research:  “[M]y [Sawicki’s] intention is to argue that this way of arranging Stein’s 
literary works will enable a very fruitful scholarly appreciation of her contributions to 
philosophy and to theology.  It is beyond the scope of my study, however, actually to 
carry out that interpretive work here.  I merely suggest a beginning.”132  Cognizant of 
Sawicki’s reading of Stein, then, and mindful of the pitfalls of Stein’s “infectious 
rapport” that can handcuff researchers to autobiography and can blind them to Stein’s 
errors, I use the autobiographical writings as a tool in deciphering Stein’s manner of 
living the ethical life.  My intent is to follow the “blazing, authorial Stein,”133 not so as to 
imitate her actions, but rather to ascertain how she achieved a coherence of her thoughts 
and beliefs with her actions. 
 
SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY  
This dissertation, “Edith Stein:  Toward an Ethic of Relationship and 
Responsibility,” is a qualitative study that combines a phenomenological, a biographical, 
and a hermeneutical approach.  These collective approaches help in ascertaining the 
essence of Stein’s ethical method and the application of that method in her lived 
experience. 
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A phenomenological approach seeks the essence of a phenomenon by “relying on 
intuition, imagination, and universal structures to obtain a picture of the experience.”134  
The phenomenon that initiated this study is that of Stein comforting a child in the 
concentration camp, an action that seemingly indicates an essential structure — Stein’s 
ethical stance in the life world.  Hence, the central question of this study is:  What was 
Stein’s manner of living ethically? 
Asking “how” Stein lived an ethical life leads to a search for a “structure” or an 
“ethic,” a coherent plan by which Stein navigated life.  Attention to Stein’s philosophical 
works, specifically On the Problem of Empathy and Philosophy of Psychology and the 
Humanities, facilitates the search for the “essence” of Stein’s ethical structure. The 
analysis of Stein’s concepts of empathy and the human person will necessarily include a 
study of the influence of Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, who contributed 
significantly to Stein’s own use of the phenomenological method (Husserl) and her 
analysis of the human person (Scheler).   
  This study is biographical in that the search for the essence of Stein’s manner of 
living an ethical life involves information gleaned from her personal writings. In a 
biographical study, life documents are used to “describe turning points in an individual’s 
life.”135  In this study, Stein’s memoirs, letters, and her account of her entrance into 
Carmel are used to show how she herself perceived certain phenomena in her life. 
Biographical episodes help in describing the essence of Stein’s ethic and in distinguishing 
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key components of her phenomenological method to action, namely, consciousness of a 
relationship with “the other” psychophysical individual and an attendant responsibility. 
  As phenomenological and biographical approaches necessarily lead to some 
interpretation on the part of the researcher, this study also incorporates a hermeneutical 
approach.  This hermeneutical approach implements a straightforward presentation of 
persons, places, and things mentioned in Stein’s autobiographical writings that gives 
evidence of her development of an ethic.  While the focus on certain selections from 
Stein’s autobiographical works is subjective and reflects my interaction as a reader with 
the “authorial” Stein, every effort is made to let the experiences of Stein’s life “speak for 
themselves” as she reveals them through her own words.     
Thus, Stein’s On The Problem of Empathy, Philosophy of Psychology and the 
Humanities, Life in a Jewish Family, Self-Portrait in Letters, and Essays On Woman will 
provide the groundwork for this phenomenological, biographical, and hermeneutical 
study.  Information gleaned from Claudia Koonz’s Mothers in the Fatherland:  Women, 
the Family and Nazi Politics136 will shed some perspective on Stein’s comments to 
women.  Stein’s comments and actions support the theory that Stein addressed problems 
of the contemporary world, thereby giving evidence of living an ethical life in the 
twentieth century. 
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LIMITATIONS FOUND IN THE STUDY 
     Two problems present themselves in this study:  the definition of the term 
“ethic” and the reliance on autobiographical sources.  First, “ethic” is defined through 
Stein’s own writings, as a matching of internal thoughts, intentions, and beliefs with 
external actions.  This “matching” presumes self-examination, self-knowledge, and effort 
because, according to Stein, human nature left to its own devices can become unruly or 
remain untapped.  Stein proposes that the most effective unfolding of the person’s natural 
gifts takes place when nature is blended with divine grace.  In her brief biography of the 
life of Saint Elizabeth of the Trinity,137 Stein explains this unfolding and blending of 
nature and grace: 
Those who avow an “unspoiled human nature” assume that people possess 
a molding power operating from the inside undisturbed by the push and 
pull of external influence, shaping people and their lives into harmonious, 
fully formed creatures.  But experience does not substantiate this lovely 
belief.  The form is indeed hidden within, but trapped in many webs that 
prevent its pure realization.  People who abandon themselves to their 
nature soon find themselves driven to and fro by it and do not arrive at a 
clear formation or organization.  And formlessness is not naturalness.  
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Now people who take control of their own nature, curtailing rampant 
impulses, and seeking to give them the form that appears good to them, 
perhaps a ready made form from outside, can possibly now and again give 
the inner form room to develop freely.  But it can also happen that they do 
violence to the inner form and that, instead of nature freely unfolded, the 
unnatural and artificial appears.  . . .  [T]his inner shaping power that is in 
bondage strains toward a light that will guide more surely, and a power 
that will free it and give it space.  This is the light and power of divine 
grace.138 
While this definition of ethic as a matching of internal thought, intention, and 
belief with external action may seem vague, it reflects the recurring influence of Thomas 
Aquinas and Max Scheler in Stein’s writings.  Aquinas posits that the soul is the life 
force or formative power of the body.139  Reminiscent of Aquinas, Stein proposes “an 
inner shaping power”140 in the psychophysical person.  Scheler’s theory of hierarchical 
values incorporates a striving among human beings for unity and fulfillment seen in a 
progression from lesser to higher values.  Scheler expresses this idea in Formalism in 
Ethics when he writes: 
We expect an ethics first of all to furnish us with an explicit determination 
of “higher” and “lower” in the order of values, a determination that is 
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itself based on the contents of the essences of values — insofar as this 
order is understood to be independent of all possible positive systems of 
goods and purposes.141 
As will be shown in the following chapter, Stein had concrete experience of what Scheler 
calls “bearers of value”142 or persons who exemplify the hierarchy of values.   
 Kurt Reinhardt, a translator of Stein’s Finite and Eternal Being, agrees with this 
definition of ethics.  In the Preface to his work, A Realistic Philosophy, Reinhardt 
stresses the need to synthesize theory and practice as he states:   
The philosopher as we envisage him [in these pages] must be able to 
demonstrate that philosophy is a theoretical science (theoria) which is 
rewarding in a dual sense:  it is a pursuit of knowledge and wisdom as 
ends in themselves; and it is simultaneously a theoria which is pregnant 
with practical consequences of vital concern to each and all.  Any 
philosophical response contains implicitly certain directions for specific 
courses of individual and social behavior, and impulses affecting the 
future course of human civilization.143 
Thus, while not corresponding to traditional definitions, describing an “ethic” as a 
matching of inner thoughts, intentions, and beliefs with external actions rings true to 
Stein’s understanding of ethic. 
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 This definition of a matching of internal thoughts and beliefs also presumes a 
movement directed by the search for truth.144  A person is capable of having bad thoughts 
and trying to match his thoughts with harmful actions.  The definition of truth in this 
study will rely on the search for truth calling forth good thoughts and subsequently good 
actions.  While it is recognized that bad thoughts engender bad actions, the definition as it 
is used in this study, moves towards truth.   
In essence this study asks:  How did Stein’s thought and beliefs inform her 
actions?  Since Stein never formally published an ethical system as did Kant and Hegel, it 
was clear to me that the appropriate question to ask was:  “How did Stein live the ethical 
life?”  The project is limited, therefore, to a study of Stein’s life and the manner in which 
she lived.  Her background as a philosopher and a religious informed her living of the 
ethical life, and this focus leads to the second limitation in method:  a reliance on 
autobiographical sources.   
This biographical study uses Stein’s autobiographical works as resources for 
ascertaining her manner of living.  As a phenomenological study, it seeks the essence of 
Stein’s ethical life by describing her self-reflective life, and as a hermeneutical study, it 
relies on a subjective interpretation of information.  The study is thus limited in that it is 
doubly subjective: it relies on Stein’s words about herself, which may be skewed, as well 
as on my choice of particular episodes in Stein’s life to the exclusion of others.   
Regarding the first subjective limitation, Stein’s words about herself, Marianne 
Sawicki posits that Stein’s autobiographical works deliberately draw the reader in by her 
use of “type”:   
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I [Sawicki] suggest that rapport with Edith Stein is engineered through the 
skillful use of “type” as a hermeneutic device.  Type is the means of 
production of rapport . . . .  Stein’s autobiography — as a self-conscious 
work of self defense against the racist policies of National Socialism —
deliberately constructed her “self” as a cultured middle-class German Jew, 
adamantly portraying “the right kind of Jews” to be “the right kind of 
Germans.”  Stein derived the notion of “type” from Dilthey, and in her 
dissertation she accorded to it a key function in human communication.  
Like Dilthey, she believed that the individual “genius” served as the 
paradigm of his age and revealed its identity.  She also believed that 
understanding and learning could occur only between persons of “the 
same type.”  “Type” is a pernicious notion when it usurps the category of 
humanity and demotes people of “other types” to subhuman status.145   
I do not find Stein demeaning people in this way.  Rather, Stein uses types, as do other 
writers, in a more general way, in order to draw distinctions.  Types can be used in a 
beneficial way, and it is in this manner that I think Stein employs them.  For instance, her 
work on the differences between man and woman “types” woman as geared toward the 
living and the personal while man is “typed” as preferring the abstract and impersonal.146  
While these seem narrow boxes within which to place man and woman, Stein 
characterizes in order to distinguish assets and needs.  In a lecture given to the 
Association of Catholic Academics in 1930, Stein questions the topic about which she is 
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asked to speak:  “The Ethos of Woman’s Professions.”  Stein queries:  “What need was 
there for a special category of women’s professions?  Besides, why are there such 
frequent discussions on women’s professions but hardly any on men’s professions?”147  
Stein ends her lecture by promoting a synthesis of qualities.  She states: 
I believe that it would be very worthwhile if at some time these questions 
would be considered seriously and thoroughly.  For a wholesome 
collaboration of the sexes in the professional life will be possible only if 
both achieve a calm and objective awareness of their nature and draw 
practical conclusions from it.  God created humanity as man and woman, 
and He created both according to His own image.  Only the purely 
developed masculine and feminine nature can yield the highest attainable 
likeness to God.  Only in this fashion can there be brought about the 
strongest interpenetration of all earthly and divine life.148 
In Chapter Three we will see how Stein’s understanding of creation contributes to this 
vision of men and women as companions who learn from one another.  Sawicki’s strict 
understanding of “types” neglects, I think, Stein’s confidence in every human being’s 
ability to contribute to a cosmic community wherein people, sharing their gifts, contribute 
to a redeemed order.   
Stein also attests to the ability of humans to move beyond types.  In the previously 
mentioned essay, “The Ethos of Women’s Professions,” Stein states:  “Only subjective 
delusion could deny that women are capable of practicing vocations other than that of 
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spouse and mother.  The experience of the last decades [1910-1920, specifically] and, for 
that matter, the experience of all times has demonstrated this.”149  Philosopher Janet E. 
Smith agrees with Stein’s positive use of typing.  Smith cites Stein’s insistence, while at 
the Pedagogical Institute in Münster that educational instruction needed to be better 
suited to woman’s unique nature:  Stein used “type” to design this alternate curriculum.  
Smith explains: 
Many who pick up Stein’s writings on women may be initially shocked by 
her generalizations about males and females.  Our age doesn’t much like 
generalizations for it generally thinks that generalizations are unjust!  We 
don’t like racial or ethnic or sexual “profiling.”  Yet an antipathy to 
generalizations also jeopardizes our ability to use our critical faculties.  It 
is difficult to make the distinctions we need to make about reality, it is 
impossible to identify the unique and unusual, unless we have the typical 
and usual against which to make our comparisons or judgments.  We 
should reject stereotypes if by that we mean we are so fixated on 
generalizations that we don’t allow for individuals who do not fit the 
stereotype.150  
In this work, I will allow for a liberal interpretation of Stein’s use of types. 
Furthermore, I reject Sawicki’s judgment that Stein used her writing to 
manipulate her audience.  I admit, with Sawicki, that Stein is a “persuasively guiding 
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author,”151 and I will reiterate this point when considering Stein’s letter to Pope Pius XI 
urging action against the Nazis.  But I propose that Stein used the power of authorship to 
persuade rather than to manipulate.  The intention of Stein’s authorship is positive, not 
negative or deceitful.  When Stein “types” people, I believe that she reflects the unfolding 
and maturation of her own person, influenced by human nature, culture, and education.  
Stein’s niece, Susanne Batzdorff, agrees that Stein’s work shows traces of prejudice:   
Edith’s frequent references to the non-Jewish appearance of various 
persons shows that that was a definite advantage and something 
thoroughly desirable.  Aside from that, it unfortunately also shows that 
while herself a Jew, she had taken on the prejudices of the population at 
large to a certain degree. She herself emphasized proudly: “By the way, 
this (the fact that I was Jewish) used to astound people since no one took 
me to be Jewish.”152   
Mindful of the pitfalls mentioned by Sawicki and the prejudices pointed out by 
Batzdorff, I suggest that Stein, had she lived, would have edited Life in a Jewish Family 
to reflect her own growth and change.  I base this conjecture on the words of Stein 
herself, who mentions times when she consciously changed, as in this passage from her 
memoirs:  
We [Hans Biberstein and Edith Stein] never again had a falling-out such 
as we sometimes had during our student years.  This was because I had 
completely changed my attitude towards others as well as toward myself.  
                                                 
151 Sawicki, Body, Text and Science 170. 
 
152 Qtd. in Herbstrith, Never Forget 42-43. 
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Being right and getting the better of my opponent under any circumstances 
were no longer essentials for me.  Also, although I still had a keen eye for 
the human weaknesses of others, I no longer made it an instrument for 
striking them at their most vulnerable point, but rather, for protecting 
them.153 
A conversion to a higher value that more closely matched her internal formative power 
would be in keeping with Stein’s living of the ethical life — an active response to a 
greater truth.   
While this project defines “ethic” in a new way, and although it relies on 
autobiographical resources, subject to differing interpretations, it does advance the study 
of Stein’s ethical stance toward the life world.  
  
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
 An overview of the following chapters gives the reader a concise plan for 
considering the manner in which Edith Stein lived the ethical life.   
   The second chapter, “Influences on Stein’s Stance,” emphasizes the fact that the 
philosophies, teachings, and actions of other persons impacted Stein’s philosophy and 
ethic.  Specifically, studying under philosophers Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, and 
delving into the philosophical works of Thomas Aquinas broadened Stein’s background 
and informed her philosophical stance.  The search for clarity and truth present in Stein’s 
friends and colleagues, Anna and Adolf Reinach, and also the faith-in-action approach of 
                                                 
153 Stein, Life 234. 
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the sixteenth century mystic, Saint Teresa of Avila, are likewise considered significant 
influences on Stein’s ethic.      
Chapter Three, “From Phenomenological Method to Action,” focuses on how 
Stein uses phenomenology and faith to weave an ethical approach to life.  Stein’s 
consistent search for truth is the foundation of her ethical stance.  The description of 
influences on Stein’s philosophy and of events in her life (Chapter Two) helps to 
elucidate key elements of her ethic.  Stein’s ethic is characterized by a constant search for 
truth as well as by four intertwining movements:  1) a perceiving of the phenomenon of 
truth; 2) an honoring of relationships; 3) a responsibility to unfold one’s ontic blueprint; 
and 4) openness to new horizons.  
Stein’s blending of phenomenology and faith enrich her ethical life as is seen in 
Chapter Four, “Evidence of a Steinian Stance.”  Within this chapter, events in Stein’s life 
during 1933, which she herself registers as significant, are recounted.  Stein’s writing to 
Pope Pius XI urging him to speak out against National Socialism, her decision to enter 
the Carmelite Order, and her writing of an account of Jewish life are all incidents that 
contribute to an understanding of the way Stein lived her life and provide proof of her 
ethical stance to the world.   
Finally, Chapter Five, “The Problem and Promise of a Steinian Ethic,” 
reconsiders the influences, essences, and evidence of Stein’s ethic.  This work concludes 
with a word about the promise of new horizons in Steinian research.  Edith Stein’s 
manner of living the ethical life holds out the promise that truth is available and 
recognizable to a person continuously willing to examine his/her life. 
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CONCLUSION 
This investigation of Stein’s philosophical and autobiographical works links her 
empathy-based ethic with her conscious attention to the life world, thus moving her 
toward an ethic of relationship and responsibility.  This dissertation therefore contributes 
to the ongoing research on Edith Stein in particular, and to the study of philosophy and 
the humanities in general.   
First, this dissertation provides a bridge between existing studies on Stein that 
focus on her ethic and studies based on her literary legacy.  Existing research by Haney 
and Andrews examines Stein’s work for contributions to an ethical discourse; Sawicki 
searches Stein’s writings and concludes that Stein’s use of personality “types” is a 
literary device for influencing the reader.  However, research to date has not explored the 
lived reality of Stein’s ethic, an ethic that seemingly developed and strengthened as her 
studies in philosophy progressed and as she professed a life of faith.  Stein has been 
correctly described as a “student of Husserl” and a “translator of Thomas Aquinas”; 
nevertheless, her concepts of empathy and the human person, as well as her resilience in 
living the ethical life, merit Stein a place of her own.  This investigation into the 
“essence” of Stein’s ethic and the evidence of that ethic, found in her personal, 
professional, and philosophical works, adds to the growing body of research on Stein and 
places her firmly within the phenomenological tradition.      
Secondly, the circumstances of Stein’s life, a study of her ethic, and her living of 
the ethical life necessarily force a reconsideration of traditional philosophical themes, 
such as the distinctions between theology and philosophy, reason and faith, and universal 
and relativistic norms.  Studies to date have delineated Stein’s philosophy in terms of her 
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concepts of person, woman, education, phenomenology, and scholasticism; biographic 
and hagiographic researchers have effectively set forth the events of Stein’s life and 
death.  However, there seems to be buried within Stein’s philosophical and literary legacy 
her own personal attempt to answer the thorny questions regarding how to live.  It is 
precisely Stein’s personal struggle to be true to what was revealed by faith and to honor 
what was gained by reason that makes her philosophy and her life so compelling.  Stein 
offers no answers by way of structured “systems” defining what “ought” to be done or 
how one is to act, but her personal attention to her relationships with God, self, and 
others, as well as her lived response (responsibility) to those relationships, allows her to 
live with this tension between faith and reason.  Stein’s life personifies that “love of 
wisdom” that perseveres in the search for truth. This dissertation will enrich the field of 
philosophy by offering the ethic and life of a twentieth-century philosopher who resolved 
the age-old tension between faith and reason by embracing and living the reality of that 
struggle in her own life.   
Finally, this dissertation will contribute to the humanities because it focuses on 
the philosophical thinking and life of a philosopher who was acutely aware of 
humankind’s interrelatedness.  Stein studied, taught, and revered the richness of the 
humanities, that branch of science which investigates the nature of humankind and 
studies humankind’s varied effect on the world.  Stein’s training in the liberal arts 
(philosophy, theology, literature, psychology) and her appreciation of the fine arts 
(music, art, dance, drama) positioned her to promote the humanities from the certainty of 
her own lived experience. She did this by stressing the existential yet transcendental 
qualities of human life, thus presenting a cohesive yet other-worldly synthesis.  
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This dissertation examines the process of Stein’s attempt to live ethically, that is, 
to live in concert with her reason and with her faith.  By delineating Stein’s 
phenomenological method to action, it is hoped that this study will contribute, not to “the 
problem of Edith Stein,” but to the recognition of the infinite possibilities Stein offers as 
a philosopher, practitioner, and promoter of the ethical life. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INFLUENCES ON STEIN’S STANCE 
 
ETHICS AS STANCE 
 In this chapter, the major influences on Stein’s theory (Husserl and Scheler) and 
the influences on her ethical practice (the Reinachs and Teresa of Avila) will be 
considered.  An examination of Stein’s writings shows Husserl, Scheler, the Reinachs, 
and Teresa of Avila to be significant influences on Stein’s ethical life. In his work, 
Cartesian Meditations, Edmund Husserl writes: “Philosophy — wisdom (sagesse) — is 
the philosopher’s quite personal affair.  It must arise as his wisdom, as his self-acquired 
knowledge tending toward universality, a knowledge for which he can answer from the 
beginning, and at each step, by virtue of his own absolute insights.”1  While this work 
was not published until 1931, years after Edith Stein had listened to Husserl’s lectures as 
a student at Göttingen, an author-signed copy among Stein’s books2 suggests the fact that 
she might have been familiar with this recurring Husserlian stance:  wisdom is a self-
acquired as well as an intuited personal affair which moves toward the universal.  While 
the concept of the philosopher’s wisdom as self-acquired knowledge and also as a 
product of absolute insights seems contradictory, Stein found in Husserl’s rigorous 
                                                 
1 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations,  trans. Dorion Cairns  (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic P, 
1999) page 2, section 1, part 44, hereafter noted as 2; §1, 44. 
 
 2 Michael Andrews, “Contributions to the Phenomenology of Empathy:  Edmund Husserl, Edith 
Stein, and Emmanuel Levinas,” diss., Villanova U, 2002. Preface xiii-xiv.  Andrews wondered if Stein had 
kept up with Husserl’s later works on the life world.  In Stein’s convent, Karmel Maria von Frieden, in 
Cologne, Andrews found evidence to suggest that Stein knew and followed Husserl’s  later works as she 
had copies of Cartesian Meditations and other works, signed personally by “the Master.” Andrews also 
attests to Stein’s following the works of members of the Göttingen Circle.  While there is no absolute proof 
that Stein read Cartesian Meditations, Sister Josephine Koeppel, translator of Stein’s works, thinks that 
Stein’s respect for Husserl makes her reading of his later works highly probable. 
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method a process for pursuing truth.  It was this Husserlian spirit of self-sufficiency and 
relentless radical pursuit of truth that fueled Stein’s imagination and prompted her to 
write in 1914:  “[W]hat I had learned about phenomenology, so far, fascinated me 
tremendously because it consisted precisely of such a labor of clarification and because, 
here, one forged one’s own mental tools for the task at hand.”3 
Stein eagerly used Husserl’s phenomenological method as her preferred way of 
philosophizing.  Her philosophical works are replete with examples of the 
phenomenological method as will be shown throughout this work.  However, Stein also 
effectively used the phenomenological method in the more immediate tasks of daily life.  
While seeking the truth or essence of things by relying on her own subjective experiences 
and attention to consciousness, she also respected the experiences of others in their search 
for truth.  Stein consistently integrated the example of others (especially the example of 
her mother, Frau Augusta Stein), her own insights, and what she had learned from her 
scholarly pursuits.  In fact, Stein’s autobiographical works show that she studied and was 
influenced by the works of Spinoza and Kant as well as Husserl. 
  Stein studied Spinoza’s ethic early in her university days.  She writes:  “I had 
just finished my first semester [at the University of Breslau] and had brought along 
Spinoza’s Ethic to read during that vacation.  I was never found without the small book.”4  
The rationalist philosopher, Baruch Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677), had tried to devise an 
ethic that balanced the rigor of the sciences with the freedom inherent in human nature.  
As a rationalist, Spinoza saw the human mind as participating in the infinite intellect and 
                                                 
3 Edith Stein, Life in a Jewish Family (Washington:  ICS, 1989) 222.  
  
4 Stein, Life 132.  
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unity of God.  As a humanist, Spinoza stressed that happiness is intertwined with the 
individual’s ability to choose freely to act in accordance with reason.  Rather than 
suggesting a formal set of rules by which to act, Spinoza relied on a person’s ability to 
know him/herself and to decide on a course of moral action which matched the person’s 
true advantage.  Spinoza posits that the person who seeks after what is truly 
advantageous, knows and understands personal freedom.  The person who seeks to 
preserve himself by means of external forces and goods is not free, according to 
Spinoza’s “ethical egoism,” but is bound by his passions.  Spinoza’s consideration of the 
human person’s needs, his emphasis on freedom, and his stress on the person’s ability to 
choose his/her own path appealed to Stein.   
Stein also read the works of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and referred to Kant’s 
idealistic schema as his “conceptual thinking apparatus.”5  Stein studied Kant’s ethic 
during a natural philosophy course with Professor Richard Hönigswald at the University 
of Breslau, and also in classes and during “at home” discussions conducted by Professor 
Edmund Husserl in Göttingen.   
While Stein fleetingly mentions Kant in her works, she was aware of his attempt 
to broach the ever-growing rift between idealism and the empiricism of the British 
philosophers.  In his moral schema, Kant considered all human beings to possess the 
same innate ability to “will the good.”  According to Kant, this good will, good in and of 
itself, enables the human being to recognize the need to act out of a sense of duty rather 
than from a desired outcome.  Thus Kant posits his famous categorical imperative:  “I 
ought never to act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a 
                                                 
5  Stein, Life 186. Stein writes:  “His [Hönigswald’s] penetrating insight and his rigorous thought 
process fascinated me.  Avowedly, this was the critical philosophy of Kant; . . .   One had to be familiar 
with the conceptual thinking apparatus of Kantianism to follow his [Hönigswald’s] presentation.” 
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universal law.”6   Put negatively, Kant’s categorical imperative advises against personally 
choosing an action that should not be done, in similar circumstances, by all.   A person 
should lie, for example, only if he is willing to allow all other persons to lie.  Kant 
believed that this categorical law is synthetic a priori — that is, the law is universal and 
necessary, but it starts with experience.  Any human being, free of self-seeking and fear, 
would arrive at the same imperative by use of his/her innate good will.   
Stein, like Kant, sought to honor the ideal of truth and to recognize the reality of 
the life world.  She is critical of herself and those persons who embrace the idea of the 
good without making it manifest in the concrete Lebenswelt (life world).  In her 
autobiography, Stein tells of her disillusionment with idealism as well as with her own 
behavior.  When she was leaving the University of Breslau for phenomenological studies 
at the University of Göttingen, a peer said to her:  “Well, I wish you the good fortune of 
finding in Göttingen people who will satisfy your taste.  Here you seem to have become 
far too critical.”7   Stein’s response gives insight into her evolving ethical schema and to 
the role that others can play in the examined life: 
The words stunned me.  I was no longer accustomed to any form of 
censure.  At home hardly anyone dared to criticize me; my friends showed 
me only affection and admiration.  So I had been living in the naïve 
conviction that I was perfect.  This is frequently the case with persons 
without any faith who live in exalted ethical idealism.  Because one is 
enthused about what is good, one believes oneself to be good.  I had 
                                                 
6 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (New 
York: Macmillan, 1990) 18, (402).  
 
7 The peer, Hugo Hermsen, is quoted in Stein, Life 196.  
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always considered it my privilege to make remarks about everything I 
found negative, inexorably pointing out other persons’ weaknesses, 
mistakes or faults of which I became aware, often using a ridiculing or 
sarcastic tone of voice.  There were persons who found me “enchantingly 
malicious.”  So these words of farewell from a man whom I esteemed and 
loved caused me acute distress.  I was not angry with him for saying them.  
Nor did I shrug them off as an undeserved reproach.  They were for me a 
first alert to which I gave much reflection.8  
Stein was so engrossed in her idea of good that she neglected to examine her practice of 
the good.  In Chapter Three, Stein’s manner of addressing this dilemma through a 
synthesis of the ideal of truth and the reality of the life world will be examined.   
While Stein knew and appreciated the ethical works of Spinoza and Kant, the 
persons who most influenced her ethic were not ethicists but phenomenologists.  The 
phenomenologists Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Max Scheler (1874-1928) provided 
the major theoretical influences on Stein’s ethic whereas Adolf Reinach (1883-1917), 
Anna Reinach, and Saint Teresa of Avila (1515-1582) contributed significantly to Stein’s 
practice of the ethical life.  Phenomenology and faith provided the structure by which 
Stein meshed the theoretical pursuit of truth with an active and reasoned participation in 
her life world.     
A brief survey of how Stein came into contact with these five most influential 
persons will facilitate an understanding of their respective importance.   First, the 
influence of Husserl and his phenomenology will be considered, with an emphasis on the 
essentials of his phenomenological method.  Next, Scheler’s influence and his application 
                                                 
8  Stein, Life 196-97. 
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of the phenomenological method to the area of ethics will be explored.  Finally, the 
Reinachs’ and Teresa of Avila’s valuations of truth within their respective life worlds 
will be considered.  To etch her phenomenological ethic, Stein used theoretical tools 
provided by Husserl and Scheler as well as practical tools supplied by the Reinachs and 
Teresa of Avila. 
 
EDMUND HUSSERL’S INFLUENCE 
 Stein first met the “Father of Phenomenology,” Edmund Husserl, when her friend, 
Dr. Georg Moskiewicz, handed her the second volume of Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations, saying:  “Leave all that stuff aside and just read this; after all, it’s where 
all the others got their ideas.”9  Stein read the text while on Christmas vacation in 1912, 
and impressed by Husserl’s phenomenological method, she quickly made plans to attend 
summer courses at the University of Göttingen, where Husserl was teaching.  By the fall 
semester, Stein had left her study of psychology at the University of Breslau and had 
become a matriculating student of philosophy at Göttingen.  Stein completed her 
dissertation (Zum Problem der Einfuhlüng, 1916) under Husserl’s direction and 
continued to work as his assistant for eighteen months.   
Throughout her life, Stein always acknowledged the influence of “the Master.”  
When her dissertation, On the Problem of Empathy, was published in 1917, Stein wrote 
in the Foreword:  “Of course, the statement of the problem [empathy] and my method of 
work have grown entirely out of intellectual stimuli received from Professor Husserl so 
that in any case what I may claim as my ‘spiritual property’ in the following expositions 
                                                 
9 Stein, Life 217-18. 
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is most questionable.”10  In Finite and Eternal Being (1936), Stein uses words of Husserl, 
(who always refers to himself as a beginner,) to describe herself, again showing his 
influence.  In the Preface of this work, Stein refers to herself in the third person, and 
while she implies other philosophical influences, she explicitly mentions her first teacher 
in phenomenology:   
This book was written by a beginner for beginners.  At an age when others 
may confidently call themselves teachers the author was compelled to start 
all over again.  She had been intellectually formed in the school of 
Edmund Husserl and had been using the phenomenological method in 
several philosophic treatises published in Husserl’s Jahrbuch.11 
But Stein’s words signal a move away from phenomenology toward a greater 
understanding of and appreciation for scholasticism.  For several years after converting to 
Catholicism in 1922, Stein was engrossed in training teachers and put aside her 
philosophical pursuits.  Her translation of Thomas Aquinas’ Questiones diputatae de 
veritate (1932) enabled her to learn more about her new faith as well as to resume 
philosophical work.  When explaining her attraction to Thomistic philosophy, she credits 
the influence of Husserl on her thinking, again using a third person reference to herself: 
St. Thomas found a reverent and willing pupil.  Her mind, however, was 
no longer a tabula rasa:  It [had] already received the firm impress of her 
philosophical training, which could not be ignored.  Her reason had 
                                                 
10 Edith Stein, On The Problem of Empathy, trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington:  ICS, 1989) 2. 
 
11 Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, trans. Kurt F. Reinhardt (Washington:  ICS, 2002) xxvii.  
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become the meeting place of two philosophic worlds which demanded a 
dialectic elucidation.12 
In Stein’s last written text, The Science of the Cross (1942), a scholarly work on John of 
the Cross, she was still employing the phenomenological method, as she explains in the 
Preface:  “In the following pages, an attempt will be made to grasp John of the Cross in 
the unity of his being as it expresses itself in his life and his works — from a viewpoint 
that will enable us to see this unity.”13  This work is more than a synthesis of St. John’s 
work; it is a systematic description of his writings in search of the essence of the mystic’s 
message.  Stein found suffering to be the essence of St. John of the Cross’ message.   
Stein was so convinced of the validity of the phenomenological method that she 
employed it not only in her scholarly work, but in her personal dealings as well, as will 
be seen in Chapter Four. 
 
Husserl’s Legacy: Phenomenology 
 Phenomenology, the philosophical attention to consciousness that so fascinated 
Stein, was Husserl’s philosophical legacy.14  Husserl began his academic career as a 
mathematician, having been awarded his doctorate in mathematics at the University of 
Vienna in 1883.15   Influenced by philosopher Franz Brentano and psychologist Carl 
                                                 
12 Stein, Finite and Eternal Being xxvii. 
 
13 Edith Stein, The Science of the Cross. Eds. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven (Washington:  ICS, 
2002) 5.  
 
              14 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. Third ed. 
(Hague: Martinus Nijhoff P, 1982) 69-165.   
   
              15 David Stewart and Algis Mickunas, Exploring Phenomenology:  A Guide to the Field and Its 
Literature (Chicago:  ALA, 1974) 9. 
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Stumpf,16 Husserl began to study philosophy and psychology while continuing in the 
field of mathematics.  Brentano’s personal example and his thoughts on intentionality 
gave Husserl the courage to “choose philosophy as the vocation of my life.”17  
In his habilitation18 thesis, later published as The Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891, 
the year Stein was born), Husserl notes that a person intuits the first numbers in the 
numerical series when counting.  However, when a person deals with larger numbers, he 
uses symbols for those numbers that were first intuited.  In this work, Husserl dabbled in 
“psychologism” when he tried to explain mathematics in terms of psychology.  Later, 
convinced that philosophy was not reducible to science or to the scientific method, 
Husserl rejected psychologism and began to fashion a new method of philosophizing.  
Husserl’s interests in logic, psychology, and philosophy complemented his mathematical 
pursuits as he served as Privatdozent19 at the University of Halle under Carl Stumpf.  
Husserl’s work on a prolegomena and six investigations concerning the theory of 
knowledge was later published in two volumes as Logical Investigations (1900-01).  
Because of this seminal work in phenomenology, he was appointed Extraordinarius 
Professor at the University of Göttingen in 1901, where he remained until 1916.20  
Husserl held the chair of philosophy at the University of Freiburg in Bresgau from 1916 
to 1930.  Gradually, Nazi policies made it impossible for the Jewish-born Husserl to 
                                                 
16 Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000) 211.    
 
17 Qtd. in Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement 72. 
  
18 A habilitation thesis or Habilitationsschrift is a second doctoral dissertation required in 
Germany for teaching at the university level. 
 
19 A Privatdozent is comparable, in the American academic system, to an associate professor. 
 
20 Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach, eds., An Introduction to Husserlian 
Phenomenology (Evanston:  Northwestern UP, 1989) 237-38.  
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teach in the university or to use the university library.  Despite the tragic loss of his son in 
World War I, the ever-encroaching governmental restrictions on his scholarship, and the 
diminishment of his body with the advancement of age, Husserl continued to “think as he 
wrote.”21  He died on April 27, 1938, leaving behind six published books and thousands 
of pages of unpublished manuscripts.  Herman Leo Van Breda, a student of Husserl’s, is 
credited with saving his teacher’s manuscripts.  The safekeeping of these manuscripts at 
the Husserl Archives at the University of Louvain in Belgium makes Husserl’s thoughts 
accessible today.22  Van Breda’s foresight also helped to save Edith Stein’s manuscripts 
from being ruined during the Allied Forces’ bombardment of Cologne.23 
The tenets of phenomenology can be problematic, especially since Husserl had a 
penchant for “starting over again.”  Phenomenologists often themselves disagree on 
certain aspects of this method of doing philosophy.24  In essence, phenomenology differs 
from other philosophical methods because it emphasizes:  1) a “return to the things 
themselves,” 2) the intentionality of consciousness, and 3) access to essences via 
                                                 
21 Husserl’s seemingly preferred way of thinking things out was to write.  His book on 
mathematics, six books on phenomenology, 40,000 pages of manuscripts and 7,000 pages of transcriptions 
attest to this fact.  Stewart and Mickunas, Exploring Phenomenology 11. 
 
22 Herman Leo Van Breda was a Franciscan priest from Louvain, Belgium, who studied 
phenomenology in Freiburg with Husserl shortly before World War II.  After Husserl’s death, Van Breda 
shipped Husserl’s library and written materials to the University of Louvain, which since has housed the 
Husserl Archives.  Van Breda is also responsible for the safe passage of Husserl’s wife, Malvine, to 
Belgium. Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology 219. 
 
23  Herman Leo van Breda, OFM, met with Edith Stein at the Carmel in Echt on April 28 and 29, 
1942, less than three months before her death.  Van Breda describes the hours that he spent with Stein as 
“etched into my memory as one of the most impressive encounters of my life.”  Van Breda was impressed 
by Stein’s charismatic gift of inspiring confidence in people with whom she came into contact, influencing 
them by her word and example.  Waltraud Herbstrith, ed.  Never Forget (Washington:  ICS, 1998) 250-55.   
 
              24 Stewart and Mickunas offer a comprehensive guide to understanding Husserl’s phenomenology 
by delineating four aspects of phenomenology: 1) a return to the traditional task of philosophy, 2) a 
philosophy without presuppositions, 3) the intentionality of consciousness, and 4) a refusal of the subject-
object dichotomy.  Stewart and Mickunas,  Exploring Phenomenology  8.  Spiegelberg, Sokolowski, Held, 
and other scholars offer comparable studies but Husserl’s penchant for “introductions” and for continual 
refinement of his new method make definitions of phenomenology more fluid than strict.   
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particulars.  While other differences also exist between phenomenology and other 
methods of philosophy, these phenomenological tenets are highlighted since they are the 
ones that directly influenced Stein as a philosopher. 
 
A Return to the Things Themselves 
 As previously mentioned, Husserl, a student of mathematics and an advocate of 
the rigor of logic, was determined to set philosophy on a firmer foundation.  Advances in 
the sciences seemed to eclipse philosophy.  In the 1800s, the physical sciences feasted on 
success as progress was made in the field of technology, and the social sciences, 
especially psychology, promised further advancement.  But Husserl judged the late 
nineteenth century’s reliance on the physical sciences as a symptom of the “natural 
attitude” that presumed the validity of the sciences.  While scientists used logic in their 
inquiry and arguments, they failed to see philosophy as a logical foundation for their 
investigations.   
Unreflective acceptance of the sciences, thought Husserl, unwittingly numbed the 
human being to the exhilarating search for truth, that “love of wisdom” that gave 
philosophy its name.  Husserl recalled the wonder and awe of the early Greeks, who 
delighted in the newness of discovery and who were relentless in their search for wisdom 
and in their quest to learn the “essence” or the intuitive meaning of things.  But the 
scientific community of the late 1800s turned to empirical evidence rather than intuition 
and essences.  Husserl did not reject the rigor of science, but he questioned the reliance 
on the deductive method of the sciences to the exclusion of intuition.  He argued that 
science is not absolute; rather it must be based on an absolute foundation — philosophy.  
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Noting the wisdom inherent in meaningful questioning and deep reflection, Husserl 
proposed a different approach to philosophy — a “phenomenology” that allowed for the 
rigor of science as well as the intuition of essences. 
 Husserl, in a summary of five lectures given in 1907, states: “Philosophical 
thinking is circumscribed by one’s position toward the problems concerning the 
possibility of cognition.”25  Therefore, his initial philosophical project focused on a 
theory of cognition wherein he sought to go beyond the confining labels of empiricism 
and idealism.  He envisioned a new method that had as its catch phrase, “a return to the 
things themselves” — a method that sought the “essence” of the object of cognition by 
first attending to how that object appears to consciousness.  He sets the standard for this 
new, presuppositionless phenomenology with his “first methodological principle”:   
It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving 
toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on 
accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, 
from “experiences” in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question 
are present to me as “they themselves.”  Indeed, even then I must at all 
times reflect on the pertinent evidence; I must examine its “range” and 
make evident to myself how far that evidence, how far its “perfection,” the 
actual giving of the affairs themselves, extends.  Where this is still 
wanting, I must not claim any final validity, but must account my 
                                                 
25 Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1990) 1.  Husserl delivered five lectures in Göttingen in the spring of 1907 
that further developed his phenomenology introduced in Logische Untersuchungen (1900-01).  Husserl’s 
lectures and summary, “The Train of Thoughts in the Lectures,” were edited by Dr. Walter Biemel and first 
published in 1950 under the title Die Idee der Phänomenologie (ix).  While Edith Stein was not present in 
Göttingen for these lectures, and died before Biemel’s publication, she probably had access to the actual 
lectures while in Husserl’s classes or in his employ.  
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judgment as, at best, a possible intermediate stage on the way to final 
validity.26 
Husserl’s phenomenological method allows the self-reflective subject to use experiences, 
or phenomena, to move toward genuine knowledge.  However, Husserl cautions that 
these experiences have limits, and to reach beyond the range of what is given to the 
subject in experience is detrimental to the epistemological project. 
In proposing the phenomenological tenet of “back to the things themselves,” 
Husserl credits the French philosopher and mathematician, René Descartes (1596-1650), 
with placing knowledge of the world in radical doubt.  Descartes writes:  “I realized that 
once in my life I had to raze everything to the ground and begin again from the original 
foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences.”27  Husserl 
desired to get back “to the things themselves,” i.e., to how objects of cognition, or 
phenomena, appear to consciousness.  Instead of radically doubting the world, Husserl 
suggests an epoché, a bracketing of, or a suspension of belief in, the existence of the 
world that would allow reflection on how things in the life world appear to 
consciousness.  By examining and describing the object as it appears to consciousness 
without entering into a discussion of the object’s existence, Husserl could look for limits 
of that object.  With limits set, Husserl could then look for the essence, or for that which 
pertains in every instance of the consciousness of that object.   
A “return to” the phenomenon of an apple, for example, allows me, the conscious 
meditator, to consider the apple as it appears to my consciousness.  I bracket all thoughts 
                                                 
              26 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 13; §5, 54.  
 
27 René Descartes,  Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy,  trans. Donald A. 
Cress,  4th ed.  (Indianapolis:  Hackett, 1998) 59. 
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concerning the existence or non-existence of the apple in order to focus more clearly on 
how the apple appears to my consciousness.  I can describe the sensually perceived red 
skin, the round shape, and the sweet smell.  But consciousness of the apple also reveals a 
memory of white pulp inside the red skin, or instances of the apple being yellow or green.  
I can imaginatively vary the shape or use of the apple.  Husserl uses a simple object such 
as apple to find the essence of a perceived object in general.  Whatever the sciences may 
add about this apple is grounded in intuited subjective consciousness of the apple itself, 
described in phenomenological terms.  In this manner, phenomenology serves as a basis 
or foundation for all of the sciences.   
This phenomenological step of attending to things in the life world appealed to 
Stein.  Husserl’s method did not advocate a break with science, but rather encouraged a 
re-examination of the life world and how it appeared to consciousness.  Stein, schooled in 
the humanities, including psychology, welcomed a method centered on the intuition of 
essences.  A self-proclaimed seeker of truth, Stein endorsed Husserl’s methodology and 
wholeheartedly embraced philosophy as her personal affair. 
 
The Intentionality of Consciousness 
Rekindling the fervor of the early Greeks in their search for wisdom and truth, 
and imitating the spirit of Descartes, who longed to be free of any and all presuppositions 
in order to rebuild philosophy on his own, Husserl forged the way for his new 
phenomenology.  As he reflected on the way the world appears to consciousness and the 
way the conscious mind constitutes the world, it became apparent to Husserl, through the 
influence of Brentano, that every “intention” is directed toward an object and that each 
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object holds an intended meaning for the intending subject.  This is true in all forms of 
cognition, such as perception, memory, and imagination.  For Husserl, the mind is made 
up of consciousness that can gaze “inwardly” at the act of consciousness (noesis) as well 
as “outwardly,” at the object of consciousness (noema).  (Even the act of gazing at 
consciousness has its own noesis, the act of gazing, and its own noema, consciousness.) 
Intentionality provides the link between consciousness of a phenomenon and its meaning.      
Upon investigation, Husserl observed that consciousness registers a 
“phenomenon”; for example, consciousness notes the appearance of a physical object, 
another person, or a cultural event.  While only perceiving sides or partial aspects of the 
object (adumbrations), consciousness grasps the “whole” of the object, and the subject 
“intuits” or immediately grasps meaning.  By examining the object pole of the 
phenomenon (noema) through a noematic analysis in which the different perspectives are 
described and analyzed, the phenomenologist can come to the “essence” of that 
phenomenon, i.e., an eidos or a form of that phenomenon.28 
The phenomenologist could also focus on the subjective side in trying to 
understand the phenomenon.  He could turn his gaze inward and examine acts within the 
stream of consciousness, thus describing the action of the subjective consciousness in a 
noetic analysis.  According to Husserl’s schema, descriptions of the noema and noesis, 
linked by intentionality, enable the subject to understand more fully the phenomenon 
presented to consciousness, as well as to understand consciousness itself.  
 
                                                 
28 Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology 177. 
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Access to Essences via Particulars 
 According to Husserl, it is possible to inspect the manifold or the many 
apperceptions of the object of cognition as well as the act of cognition itself.  The 
investigation of the noetic and noematic poles enables the phenomenologist to explore the 
limits and possibilities of the phenomenon.  Such an investigation also allows the 
phenomenologist to describe that which remains the same or the essence of that 
phenomenon. 
  In Lecture IV of The Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl advances this idea by 
linking particulars with universals.  Husserl summarizes this phenomenological move by 
describing an intuition such as “redness” perceived in a piece of red blotter paper: 
“And now I fully grasp in pure ‘seeing’ the meaning of the concept of redness in general, 
redness in specie [in the act of seeing], the universal ‘seen’ as identical in this and that.  
No longer is it the particular as such which is referred to, not this or that red thing, but 
redness in general.”29  Husserl allows for the subject, through consciousness, to go 
beyond the particular to the meaning of red as a universal. 
Husserl’s reliance on intuition, on the ability of consciousness to see immediately, 
was innovative but risky.  How could phenomenology, which relies on intuition, be the 
basis of the empirical sciences which rely so heavily on fact?    Furthermore, Husserl’s 
bracketing of the world and his move to consciousness seemed too narrowly turned in on 
self, bordering on solipsism.30   
                                                 
29 Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology 44-45.  
 
30 Solipsism refers to “a theory holding that the self can know nothing but its own modifications 
and that the self is the only existent thing.”  Husserl’s claim that the individual subject could know the 
objective world borders on solipsism, but Husserl later speaks of  individuals knowing through a 
community of knowers.  “Solipsism,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 1996 ed. 
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Husserl answered the charge of solipsism in his lectures and personal letters, 
formally addressing this criticism when his lectures were published as Cartesian 
Meditations (in French) in 1931.  He states: 
When I, the meditating I, reduce myself to my absolute transcendental ego 
by phenomenological epoché do I not become solus ipse; and do I not 
remain that, as long as I carry on a consistent self-explication under the 
name phenomenology?  Should not a phenomenology that proposed to 
solve the problems of Objective being, and to present itself actually as 
philosophy, be branded therefore as transcendental solipsism?31  
Husserl goes on to stress that his method of exploring the limits of consciousness is not 
turned inward exclusively since the intentional quality of consciousness necessarily turns 
outward in search of the object of cognition.  When the transcendental I turns its gaze 
outward, the subject encounters “the Other” in “straightforward consciousness.”32  
Awareness of another “I,” that is, cognizance of another reflective subject who is 
likewise the locus of his own thinking, willing, etc. removes the threat of solipsism.    
Moreover, Husserl defends his transcendental turn inward as he states:   
[W]e must discover in what intentionalities, synthesis, motivations, the 
sense “other ego” becomes fashioned in me and, under the title, 
harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and 
even as itself there in its own manner.  These experiences and their works 
are facts belonging to my phenomenological sphere.  How else than by 
                                                 
31 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 89; §42, 122. 
 
32 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 90; §42, 122.   
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examining them can I explicate the sense, existing others, in all its 
aspects?33   
  Husserl notes that there is a pairing of the individual I “here” and the other I 
“there,” and while the two may perceive the world in similar ways, they are not one 
being, but rather they contribute to a “community of monads,” who in turn constitute one 
identical world.34  Husserl explains further that the subject also avoids solipsism because 
of its capacity to know another subject through “empathy.”  This understanding of 
another person through empathy has the potential to shatter any threat of solipsism.  
Husserl writes:  
[E]very successful understanding of what occurs in others has the effect of 
opening up new associations and new possibilities of understanding; and 
conversely, since every pairing association is reciprocal, every such 
understanding uncovers my own psychic life in its similarity and 
difference and, by bringing new features into prominence, makes it fruitful 
for new associations.35  
Husserl’s idea of empathy would become the topic of Stein’s doctoral dissertation, and 
she would experience new associations and new possibilities of understanding expressly 
through her encounters with others. 
Husserl’s phenomenological method gave Stein a specific means of 
philosophizing and helped to define her approach to life.  It was precisely this method, 
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34 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 107; §49, 137. 
 
35 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 120; §54, 149 
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the analysis of essences, given in immediate evidence, which fueled Stein’s imagination 
and assuaged her thirst for a way of ascertaining truth.  Max Scheler, a philosopher of 
“practical phenomenology” offered Stein a way to apply the phenomenological method to 
her life world. 
 
MAX SCHELER’S INFLUENCE 
 Max Scheler was born in Munich, Germany.  He received university training in 
the city of Jena, where he met Edmund Husserl, who was then a Privatdozent at the 
University of Halle.36  In 1906, Husserl helped Scheler to transfer to the University of 
Munich where he came into contact with the group of phenomenologists known as the 
“Munich Circle.”  While at the University of Munich, personal matters led to Scheler’s 
dismissal from teaching.37  He supported himself and his new wife by publications and 
unofficial lectures.  Writing treatises on empathy and the anthropology of the human 
person engaged Scheler from 1912 to 1918, and it was during this period that Edith Stein 
met him.  After public attention regarding Scheler’s personal life subsided, he was 
appointed Chair of Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Cologne.  Poor 
eyesight restricted Scheler’s military involvement in World War I, but he contributed to 
the war effort by giving propaganda speeches and by serving as a diplomat in Switzerland 
                                                 
36 Stein, Life 259.   Koeppel, the translator of Life, gives valuable background information on 
Scheler as does Frings in: Manfred S. Frings,  Max Scheler:  A Concise Introduction into the World of a 
Great Thinker (Milwaukee: Marquette UP, 1996).  
 
37 Stein, Life 258.  Stein explains the personal matters:  “At the time, Scheler’s personal affairs 
were in a very bad way.  His first wife, whom he had divorced, had implicated him in a scandalous suit in 
Munich.  In consequence of incriminating disclosures during the process, the university withdrew his 
faculty status.  So his career as an educator had come to an end; as it had been his only steady source of 
income, he now depended on his writings for his livelihood.  With his second wife (Märit Furtwängler), he 
was living in a modest furnished room in Berlin; often, he traveled, [giving lectures].” 
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and the Netherlands.  He was named to a post at the University of Frankfurt in 1928, but 
died of a heart attack before assuming his assignment. 
Stein never formally studied philosophy with Max Scheler because her time at the 
university coincided with the period when personal matters kept him from maintaining 
his status as a professor.  However, Stein learned from Scheler, in theory and practice, 
when he visited Göttingen as a guest speaker for the Philosophical Society to which she 
belonged.  Whereas Husserl introduced Stein to the phenomenological method, Scheler 
introduced her to a phenomenological view of ethics.  Stein was convinced of Scheler’s 
place in the history of ethics, and in her autobiography she writes:  “That summer [1913] 
the Philosophical Society chose the second major work in the current Yearbook as the 
subject matter for our discussions.  It was Max Scheler’s Formalism in Ethics and Non-
Formal Ethics of Values [Ethics] which has probably affected the entire intellectual world 
of recent decades even more than Husserl’s Ideas.”38  Stein’s judgment that Scheler’s 
Ethics might eclipse Husserl’s Ideas never came true, but this statement shows her strong 
endorsement of Scheler and his philosophy of ethics.  
Scheler was interested, as was Husserl, in setting philosophy on a firm foundation 
and repositioning it as the bulwark of all of the sciences.  Scheler’s emphasis, however, 
was not on consciousness, but rather on the person, specifically “the being of Man, here 
and now, in his biological, social, ethical, metaphysical, and religious dimensions — and 
ultimately, man as the bearer of love.”39  Scheler envisioned an integration of the logical 
(mental) and alogical (emotional) spheres of the human person and he rejected all 
                                                 
38 Stein, Life 258.  
  
39 Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings 
and Roger L. Funk (Evanston:  Northwestern UP, 1973) xiv. 
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treatments of the person as an object or a thing.  In Ethics he states:  “For the person is 
not a thing; nor does the person possess the nature of thingness . . . ”40  Schelerian 
scholar, Manfred Frings further explains Scheler’s focus:  
All these notions [of man] designate only single aspects from which man’s 
being is understood.  None of them [Nietzsche’s Dionysian man, Freud’s 
libido man, Marx’s economic man] is adequate to man’s extreme 
flexibility as well as the complexity of the whole of his spiritual, social, 
voluntary and emotional being. All these notions are, for Scheler, ideas of 
things, but man is not a thing.41 
Stein affirmed Scheler’s emphasis on the human person, by making this the focus of her 
study on empathy and later, on the psychophysical person.     
Scheler’s work, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (1916), 
gives evidence of his intent to write a foundational philosophical system, but this text is 
the only one of the four projected works that Scheler completed before his death.  In 
Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, Scheler has two objectives:  1) to 
provide a basis for philosophical ethics42 and 2) to critique Immanuel Kant’s ethical 
theory.  In critiquing Kant’s work, Scheler pays tribute to Kant’s genius, which he 
admired and respected, but contra Kant, he makes a case for “emotional a priorism,”43 
demonstrating the interconnection between a priori essences and feelings.  Scheler 
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43 Scheler, Ethics xxiii. 
 
86 
 
sought to present an ethics based on “non-formal” or value-laden content, as opposed to 
Kant’s ideal, concept-laden content.  Scheler’s non-formal ethic is centered on the human 
person whom he considers a locus of the rational, emotional, and spiritual spheres and 
therefore the bearer of love.  Scheler bases his concept of a priori emotionalism on the 
fact that human beings are comprised of both matter and spirit.  As spirit, the human 
being goes beyond the drives and urges of lower levels of being (animals, plants) in order 
to manage, shape, and change his environment.  Independent of environment, this 
spiritual being is capable of ideation which Scheler defines as “a specific act of spirit . . . 
a cancellation of the reality of objects, resulting in the comprehension of essence.”44  This 
spiritual dimension allows the human person to know “things,” as well as self and others, 
in different ways.  Frings elaborates:  “For example, a rock is comprehended by an artist 
from an aesthetic aspect, whereas it may have very different meanings for a hunter or a 
geologist.”45  It is noted that while Scheler refuses to define the human person as an 
object, a human person, because of his spiritual nature, can objectify things, self, and 
other persons.  Scheler’s person is not an object but can objectify as part of his/her 
spiritual nature. 
  According to Scheler’s hypothesis, the human person is able to distance himself 
from his environment; he is superior to other creatures, and able to grasp pure essences.46  
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46 Frings,  Max Scheler 20.  Frings explains this difference: “The ontic difference between man, as 
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This ability of the human person to objectify things, self, and others for further reflection 
and examination, cannot, Scheler thinks, come from anything in the objective world.  
This ability to go beyond the material has its source in and reflects the primordial force of 
the cosmos, which Scheler names love. 
 Love, or “ordo amoris” as Scheler calls this life force, evidences itself in human 
beings as a constant disposition.  Via this primordial force or constant disposition, the 
human person establishes immediate contact with the world and others in the world, prior 
to all thinking.  Scheler posits that there is a hierarchy of values that can be immediately 
intuited by the human person and that value-components are “already given in a manner 
that is perfectly clear and distinct.”47  According to Scheler’s schema, a priori 
emotionalism precedes Kant’s a priori idealism.  
 One way in which the human person evidences this spiritual quality is the 
recognition of an absolute, a priori ethical system.  This ethic stems from Scheler’s view 
of love as a creative life force, concentrated in persons who are bearers of love and agents 
of value, perpetually seeking to reflect the love of the Creator, God.  Scheler envisions 
the human person soaring upward to God and outward to others in contrast to what he 
considers “Kant’s empty and barren formalism and the one-sidedness of its idea of 
duty.”48 
While Scheler recognizes universal values, he posits that these values are 
subordinate to the values of the person since the human person is capable of knowing and 
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choosing “absolute good for one’s own self.”49    Scheler clarifies his idea of 
individualism: 
Every false so-called individualism, with its erroneous and pernicious 
consequences, is excluded in my ethics by the theory of the original 
coresponsibility of every person for the moral salvation of the whole of the 
realms of persons (principle of solidarity).  What is of moral value, in my 
view, is not the “isolated” person but the person originally and knowingly 
joined with God, directed toward the world in love, and feeling united 
with the whole of the spiritual world and humanity.50 
Schelerian scholar, John Raphael Staude regards Scheler’s interest in community as a 
reflection on his disjointed personal life rather than as a humanitarian trait.  Staude 
explains:  “Scheler’s personal desire to belong to a unified group and to heal the political, 
sociological, and ideological divisions of his country stemmed, in part, from the divided 
nature of his family background.  His personal life reflected and reinforced the disunity 
and disorder of the society in which he lived.”51  Whatever Scheler’s reasons for stressing 
the responsibility of each individual to society, Stein would incorporate this sense of 
relationship and responsibility into her own life. 
In addition to instilling a sense of personal responsibility for the community, three 
concepts of Scheler’s ethic influenced Stein.  In her writings and in her life she included 
Scheler’s ideas regarding an intuited a priori value system, a hierarchy of values, and 
also persons throughout history who exhibited these values. 
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51 John Raphael Staude, Max Scheler:  An Intellectual Portrait (New York:  Free Press, 1967) xii. 
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An Intuited a priori Value System    
 Scheler agrees with Kant that human beings know certain things a priori but 
Scheler asserts that human beings can also feel values a priori, without reflection and 
before any experience or judgment.  The a priori of all philosophical investigation for 
Scheler is the value that appears to a human being prior to all reason.  For Scheler, the 
emotive sphere, i.e., feelings, makes it possible for human beings to intuit the whatness or 
the higher and lower values and to prefer, reject, love, and hate, according to an inner, 
universal law or ethic.     
This concept follows from Scheler’s insistence that human persons, as spiritual 
beings, transcend their environment and are therefore capable of grasping essences.  
Scheler rejects Kant’s notion of the a priori as a product of the understanding, a synthesis 
of objects and states of affairs.  Scheler’s use of the a priori points to the interconnection 
between objects and states of affairs that are intuited, grounded in essences, and have 
their seat in the emotive sphere of the human being, not in reason.52  Scheler builds his 
ethical system upon the human ability to intuit the valuable, calling his position 
“emotional intuitionism” and “non-formal a priorism.”53    
  
A Hierarchy of Values 
 Scheler posits that the human person, as a spiritual being independent of 
environment, naturally comprehends essences such as values.  The human person is 
naturally attuned to an inner law or an ethic.  Scheler writes of “a depth in us where we 
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always secretly know what the case is with respect to the relativity of experienced 
(erlebten) values.”54 The emotive sphere has its own lawfulness and is able to grasp the a 
priori values given in acts, objects, and persons.  The value content is found in ethics, not 
in logic. 
Scheler’s system incorporates an “ethical absolutism” whereby there is an ordered 
hierarchy of values given a priori in immediate intuition to the human person via the 
emotive sphere.  From lowest to highest, the value states that comprise Scheler’s system 
are:  values of the senses (pleasure/pain), values of life (the noble/the common), values of 
the spirit (beauty, justice, truth/unattractiveness, injustice, untruth), and religious values 
(values of the holy/unholy.)55  The values are qualitatively “higher” based on criteria that 
include endurance of the value, ability to share the value with others, and inner 
satisfaction.  Scheler posits that the human person intuits value and the hierarchy of that 
value by virtue of his spiritual being. 
According to Scheler’s schema, a human being naturally and immediately intuits 
the higher value, despite any social or cultural norms that might favor the lesser value.  
Thus, Scheler distinguishes between absolute values that the human person can arrive at 
intuitively, and valuations that are relative to a person’s cultural and social milieu.  
Scheler’s human person as bearer of love is naturally drawn to recognize and to strive for 
the highest value.     
So, according to Scheler’s ethical schema, when confronted with the choice of 
calling in sick in order to enjoy a round of golf versus going to work, a person can intuit 
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that it is better to go to work.  Telling the truth and fulfilling one’s obligation are values 
of the spirit that produce a greater satisfaction and feeling of integrated well-being than 
do the values of the senses and the attendant pleasures.  Conversely, a different person, 
overstressed by work, will also intuit the higher value of going to work, but might opt for 
the golf outing and be perfectly ethical in Scheler’s schema.  The value of life, in this 
case, preserving one’s sanity through relaxation and exercise, supersedes the pleasurable 
values of the senses.  In the first scenario, appropriate love of self prohibits the person 
from calling in sick for pleasurable satisfaction.  In the second scenario, appropriate love 
of self compels the golfer to make the sick call.  The human person’s ability to intuit 
value is absolute in Scheler’s ethical framework, while the personal choice regarding that 
ethical absolute is relative to the person’s situation and relies on the personal freedom of 
the individual to choose a particular action.   
Scheler’s ethical system allows for spiritual beings not tethered to the material 
world, who immediately intuit values and their hierarchy.  However, Scheler’s ethical 
system also allows for personal and communal “moralities” whereby a person’s or 
community’s choices and actions show a preference for certain values.  For example, a 
person is free to choose the higher value of life (health) rather than the value of the senses 
(pleasure) as is seen in the action of the person who quits smoking.  However, in a 
society that emphasizes consumerism and corporate profit over individual health, mass-
media advertising may be permitted to promote acceptance of a lesser value.  Frings 
explains this distinction between ethical absolutes and relative moral choices:  “Scheler 
holds that historical variations of both valuation (Schätzsungsweisen) and rules of 
preferring between values take place on the background of an evident order of values, 
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which is as objective as mathematical truth.”56  Whatever society accepts or promotes as 
the preferred value, the person is ultimately free to and responsible for choosing the 
highest good.       
If ethical values and their hierarchy are a priori absolutes, then why do some 
people and societies choose different values?  Scheler’s answer lies in his concept of life 
force or love.  “Ordo amoris” is the term Scheler gives to rightly ordered love that prefers 
the agreeable to the disagreeable.  He conceives these ordered values and their 
hierarchical structure not as posited by the human person but “borne” by him/her as a 
bearer of love.57  For Scheler, human persons exemplify these universal values by virtue 
of their psychophysical makeup.  However, Scheler realistically allows for persons who, 
rejecting a hierarchy of values, refuse to acknowledge the immediate givenness of the 
valuation of acts.  Echoing Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and prefiguring Jean-Paul 
Sartre (1905-1980), Scheler defines Ressentiment as a reversal or downfall (Umsturz) of 
values present to human consciousness that “causes deception in the comprehension of 
the order of the values and their realization in life and history.”58  The ressentiment-
subject always feels threatened by and incapable of acquiring things of higher values and 
therefore settles for a lesser value.  Scheler characterizes the person “fraught with 
ressentiment” as impotent and unable to incline toward the higher good, saying:  “All of 
this is nothing.  It has no value.  These are things of no importance.”59  However, 
explains Frings, “the genuine order of values always remains transparent throughout such 
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ressentiment values of illusion constituting a moral world in a ressentiment-subject.”60  
For Scheler, a person who recognizes his/her dignity as a bearer of love and embraces 
ordo amoris by acknowledging values and their hierarchy, ultimately fulfills his/her ontic 
destiny — holiness. 
An interesting question arises about Scheler’s personal involvement in the making 
of propaganda speeches during World War I.  In his position of German citizen 
promoting the policies and practices of his country, is Scheler a bearer of love or a 
ressentiment subject?  Outward appearances can be deceptive and would have to be 
viewed in the light of Scheler’s total life:  Edith Stein might posit that while the actions 
of another human being can be interpreted and understood, they should be judged in light 
of self-reflection, i.e., by asking:  “What would I do in a similar circumstance?”  
According to Scheler’s schema, the propagandist can be viewed as a hero who embraces 
love of family, of country, and heritage but not a saint who seeks to love all humankind.  
Scheler might also add that a person may perhaps change as a result of personal 
development as well as changes within society itself.  
 
Personality Types throughout History 
Scheler posits that human persons immediately intuit an ethical system through 
emotional a priorism and are free to embrace and live at their own chosen valuation level.  
Although universal values (truth, goodness) are accessible to each person, cultural and 
social ideas about these values can be harmonious — exhibiting ordo amoris, or the 
reverse — exhibiting value deception or ressentiment.  Convinced that people have the 
ability to reach for the highest good, Scheler was also persuaded that values are not 
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taught by any moral authority, but rather they are intuitively grasped as present in the 
actions of others.     
Certain persons, exemplifying different levels of values, are able to draw others 
toward specific values because of their comportment and way of acting.61  These 
exemplars of values correspond to the order of values; from least to greatest they are: the 
master of enjoyment (value state of the senses), the hero (value state of life), the genius 
(value state of the spirit), and the saint (value state of the holy).62  Whereas certain epochs 
may be influenced by strong individuals or may be forced to adopt specific moral 
systems, Scheler conceived of an eternal ethical system as the backdrop for moralities 
influenced by history and society.  Scheler envisions a time when the thought-driven 
Western European morality will merge with the feeling-driven Eastern morality and 
human persons will live in ordo amoris.  Chapter Four will examine how Scheler’s ordo 
amoris fits in with Stein’s vision of redeemed humanity. 
 
Principles Learned 
It is possible that Stein heard earlier versions of Scheler’s ethical system when he 
spoke to the Philosophical Society to which she belonged in Göttingen (1913-1916).  It is 
certain that she read Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (1926) 
because she speculated that Scheler’s work on ethics would have a greater impact on 
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philosophy than Husserl’s Ideas.63  Scheler’s concepts concerning the nature of 
humankind and the importance of love as a life-force attracted Stein as she herself attests:   
His [Scheler’s] influence in those years affected me, as it did many others, 
far beyond the sphere of philosophy.  I do not know in which year Scheler 
returned to the Catholic Church.  It could not have been long before I met 
him.  In any case, he was quite full of Catholic ideas at the time and 
employed all the brilliance of his spirit and his eloquence to plead them.  
This was my first encounter with this hitherto totally unknown world.  It 
did not lead me as yet to the Faith.  But it did open for me a region of 
“phenomena” which I could then no longer bypass blindly.  With good 
reason we were repeatedly enjoined to observe all things without 
prejudice, to discard all possible “blinders.”  The barriers of rationalistic 
prejudices with which I had unwittingly grown up fell and the world of 
faith unfolded before me.64 
The content of Scheler’s ideas allowed Stein to bracket her preference for reason and 
logic and to consider the alogical and the emotive sphere as having a valid voice in 
ethical actions.  Stein’s phenomenological method as influenced by Husserl and Scheler, 
then, incorporated intuition and emotion in the investigation of essences.   
  While Stein was both fascinated by Scheler as a person and annoyed at his 
seeming disregard for Husserl,65 she was nevertheless, by her own admission, 
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65 Stein, Life 259.  While Scheler never studied with Husserl, Stein reports that Husserl always 
thought that Scheler was dependent on him.  Stein, always loyal to “the Master,” had her own interpretation 
of Scheler’s boast that he had discovered the phenomenological method for himself: “Everyone who is 
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transformed by him.  Having renounced prayer and her practice of Judaism as a teenager, 
Stein felt herself drawn to people within her academic circle who professed faith.  
Scheler’s theory of the hierarchy of values and human exemplars of these values made 
Stein more open to matters of faith.  In fact, Scheler initially personified for Stein the 
value of the spirit. 
Stein also seemed to appreciate Scheler’s concept of coresponsibility and his idea 
that love is “the foundation of all being-in-the-world and the relation to death.”66  Stein 
would later embrace the belief — “Suffering and death have their origin . . . in love”67 — 
as a principle of the Catholic faith and as her special mission as a Carmelite.  In a lecture 
entitled, “Ethos of Women’s Professions,” given to a group of Catholic women, Stein 
strongly echoes Scheler’s thoughts:  “The innermost formative principle of woman’s soul 
is the love which flows from the divine heart.”68  Stein’s message follows Catholic 
thought and specifically mentions “divine love,” but one can decipher, I think, a reference 
to Scheler’s idea of ordo amoris, the formative and uniting power of love. 
While Stein retained Scheler’s hierarchy of values and his concept of the human 
person as the bearer of love, and later built upon it, she rejected Scheler’s idea that values 
cannot be taught.  Her years spent in Speyer as a teacher of young women verify her firm 
conviction that values are taught first in the home within the family unit, and then in 
society through the school systems. Her lectures to women attest to her concern that 
                                                                                                                                                 
acquainted with Scheler, or who has merely given his writings a careful reading, knows how apt he was to 
pick up suggestions from others.  Ideas slipped into his mind and grew there while he himself was totally 
unaware of his having been influenced.  He could say with a good conscience that all was his property.” 
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67 Frings,  Max Scheler 5. 
 
68 Edith Stein, Essays On Woman, trans. Freda Mary Oben (Washington:  ICS, 1996) 57.  
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values be transmitted, especially through education.  Stein urged parents to exemplify 
rightly ordered value judgments in their own actions as well as to be guides for children 
in making value judgments.  Stein thought that it was especially the woman’s role in the 
family to impart values, thus incorporating Scheler’s notion of exemplars of values who 
concretely apply these values to life situations.  After her conversion to Catholicism, 
Stein held Mary, Mother of God, as the supreme example of a human being who reached 
up in love to a personal, Creator God and outward to all of humankind. 
 Stein would come to understand firsthand Scheler’s idea that there are exemplars 
of values whose very comportment to the world draws others to seek higher values.  This 
was the case for Stein when she encountered Adolf Reinach and Anna Reinach, and 
Teresa of Avila.       
 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE REINACHS 
 Husserl introduced Stein to the phenomenological method and to the notion of 
empathy; Scheler employed the phenomenological method in his work on ethics; but it 
was Adolf Reinach, who first exemplified for Stein a philosopher whose thought 
conformed to his actions.  Noting the influence that Adolf and his wife Anna had on 
Stein, Koeppel states:  “Both Reinachs impressed Edith and confirmed her in the search 
for truth which began at the time she met them in Göttingen.  If Scheler introduced her to 
Christian thought, then the Reinachs lived what Scheler taught.”69  Dietrich von 
Hildebrand (1889-1977), a contemporary of the Reinachs and Stein, attests to Adolf 
Reinach’s quest for truth and his clarity as a teacher.  Hildebrand writes:  “I met the 
philosopher [Reinach] who impressed me the most deeply with his unconditional love of 
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truth, his intellectual power, his thoroughness, and his quite unique clarity.  The many 
discussions of philosophical questions I had with him were a great gift to me.  In 
Göttingen he came to be my only teacher.”70   
As Hildebrand affirms, it was Adolf Reinach, who, in a sense, “translated” 
Husserl for Stein and many other students through his lectures and the discussions he 
held in his home, and also through his personal assistance.  Reinach was able to clarify 
many of Husserl’s more obscure thoughts, and his lively presentation of material stood in 
stark contrast to Husserl’s dry delivery.  Reinach’s clear explanations and enthusiasm are 
evident in his writing.  At a lecture to neo-Kantians in Marburg in 1914, for example, 
Reinach described the tenets of phenomenology, explaining how a person perceives 
objects in the natural attitude as well as in the phenomenological mode.  Reinach states: 
Taking the case where I see a material, colored object in the world, the 
object — with its properties and modalities — is then something physical; 
but my perception of the object, my turning to it and attending to it, the 
joy which I feel over it, my admiration and, in short, all that presents itself 
as an activity or state or function of the ego — all of that is psychical.71 
Once, when struggling with her dissertation, Stein again took the advice of the 
previously mentioned Moskiewicz and consulted Reinach.  When she told Reinach about 
her struggles, dejectedly admitting, “But it’s all still so unclear,” Reinach answered:  
“Well, one certainly ought to be able to clarify anything that’s not clear.” 72  She later 
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wrote:  “By one magic word, he seemed to have transformed the monstrous offspring of 
my poor brain into a clear and well-organized whole.  I was completely confident that his 
verdict was reliable.”73   Although Stein never disclosed what Reinach’s magic word was, 
his ability to clarify intricate thoughts by a reduction to simpler parts and a reconstruction 
of the complex solved Stein’s difficulty with her dissertation and impressed her for life.  
In her intellectual work, her own quest for truth, and her dealings with others, Stein 
embraced this goal — to clarify anything not clear — just as Reinach did.  
Stein thoroughly enjoyed classes taught by Reinach because he seemed so 
animated and so thoroughly in command of the material.  As a member of the advanced 
class that met in the Reinach home, Stein appreciated the seemingly effortless way in 
which Reinach conducted the class:  “It was, then, not a matter of lecturing and learning 
but rather of mutual searching similar to what we had done in the Philosophical Circle, 
except that now a reliable guide was present.”74  She was later amazed that every word of 
his classes was scripted, up to his parting line.75  While Stein would later rely 
predominantly on lecture in her classes to high school girls and prospective teachers, her 
writings are full of clear descriptions and lifelike examples, and she reveals a desire for 
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“mutual searching” with students, members of the audience, or, as Marianne Sawicki 
mentions, with her readers.     
Not only did Reinach influence Stein’s scholarly life, but he and his wife were 
also partially responsible for leading Stein away from her earlier decision to forsake 
prayer toward her eventual conversion to the Catholic faith.  Reinach and his wife Anna 
had converted from Judaism to Lutheranism shortly before the outbreak of World War I.  
After Reinach was killed in Flanders in 1917, his widow asked Stein to come to their 
home to put her husband’s papers in order for eventual publication.  Stein hesitated; 
coping with her own loss and sorrow, she felt unable to face the young widow’s grief.  
Upon arriving, however, Stein found Anna Reinach strong and faith-filled.  When Stein 
questioned her, Frau Reinach replied that hers was the power of Christ’s cross.  This was 
the first time, Stein was to say, that she came face to face with the power of the cross.76 
While the phenomenological method of Husserl and the personalism and non-
formal ethic of Scheler had major impacts on Stein’s thought, it was Adolf and Anna 
Reinach, who made a personal impression on her.  In them, Stein first glimpsed the 
pursuit of truth combined with the living of the ethical life, a combination which she 
sought to emulate throughout her life.  This pursuit of truth was even more dramatically 
portrayed to Stein when she encountered the autobiography of the Catholic mystic, Saint 
Teresa of Avila. 
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THE INFLUENCE OF SAINT TERESA OF AVILA  
Edmund Husserl, noting that many of his students and associates embraced some 
form of religion while engaged in phenomenology, once quipped that upon his death, he 
should be canonized for leading so many to the acceptance of Christianity.77  This would 
seem especially true in the case of Stein but her introduction to Christianity, specifically 
Catholicism, came through the lectures of Max Scheler, the living witness of Anna and 
Adolf Reinach, and, on a different level, through her own translation of Thomas Aquinas’ 
De Veritate.78  While it is true that many, especially in the Göttingen Circle, became 
practicing members of Christian denominations, Stein credits Teresa of Avila, not 
Husserl, as the major catalyst in her acceptance of the Catholic faith.   
In the summer of 1922, while spending time with her philosopher friends, Adolf 
and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Stein read Teresa of Avila’s The Book of Her Life.  
Reading all through the night, Stein finished the autobiography in the first light of dawn 
and declared, “This is the truth.”79  Reflecting upon Stein’s conversion, Jude Dougherty 
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78 After her conversion to Catholicism, Edith Stein wanted to immerse herself in her new-found 
faith.  At the suggestion of the Jesuit, Erich Pryzwara, Edith Stein translated Thomas Aquinas’ De Veritate 
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phenomenology and scholasticism in “Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Saint Thomas 
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attend the Journées de Juvisy where she spoke, as a respondent, and in French, about Thomas’ 
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defender of phenomenology.”  McInerny claims that phenomenology influenced the way Stein read and 
interpreted the works of Thomas Aquinas.  See D. Q. McInerny, “Edith Stein as Philosopher,” Fellowship 
of Catholic Scholars  26.4  (2004):  17-32. 
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notes:  “[I]t wasn’t Thomas alone who prepared her for her reception of the Catholic 
faith.  Husserl and Thomas both opened the way.  Husserl’s realism opened her to theism; 
from Thomas she acquired a Christian outlook.  Yet it was Teresa of Avila who led her to 
the final step.”80  Teresa of Avila altered the course of Stein’s life by bringing her to the 
gateway of a new truth and ultimately to the doors of Carmel. 
  Teresa of Avila appealed to Stein as someone who lived the truth.  Examining 
herself and her life within a Carmelite convent in Spain, the young Teresa found that she 
was neither holy nor trying to live a holy life.  In an endeavor to change that, she initiated 
a spiritual regimen of personal conversation with God, dialogue with spiritual directors, 
and personal efforts to make her actions reflect her love of God.  As a result, Teresa left 
her convent to start a stricter religious order of nuns, who were “reformed” or who sought 
to follow the original rule of the Carmelite Order.  Politically, Teresa’s founding of the 
“Discalced” Carmelites81 was unsettling to the “unreformed” nuns who were afraid that 
Teresa’s renewal would force them to change.  But Teresa’s example gave hope to those 
Carmelites who sought to express their relationship with God more genuinely.  
Stein found Scheler’s exemplar of the value of holiness in Teresa of Avila.  The 
reformer’s determination to live a better life brought some of the Sisters with whom she 
lived to the recognition of a higher value, a lesson not lost on the then-questioning Edith 
Stein.  In her autobiography, the sixteenth century mystic writes:  “What I advise strongly 
is not to abandon prayer, for in prayer people will understand what they are doing and 
win repentance from the Lord and fortitude to lift themselves up.  And you must believe 
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hemp sandals as did the poor. 
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that if you give up prayer, you are, in my opinion courting danger.”82  It is easy to 
imagine Stein, who consciously gave up praying as a teenager, being captivated by 
Teresa of Avila’s direct approach.  Teresa’s candor in speech, her reflective approach to 
her own personal experiences, and her sharing through vivid description appealed to 
Stein. 
Besides finding in Teresa an outstanding exemplar of holiness, Stein promoted the 
saint as an example of courage and faith for others.  In 1934, one year after Hitler had 
risen to power in Germany, Stein writes in an essay:  “In our time, when the 
powerlessness of all natural means for battling the overwhelming misery everywhere has 
been demonstrated so obviously, an entirely new understanding of the power of prayer, of 
expiation, and of vicarious atonement has again awakened.”83  Stein offered a written 
synopsis of Teresa’s life and her intent was clear: Teresa and her writings could be a 
guide for the people of the twentieth century.  Stein continues:  “One would like to bring 
into our times also something of the spirit of this great woman who built amazingly 
during a century [16th] of battles and disturbances.”  Stein encourages the readers of this 
essay: “[W]hoever has learned to draw from these sources will never tire of gaining 
courage and strength from them again and again.”84  In 1934, a time when uncertainty 
threatened to envelop Stein and when Germany dwelt in chaos, she was intuitively drawn 
to the lived values embodied in Teresa of Avila.  
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CONCLUSION  
 In this chapter, the philosophical influences of Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler 
have been explored.  While it is beyond the scope of this work to trace Husserl or 
Scheler’s many contributions to Stein, a consideration of the phenomenological method 
and the theory of non-formal ethics has provided an opportunity to appreciate their major 
influences on Stein’s ethic.  Stein realized that Husserl’s phenomenological method 
provided a tool by which she could search for truth with confidence.  Scheler reaffirmed 
what she knew from personal experience:  that essences and values are available and 
accessible through the emotions.  Husserl’s phenomenological approach and Scheler’s 
emotional intuitionism fueled Stein’s drive for truth and allowed her to use both her 
rational and emotive powers.  The Reinachs and Teresa of Avila augmented that 
reasonable search for truth with their examples of faith in action.  Stein began to blend 
spiritual, emotional, and rational resources into a synthesis of a lived ethic.   
Husserl insists that phenomenology is the philosopher’s “quite personal affair” 
which leads to universal truths and that provides the basis of philosophy and all of the 
sciences.  Commenting on Husserl’s radical grounding, Maurice Natanson writes:  
“Husserl’s struggle for philosophical certitude begins with the recognition that it is only 
at the granite base of mundane knowledge and belief that a proper foundation is to be 
found for erecting a veridical philosophy.”85  Husserl’s phenomenological method that 
linked a “quite personal affair” with the universal, Scheler’s emotive a priorism, Adolf 
Reinach’s insistence on clarity and a mutual search for truth, Anna Reinach’s embracing 
of faith amidst suffering, and Teresa of Avila’s determination to live in truth — all of 
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these helped Stein to reach the bedrock of her own thoughts and beliefs.  But after her 
initial encounter with Husserl, Scheler, the Reinachs, and Teresa of Avila, and after her 
conversion to Catholicism, Stein came in contact with the works of the scholastic 
philosopher, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).  While Stein was convinced that truth could 
be arrived at by way of reason, the writings of Aquinas introduced her to the possibility 
of universal truth available through faith.  The next chapter will show how Stein wove 
her own ethical edifice using a foundation of phenomenology and faith. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FROM PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD TO ACTION 
INTRODUCTION  
 As a student of Husserl, Scheler, the Reinachs, and Teresa of Avila, Edith Stein 
could in a sense be called “daughter” of all five, for she mirrors the influence of her 
intellectual and spiritual “progenitors” in her writings as well as in her actions.  Stein 
reflects their influence amidst her own social and cultural surroundings and asserts her 
independence; she cuts a unique path using what she has gleaned from her predecessors 
to develop her own insights.   
Stein also reflects the influence of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), whose 
work she read, translated into German, and commented on.  Aquinas wrote his 
masterwork, Summa Theologiae, for novices, or young men studying theology in 
preparation for becoming priests and brothers, but the work is replete with systematic 
argumentation and is even today studied as a model of scholastic philosophy.  Aquinas 
distinguishes between reason and faith, philosophy and theology, but he incorporates the 
wisdom of Aristotle, the Neoplatonists, and other philosophers with the teachings of 
Scripture and the Church Fathers while adding his own “I answer that” in proposing 
solutions to questions on the nature of man, the soul, and other topics.  Confident that 
theology and philosophy, while different, are not opposed, Thomas gives testimony that 
faith and reason complement each other in the search for truth. 
Stein claims this blending as part of her own philosophical lineage.  In Finite and 
Eternal Being, she refers to this sharing between philosophy based on natural reason and 
theology founded on revealed truth, calling it “Christian philosophy.”  Stein attests to the 
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influence of Aquinas and perhaps discloses something of her own struggle to 
accommodate philosophy and faith as she writes: 
A Christian philosophy will regard it as its noblest task to prepare the way 
for supernatural faith.  This is the precise reason why St. Thomas was so 
deeply concerned with the problem of how to build a pure philosophy on 
the basis of natural reason.  He knew well that this was the only way of 
finding some common ground with unbelieving thinkers.  If the latter are 
willing to join us at least part of the way, they may perhaps subsequently 
allow themselves to be guided farther then they originally intended to go.  
From the point of view of Christian philosophy, there should then be no 
misgivings about a common effort.  Adhering to the principle, “Examine 
everything, and retain the best,” Christian philosophy is willing to learn 
from the Greeks and from the moderns and to appropriate for itself 
whatever can meet the test of its own standards of measurement.  On the 
other hand, it can well afford to display generously what it itself has to 
offer and then leave to others the task of examination and selection.1 
By examining everything available in her life world and retaining what she deems to be 
best, Stein includes philosophy and faith, and more specifically, phenomenology and 
Catholicism in her legacy. 
 Staunch philosophers who perceive a solid wall separating faith and reason would 
reject Stein’s mixed influences and would prefer that she stay on the side of reason.  
Ardent theologians would propose that Stein hold onto the course of faith based on 
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Scripture, tradition, and revealed truths.  Stein, ever the seeker after truth, recognizes that 
both philosophy and theology move her closer to truth; thus she relies on the power of 
reason as well as the power of faith to bring her to that truth.  In this chapter, I will show 
how Stein fashions her ethical stance to the life world by blending phenomenology and 
faith. 
 How can an ethic be attributed to Edith Stein, Saint Teresa Benedicta of the 
Cross, if she never wrote a system of moral action?  To posit that Stein would have 
proposed an ethic had she not died in the concentration camp would be speculative.  But 
given Stein’s philosophical and personal writings, her incessant search for truth, and her 
own actions, I posit that an ethic, an attempt to match internal thoughts and beliefs with 
external actions, can be found.  Stein penned the outline of her formal ethic with her life. 
 Stein speaks specifically of ethics in light of philosophy and theology in Finite 
and Eternal Being.  She agrees with the Neo-Thomist, Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), that 
ethics must be based on theology and philosophy.  Stein writes: 
As regards human action, Maritain has pointed out that it must be 
considered in the light of the revealed truths of original sin and redemption 
and that therefore no system of ethics can be complete if it rests 
exclusively on a purely philosophical basis.  It can be completed only if, 
acknowledging its dependence on the supernatural (i.e., on theology), it 
supplements its own basic truths with the truths of revelation.  This 
statement, it seems to me applies — with some modifications and 
additions — to all finite existence and also to the whole of philosophy.  In 
the light which the fundamental truths of the Christian faith — the truths 
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of creation, original sin, redemption, and supernatural perfection — throw 
upon the totality of existence, it appears impossible for a pure philosophy 
(i.e., a philosophy based exclusively on natural reason) to perfect itself or 
to perform a perfectum opus rationis.  It needs for its completion the aid of 
theology without, however, becoming itself a theology.2    
In order to recognize Stein’s blending of phenomenology and faith in her ethical schema, 
it is important to understand her thoughts and beliefs.  In Chapter Four, I will show how 
Stein expresses these thoughts and beliefs in ethical decisions and actions.  Before 
proceeding to those actions, however, we must understand Stein’s philosophical and 
theological concepts, specifically her realism, her concept of the soul, her schema of 
creation, and the levels of the psychophysical person.  I will then reconstruct Stein’s 
ethic, proposing that it includes four components:  a search for truth in the world 
(realism); recognition of relatedness or connection with God, self, and other human 
beings (relationship); a responsibility to unfold one’s ontic blueprint (responsibility); and 
4) openness to new horizons (grace).  We begin with a consideration of Stein’s adherence 
to realism.        
 
STEIN’S REALISM 
 Before delving into Stein’s ethical stance to the life world, it is important to make 
one distinction between her phenomenology and that of Husserl.  Initially, Stein found 
that Husserl embraced realism, but starting with Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (Ideas I, 1913), he moved away from 
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realism to a more idealistic treatment of the world and the things of the world.  Stein, 
distinguishing herself from Husserl, maintains a realism3 whereby she accepts the 
existence of the world and claims to have access to knowledge through being in the 
world.  Husserl does not reject knowledge of things in the world; however, he favors an 
ideal constitution of things in consciousness to a partial knowledge gained through 
perception of things of the world.   
Stein’s acceptance of realism dates back to her first introduction to 
phenomenology in late 1912.  At the bidding of a colleague, Georg Moskiewicz, Stein 
read Husserl’s second volume of Logical Investigations (1901).  Stein must have sensed, 
at the very least, an intellectual affinity, if not a kindred searcher for truth in Husserl, for 
she immediately made arrangements to study at the University of Göttingen during the 
1913 summer session.  In Husserl’s Logical Investigations, an early version of his 
phenomenology, the phenomenologist proposes a realistic stance.  Husserl writes in 
Logical Investigations:   
We do not wish to lose ourselves in the erring paths of such a 
metaphysics.  For us what is “in” consciousness counts as real (real) just 
as much as what is “outside” of it.  What is real (real) is the individual 
with all its constituents:  it is something here and now.  For us temporality 
is a sufficient mark of reality.  Real being and temporal being may not be 
identical notions, but they coincide in extension.  We do not, of course, 
suppose that psychical experiences are in a metaphysical sense “things.”  
                                                 
3 Steinian scholar, Sarah Borden, points out Stein’s realism as opposed to Husserl’s idealism as 
she writes:  “Stein accepts the Logical Investigations quite unambiguously but refuses to fully endorse 
Ideas I or the subsequent publications that develop the transcendental reduction.  Instead, she identifies 
herself with the tradition of phenomenological realism.”  Sarah Borden, Edith Stein (London:  Continuum, 
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But even they belong to a thinglike unity, if the traditional metaphysical 
conviction is right in holding that all temporal existents must be things, or 
must help to constitute things.  Should we wish, however, to keep all 
metaphysics out, we may simply define “reality” in terms of temporality.  
For the only point of importance is to oppose it to the timeless “being” of 
the ideal.4 
 Husserl’s sense of the individual and its constituents as real resonated with Stein’s 
search for truth.  She was convinced that the “here and now” contained its own veracity. 
In her dissertation, On Empathy, Stein seems to follow this realistic move as she 
describes how acts of empathy appear to consciousness.  In describing the constitution of 
the real outer world in intersubjective experience, Stein writes:   
The world I glimpse empathically is an existing world, posited as having 
being like the world primordially given.  The perceived world and the 
world given empathically are the same world differently seen.  But it is not 
only the same one seen from different sides as when I perceive 
primordially and, traversing continuous varieties of appearances, go from 
one standpoint to another.  Here each earlier standpoint motivates the later 
one, each following one severs the preceding one.  Of course, I also 
accomplish the transition from my standpoint to the other’s in the same 
manner, but the new standpoint does not step into the old one’s place.  I 
retain them both at the same time.  The same world is not merely 
presented now in one way and then in another, but in both ways at the 
                                                 
4 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume II, §8 in The Shorter Logical Investigations,  
trans. J. N. Findlay  (New York:  Routledge, 2001) 143. 
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same time.  And not only is it differently presented depending on the 
momentary standpoint, but also depending on the nature of the observer.5  
In Ideas I, Husserl confirms a turn that he had been considering for some time.  In 
a move that surpasses his initial turn from the natural, unreflective acceptance of the 
world to a more reflective consideration of how things appear to consciousness, Husserl 
posits a bracketing of the existence of the world and a move to an investigation of the 
transcendental object of consciousness.  In Ideas, Husserl explains this stronger concept 
of bracketing the existence of the world:   
We put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of 
the natural attitude; we parenthesize everything which that positing 
encompasses with respect to being:  thus the whole natural world which is 
continually “there for us,” “on hand,” and which will always remain there 
according to consciousness as an “actuality” even if we choose to 
parenthesize it.  If I do that, as I can with complete freedom, then I am not 
negating the “world” as though I were a sophist; I am not doubting its 
factual being as though I were a skeptic; rather I am exercising the 
“phenomenological” epoché which also completely shuts me off from any 
judgment about spatiotemporal factual being.6 
Stein, cautious of this “transcendental turn,” later comments on her reticence as she notes 
in her reminiscences:   
                                                 
5 Edith Stein, On The Problem of Empathy, trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington:  ICS, 1989) 63-64. 
 
6 Husserl, Ideas §32 in The Essential Husserl, ed. Donn Welton (Bloomington:  Indiana UP, 1999) 
65. 
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All the young phenomenologists were confirmed realists.  However, the 
Ideas included some expressions which sounded very much as though 
their Master wished to return to Idealism.  Nor could his oral interpretation 
dispel our misgivings.  It was the beginning of that development which led 
Husserl to see, more and more, in what he called “transcendental 
Idealism” the actual nucleus of his philosophy and to devote all of his 
energies to its establishment.7 
 Husserlian scholar, Harrison Hall explains Husserl’s move to idealism as he 
writes: 
Husserl chose to express the difference as that between the real and the 
ideal, the contents of empirical consciousness are real mental states and 
processes, caught up in the causal network that ties all of natural reality 
together and forms the subject matter for empirical scientific 
investigations.  The meanings which mediate natural experience are not 
part of this reality at all, are ideal rather than real, and the laws governing 
their relations are of a completely different kind.  The study of these laws 
of meaning is the legitimate function of philosophy, and so philosophy is 
an idealism, a study of the ideal intentional correlates of conscious acts 
rather than a study of their empirical reality.8   
                                                 
7 Edith Stein, Life in a Jewish Family (Washington: ICS, 1989) 250.   
 
8 Harrison Hall, “Realism and Idealism” found in Husserl’s Phenomenology:  A Textbook, ed. 
J.N. Mohanty and William R. McKenna (Washington:  Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology 
and University Press of America, 1989) 442. 
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 While working as Husserl’s assistant in 1917, Stein records again her unease with 
this turn away from realism.  To fellow realist and friend, Roman Ingarden, she writes:   
Recently I laid before the Master, most solemnly, my reservations against 
idealism. . . . [F]or two hours there was a heated debate — naturally 
without either side persuading the other.  The Master is of the opinion that 
he is not at all disinclined to change his viewpoint if one demonstrates to 
him such a necessity.  I have, however, never managed to do that.9  
Nearly two months later, Stein writes again to Ingarden:  “I will write out in neat format 
my reservations about certain points of the Ideen in preparation for a common discussion.  
I began today with ‘Idealism.’”10     
 Steinian scholar Sarah Borden confirms Stein’s stance as a realist:   
Individual experiences or objects may turn out to be dubious, erroneous, 
or illusory, but only against the backdrop of an awareness of the truly 
existing world.  Our consciousness is always already involved with objects 
and existing entities, and any attempt to reach a purified consciousness 
(that is, purified of all “prejudices” concerning existence and dedicated 
solely to the study of ideal structures) must fail.11 
While Stein never persuaded the “Master” that realism grants access to truth, Husserl 
never convinced Stein that idealism is a prerequisite for reaching truth. 
                                                 
9 Edith Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters, 1916-1942 (Washington: ICS, 1993) pages 10-11, letter 8, 
hereafter noted as 10-11, #8. 
  
10 Stein, Letters 14, #12.  Stein’s notes for her discussion with Husserl are apparently lost. 
  
11 Borden, Edith Stein 27. 
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 Embracing the life world, Stein thinks that the inconsistencies of the world help 
us to come to truth.  Stein’s realism and her rejection of Husserl’s study of the laws of 
meaning are significant and point to an essential part of her philosophy.  While she agrees 
with Husserl’s move away from a naive acceptance of the natural world to a more 
reflective seeing of things as they appear to consciousness, she does not want to 
emphasize the constitution of the world in consciousness to the exclusion of the world.  
This is seen not only in her philosophy but stems from her own life experiences.  In her 
dissertation, Stein expresses this realism:  “[T]he appearing world — which is the same, 
however and to whomever it appears — is made independent of consciousness.  Were I 
imprisoned within the boundaries of my individuality, I could not go beyond ‘the world 
as it appears to me.’”12  Stein considered the life world as a touchstone, a point of 
reference, and a clarifying factor for her, both philosophically and existentially. 
 Stein’s acceptance of the “world as it appears” gave her partial access to the truth 
but her search continued.  Her understanding of the psychophysical person would at first 
contain a philosophical treatment of the soul but eventually, she would include a 
theological interpretation of the soul.  We turn from Stein’s realism to her understanding 
of the soul, which informed her concept of the psychophysical person.   
     
THE SOUL 
 Stein mentions the soul in her dissertation, On Empathy.  She describes the 
psychophysical person as an “I” in possession of a soul, a soul that is the “bearer of the 
                                                 
12 Stein, On The Problem of Empathy 64. 
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stream of experience.”13  But Stein does not separate the body from the soul, and she 
encourages her readers to think of the psychic in terms of the physical and vice-versa as 
she writes:  “Our proposed division between soul and body was an artificial one, for the 
soul is always necessarily a soul in the body.”14    
 In her philosophical work, Finite and Eternal Being, Stein develops more fully her 
understanding of the soul.  To do this she uses the writings of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, 
and her friend and fellow philosopher, Hedwig Conrad-Martius.  The soul forms the basis 
of Stein’s threefold relatedness — the relatedness between a created human person and 
its creator, between the human person and other human beings, and between the human 
person and him/herself.   
Drawing on the metaphysics of change, specifically the act and potency 
distinction of Aristotle and Aquinas, Stein understands the creator of human beings and 
of the world to be pure being or actuality; she calls this creator “God.”  As pure being, the 
Creator God “differs from the being of every created thing.”15  Created beings possess the 
potential to act, but composed of matter, they are neither pure beings nor pure act.  
Through a “divine creative act,” the Creator bestows on human beings a life power, the 
soul.  The soul invigorates the material body (Körper), making it a living body (Leib).  
For Stein then, the soul is this life power that issues from the divine, infinite, and creative 
power of God.  Stein acknowledges her debt to Aristotle, Aquinas, and the scholastics as 
she writes: 
                                                 
13 Stein, On The Problem of Empathy cf. 40.  
 
14  Stein, On The Problem of Empathy 40-41. 
 
15 Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being 254.  
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Living beings are capable of transforming and “incorporating” in 
themselves foreign material elements and of bringing forth new structures 
of their own species.  The formal principle which commands such a 
superior formative power is called the soul by Aristotle and the scholastic 
thinkers, while the material structure that is molded by this form is 
designated as the body.16 
Stein thus speaks of a “besouled body” within which the soul, or “vital center” of the 
body, functions as the form; the body is the matter that is being formed.17  This besouled 
body has the ability to sustain itself18 and to procreate. 
 While Stein relies on scholastic thinkers for her understanding of the soul, she 
also knew that Husserl had a similar understanding of the body and soul as one entity.  
She worked on the manuscript that became Ideas II wherein Husserl describes the 
relationship between the Body19 and the soul.  Summarizing the way in which he 
characterized the living body as constituted, Husserl stated: 
[The Body] viewed from “within” — in the “inner attitude” — it appears 
as a freely moving organ (or system of such organs) by means of which 
the subject experiences the external world.  Furthermore, the Body appears 
as a bearer of sensations, and thanks to their intertwining with the rest of 
                                                 
16 Stein, Finite and Eternal Being 244-45. 
  
17 Stein, Finite and Eternal Being 183-84. 
 
18 The besouled body sustains itself in the sense of caring for itself; for Stein, as for Aquinas, God 
keeps the besouled body in existence.   
 
19 “Body” — Leib, lived body, as distinguished from “body” —  Körper, physical body.  Cf. 
Welton’s footnote in The Essential Husserl, ed. Donn Welton (Bloomington:  Indiana UP, 1999) 163.   
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the psychic life in its totality, it appears as forming, with the soul, a 
concrete unity.20 
Stein’s understanding of the psychophysical person, body and soul, draws from 
scholasticism and phenomenology alike.  
In addition to calling the soul the “life power” of the human person, Stein also 
refers to the soul as the “universal essence” that issues from the pure essence of God the 
Creator.  All human beings possess this essence or life power of the soul, which is 
therefore “universal.”  In Finite and Eternal Being, Stein explains:  “Now the universal 
essence is not something existing aside from nor something external to the individual 
thing, but the universal essence is that which can be conceived as a universal in the 
individual.”21  Since this universal essence issues from the pure essence, God, and since 
all human beings share this essence as a common factor of their makeup, Stein 
understands all human beings to be related and made in the image and likeness of God.  
There is a double sense of common descent, however, since human beings share this 
essence in common as a species as well.  This relationship, first to God and then to others 
by virtue of a sharing in the universal essence or soul is another key component of Stein’s 
ethical philosophy.   
By virtue of this sharing of the universal essence or life power, Stein develops her 
concept of “common descent.”  In Finite and Eternal Being she states:   
Each living being has its specific determinateness — which is the “same” 
for all the members of “its species” — and it owes its specificity to the 
                                                 
20 Husserl, Ideas II §42 in The Essential Husserl, ed. Donn Welton (Bloomington:  Indiana UP, 
1999) 185.  
  
21 Stein, Finite and Eternal Being 252. 
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fact that it belongs to that “whole” which as such has a common 
determinateness of the essence, because it stands within a relationship of 
common descent.22   
Understanding the besouled body to be related to God through a sharing in the universal 
essence, Stein conceives of an added relationship among all human beings through a 
shared common descent.   
Related to God because a divine creative act bestows the soul and thus enlivens 
the body, and related to other human beings because each person shares this common 
descent, the individual person also possesses a third relationship — an unfolding 
relationship within oneself.  As a besouled human being who shares in a community of 
common descent, each individual has a specific function, a particular ontic destiny 
whereby potential attributes can become actual attributes expressed in actions.  In a 
passage from Finite and Eternal Being, Stein elucidates this concept of the human being 
as contributing a unique part to the whole community of human beings:   
The species steps into existence, receives its formal impress, evolves, and 
is transformed — in individual beings.  Owing to the fact that each of 
these individual beings efficaciously actuates beyond itself and its own 
existence, all of them are linked together by a causal and existential chain.  
But each and every link of this chain is rounded off (gerundet) and 
founded in itself, and with each and every one of them a new existence or 
a new life begins.  Each of them is nonetheless also “overt,” [manifest] for 
each of them releases new individual beings and transmits — by 
transformation or variation — the particularity of the species.  With the 
                                                 
22 Stein, Finite and Eternal Being 258. 
120 
 
 
first individual being of a species there begins simultaneously the 
existence of the species as a comprehensive wholeness in which all those 
individual beings that are interrelated by common descent 
[Abstammungszusammenhang] inhere as “links” or members.  The 
wholeness is actualized in the juxtaposition and temporal sequence of its 
specimens.23  
Each individual human person has a unique role to fulfill in sustaining and generating not 
only his/her own life, but also the life of the community.  Each person is free, posits 
Stein, to procreate physically as well as psychically in unfolding his/her ontic core.  Each 
person, then, possesses within him/herself a unique “ontological map” or blueprint by 
which the person, in maturation, comes to know self and his/her role in the development 
of the worldwide human family.  The soul — giving the human being the ability to 
unfold this ontological map, which Stein refers to as a “kernel”24 — enables the 
psychophysical person to actualize his/her potential as a fully individuated human being.  
The soul, the universal essence that issues from the creator to the created, that 
links individuals to others, and that unfolds the ontological map of each human person, is 
the source of the relatedness of human beings to God, others, and self.  In order to realize 
more fully Stein’s unfolding of human potentiality into actuality, it is important to be 
aware of how she understands the created order and the human person.  We turn first to 
                                                 
23 Stein, Finite and Eternal Being 262. 
 
24 Husserl also uses the word “kernel” as in “kernel of truth.”  More importantly, Husserl notes 
this teleological goal of unfolding the ontic blueprint.  In the article for Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
“Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology (1927),” wherein Husserl uses “kernel 
of truth,” he also writes: “The tracing back of all being to the transcendental subjectivity and its constitutive 
intentional functions leaves open, to mention one more thing, no other way of contemplating the world than 
the teleological.”  Cf. Husserl, “Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology” in 
The Essential Husserl 335.      
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Stein’s understanding of the order of creation which includes phenomenological 
description and theological themes.  
 
STEIN’S SCHEMA OF CREATION 
 
 In her 1931 essay for Catholic women entitled “The Separate Vocations of Man 
and Woman According to Nature and Grace,”25 Stein explains her schema of creation by 
beginning with a literal interpretation of the creation story.  Found in Genesis,26 the first 
book of scriptures or sacred writings of both the Jewish and Christian religions, this 
mythical creation story reveals the power and goodness of God the creator, who brings 
life out of nothingness.  Stein uses the story to elucidate her concept of the order of 
humanity, which encompasses created, fallen, and redeemed humanity.     
 Initially, explains Stein, man and woman were each created as recipients of the 
divine breath of God, even though, according to the creation story, man was created first.  
In the first or “Created Order,” man and woman are given the same tasks of reflecting the 
image of God, bringing forth posterity, and being stewards of the earth,27 they are equal; 
however, man and woman accomplish these tasks in different ways.  By nature, Stein 
                                                 
25 Edith Stein, “The Separate Vocations of Man According to Nature and Grace,” in Essays on 
Woman (Washington: ICS, 1996) 59-85. 
 
26 Genesis 1:1 - 2:3 is designated the “first story of creation” and describes how God created the 
heavens and the earth out of a formless wasteland.  Genesis 2:4 - 3:24 recounts the creation of man and 
woman.  The New American Bible (New York:  Catholic Book P, 1970) 4-7.  While Stein follows literally 
the second creation story (she notes that man is created before woman), her emphasis is on the creative act 
of God and the harmony of creation that exists within self, among others, and with the entire created world.   
   
27 Stein, “Separate Vocations,” in Essays on Woman         61.  Stein writes:  “Mutually, they [men 
and women] are given the threefold vocation:  they are to be the image of God, bring forth posterity, and be 
masters over the earth.” 
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describes woman as tending toward the whole, the personal, and the living.28  The 
feminine soul also strives to mesh theoretical views with practical actions.  Lastly, Stein 
describes woman as inclined toward sharing life as a companion, which she does through 
listening and ministering to another.  Stein types man as naturally tending to the abstract 
and theoretical.  While woman tends to the whole, man is able to focus his attention on 
one enterprise to the exclusion of others; Stein judges that “it is difficult for him to 
become involved in other beings and their concerns.”29  Rather than as a companion, 
Stein defines man by nature as a leader.  
 Stein’s typecasting of man and woman as equal but different comes very close to 
stereotyping woman as “helpmate” and man as “leader.”  In her writings, Stein also 
delineates certain professions, such as teaching, healthcare, and social work as 
“feminine.”  Stein states:   
In using the term “feminine profession” significantly, it can only denote 
those objective tasks assigned by the feminine nature.  This would mean 
all vocations depending on sympathetic rapport such as nursing, 
education, and social work; consequently also included would be the 
vocation of doctor and nurse, teacher and governess, housemaid, and the 
entire range of contemporary social services.30    
Stein’s stereotyping seems to support Sawicki’s claim that Stein “types” people, and, in 
this case, men and women, into neat and narrowly defined roles with clear and easily 
                                                 
28 Stein, , “The Ethos of Women’s Professions,” in Essays on Woman 45.  According to Stein:  
“Woman naturally seeks to embrace that which is living, personal, and whole.  To cherish, guard, protect, 
nourish and advance growth is her natural, maternal yearning.”  
   
29 Stein, “Ethos,” Essays on Woman 46.  
 
30 Stein, “Ethos,” Essays on Woman 49. 
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identifiable characteristics.  Stein’s vision, though, is always of the fully developing and 
acting human person who contributes to the community.  So while stereotyping women 
as caretakers, Stein clearly states that women can perform any job that man can perform.  
In the same essay, Stein writes:   
Individual gifts and tendencies can lead to the most diversified activities.  
Indeed, no woman is only woman; like a man, each has her individual 
specialty and talent, and this talent gives her the capability of doing 
professional work, be it artistic, scientific, technical, etc.  Essentially, the 
individual talent can enable her to embark on any discipline, even those 
remote from the usual feminine vocations.31    
 While both man and woman share equally in the universal essence or soul, Stein 
posits that woman’s soul is different from man’s soul in that her attributes are different.  
In the essay, entitled “The Ethos of Women’s Professions,” Stein writes:  “[I]t follows 
from the Thomistic principle of anima forma corporis [soul (is the) form of the body] 
that such a spiritual characteristic does exist [in woman]. . . .  [W]oman shares a basic 
human nature, but basically her faculties are different from men’s; therefore a differing 
type of soul must exist as well.”32  In Stein’s schema, the body, made for the soul, reflects 
this differentiation.  This schema follows the teaching of Thomas Aquinas who explained 
in the Summa Theologiae:   
Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we 
must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and 
                                                 
31 Edith Stein, “Ethos,” Essays on Woman (Washington: ICS, 1996) 49. 
 
32 Stein, “Ethos,” Essays on Woman 45.  
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not conversely. . . .  But nature never fails anyone what is necessary, and 
therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power 
of understanding, but also with the power of sensing.  Now the action of 
the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument.  Therefore the 
intellectual soul had to be united to a body which could be the fitting 
organ of sense.33 
Stein reiterates Aquinas’ teachings:  not only is the “matter for the form” in terms of the 
human body being for the intellectual soul, but the male and female bodies, different but 
equal, reflect the differing but equal male and female souls. 
While Stein’s descriptions and typecasting of man and woman are problematic, 
her vision of blending feminine and masculine qualities, both within the individual and 
within the community is important.  According to Stein’s schema, each individual must 
come to know and to recognize his/her own gifts and to develop them for the good of all.  
Stein maintains:   
For a wholesome collaboration of the sexes in professional life will be 
possible only if both achieve a calm and objective awareness of their 
nature and draw practical conclusions from it.  God created humanity as 
man and woman, and he created both according to His own image.  Only 
the purely developed masculine and feminine nature can yield the highest 
                                                 
33 Thomas Aquinas in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. 1 
(Indianapolis:  Hackett, 1997).  Summa Theologica 710-711, Q. 75, Art 5.  
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attainable likeness to God.34  Only in this fashion can there be brought 
about the strongest interpenetration of all earthly and divine life.35   
Man and woman, different but equal and both charged with the same “vocation,”36 are 
called to be image, progenitor, and steward, 37 and are to help one another in fulfilling 
these tasks.  Cognizant of and willing to share their gifts, man and woman fulfill their 
ontological mission. 
 Stein’s analysis and description of the different but equal natures of man and 
woman are important because they point to a third basic theme in her ethical philosophy:  
the responsibility of humans to work together to achieve harmony — harmony that Stein 
considers to be the birthright of all human beings.  Stein agrees with traditional 
theological teaching that harmony, within self, with God, and with others was lost 
through sin.  She suggests that human beings strive to regain this threefold harmony with 
God, self, and others through responsible reflection and action.  Examination of an 
individual’s life world and natural gifts directs that individual to an acceptance and 
appreciation of his/her uniqueness and an awareness of his/her ontic destiny, moving the 
individual toward actions that contribute to the original state of harmony.   
                                                 
34 It seems that Stein refers to God as androgynous in this passage, i.e., God has both feminine and 
masculine characteristics.  Stein indeed prefigures current spiritual thinking that identifies God as Father 
and Mother. 
 
35 Stein, “Ethos,” Essays on Woman 57.  
 
36 Stein distinguishes between “vocation” which she considers as a means by which the ontic 
blueprint is unfolded and “profession” which can be accomplished as a means to livelihood.  She writes:  
“A person’s attitude toward his or her profession clearly helps determine the results achieved in it.  
Whoever regards his work as a mere source of income or as a pastime will perform it differently from the 
person who feels that his profession is an authentic vocation.”  Stein, “Ethos,” Essays on Woman 44. 
 
37 Stein, Finite and Eternal Being 262. 
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According to Stein’s schema, at the beginning of the creation of human beings, 
“the faculties in each individual were in perfect harmony; senses and spirit [were] in right 
relation with no possibility of conflict.”38  Stein, echoing an Augustinian theme, 
conceives of the first humans as beings in right relationship with God, with each other, 
and within themselves.  However, Stein considers that the original order was obliterated 
after the Fall, that is, after the turning of man and woman away from God through sin.39   
This turning of man and woman away from God signals the second order of 
humanity that Stein calls the “Fallen Order.”  She writes:  “After their Fall, the 
relationship between them [man and woman] is transformed from a pure partnership of 
love to a relationship of sovereignty and subordination.  The difficult struggle for 
existence is allocated primarily to the man and the hardship of childbirth to woman.”40  In 
this fallen order, tension replaces a spirit of cooperation, and man and woman see 
themselves in competition rather than as sharers in a common descent.     
 In the third order, the “Redeemed Order,” each individual recognizes the dignity 
of his/her being made in the image and likeness of God.  In addition, the individual is 
able to unfold his/her unique qualities that contribute to harmony within him/herself, 
within the community, and within the universal family.  The individual strives to reflect 
                                                 
38 Stein, “Separate Vocations,” Essays on Woman 62. 
 
39 Augustine of Hippo (354-430) saw sin as a threefold rupture of a human being whereby he/she 
destroys his/her bond with God, self, and others.  Augustine writes of his own first-hand experience of this 
rupture.   In his autobiography, Confessions, for example, Augustine writes:  “I still thought that it was not 
ourselves who sin, but that some sort of different nature within us commits the sin.  It gave joy to my pride 
to be above all guilt, and when I did an evil deed, not to confess that I myself had done it, so that you might 
heal my soul, since it had sinned against you.  I loved to excuse myself, and to accuse I know not what 
other being that was present with me but yet was not I.  But in truth I was the one whole being, and my own 
impiety had divided me against myself.”  Augustine of Hippo, The Confessions of Saint Augustine, trans. 
John K. Ryan (New York:  Doubleday:  1960) 126.   
 
40 Stein, “Separate Vocations,” Essays on Woman 70. 
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this uniqueness, this divine image in his/her dealings with others.  This recognition of 
being made in the image of God comes from an awareness that the human person is made 
of body and soul.   
 In the first order of creation, Stein describes a harmony that exists between creator 
and created, between man and woman, and within one’s self.  Man and woman, 
manifesting God’s creative act differently but equally, work together in reflecting God’s 
creative image, bringing forth posterity, and taking care of the earth.  The harmonious 
order was disrupted, however, and Stein cites the tension between man and woman as 
proof of that fallen order.  In the redeemed order, Stein envisions a restoration of 
harmony through recognition of personal gifts and responsible sharing of these gifts for 
the good of all.  A spirit of cooperation replaces the existing spirit of dominance and 
submission. 
 Stein suggests that the redeemed order can only occur if individual persons 
recognize their human dignity and contribute to a universal harmony that radiates beyond 
self.  Human dignity is fostered, posits Stein, by an understanding of the psychophysical 
person.  We consider, then, Stein’s four levels of the psychophysical person.    
 
FOUR LEVELS OF THE PSYCHOPHYSICAL PERSON 
 
 Stein gradually develops her concept of the psychophysical person, and as is the 
case for Scheler, the study of the human person is a recurring theme in her works.  We 
have mentioned Stein’s concept of the soul as found in Finite and Eternal Being.  In a 
previous work, her dissertation, On Empathy, Stein describes the psychophysical person 
as comprised of four phenomenal levels of activity which, though distinct, influence one 
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another:  physical, sentient or emotional, mental, and personal.41  These four levels of the 
psychophysical person work together in helping an individual to understand phenomena.  
In her habilitation treatise, “Sentient Causality,” Stein, elaborating on her initial 
dissertation, considers the effects of causality and motivation on each level of the 
psychophysical person.  These four levels intertwine to form the life stream of the person 
which is supported by the soul, and which finds expression in valuation and action. 
The Physical Level 
 
   The physical layer of the psychophysical person is comprised of the physical 
body, Körper, which takes up physical space in the life world and is ruled by laws of 
causality.  By causality, Stein means a mediated effect, that is, a causal process is 
enacted, either from the outer world onto the person or vice-versa.42  Using Stein’s 
examples, an actor may make an onlooker cry; a person perceiving a stone coming 
toward him can deflect the stone.  The physical layer is affected by causality.  The 
physical level is the most apparent level and the level at which an individual interfaces 
with the life world and with others in that world.  The physical level is also the most 
basic level at which the things of the world are in contact with the human person.   
The Sentient Level 
 
 Building on and related to the physical level is the sentient or feeling level of the 
human person.  This level is also ruled by causality.  It is at this second level that the 
effect of the universal essence is perceived.  The physical body, manifesting a share in 
                                                 
41 Steinian scholar Marianne Sawicki has done much work in elucidating these four phenomenal 
layers and is responsible for naming them.  See Editor’s Introduction in Stein, Philosophy of Psychology 
and the Humanities, trans. Mary Catherine Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki (Washington: ICS, 2000) xv. 
 
42 Stein, On The Problem of Empathy cf. 72. 
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the universal essence (imparted by the Pure Essence), is alive and sensing.  A “life 
power”43  that courses through the human body is especially evident at the sentient level.  
The sentient level finds expression at the physical level: excitement, for example, 
registers in a person’s eyes or manner of talking.   
Marianne Sawicki connects Stein’s use of the term life power with the evolving 
technology of electricity in 1919 that so fascinated Stein.44  This life power, like electrical 
current, can be drawn on, exhausted, and replenished by life experiences, thus showing a 
flow between all four layers.  For example, a person may be tired on a physical level after 
a full day at work, but an invitation to dinner, registering on the sentient level, may cause 
an upsurge in energy within the psychophysical being.  Conversely, a physically fit 
person who is enthusiastically looking forward to taking a walk with a friend may feel 
her energy wane while waiting impatiently for the friend to get ready. 
The Mental Level 
 
The third level of the psychophysical person, the mental level, is the locus of 
intellect and meaning.  This is the level, thinks Stein, where motivation is important.  At 
this level, meaning, and not causality, holds sway.  The meaning that is received through 
music or works of art at the mental level can affect the sentient level and thus replenish 
the life power.  Reflection on an artwork or a beautiful musical piece can replenish life 
power on the physical as well as the sentient levels.  Meaning has a direct impact on 
motivation, too.  Reading a difficult text, for instance, can drain a student’s energy and 
motivate the student to pack up her books and go to another, easier task.  Poring over a 
                                                 
43  In this study, “lifepower” will be stated “life power.” 
   
44 Sawicki makes this connection in her Introduction to Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the 
Humanities xviii.  Borden also notes the analogy between life power and electrical current in Borden, Edith 
Stein 34.   
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difficult text and persevering until some understanding occurs, however, can spur the 
reader on to tackle more difficult concepts. 
The Personal Level 
 
The personal level or personal core is the realm of freedom expressed in the 
personality and actions of the individual; of the four levels, the personal level most 
distinctly manifests the relationship between the individuated soul and Pure Being.  It is 
at this level that the “unchangeable kernel”45 can be found and unfolded.  Stein’s 
ontology is clear:  “[W]e see the meaning of life to be this unfolding of the person.”46  
This level, which affirms the human person’s individuality, would seem the locus of the 
“soul”; however, Stein considers life power or that which emanates from the soul as 
running through and connecting all four levels of the psychophysical person.   
 Connected with the physical, sentient, and mental levels, the personal level retains 
its own source of life power, as if possessing a private reserve.  Though conditioned by 
sentient causality and influenced by motives, the personal core remains independent.  
Borden explains that the personal level is “relatively independent”47 as she writes:   
Influences flow directly between the physical and the sentient realms and 
between the sentient and the mental realms.  In addition, Stein claims that 
the fourth realm, the personal layer, retains its own reserve of life power 
regardless of the state of the other three realms.  The fourth realm, the 
center of the will, always has the power to make a resolve, even though 
                                                 
45 Stein, On The Problem of Empathy 110. 
 
46 Stein, On The Problem of Empathy 111. 
 
47 Borden, Edith Stein 36. 
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the physical, sentient, and mental reserves may be low or exhausted.  The 
personal realm, Stein claims, is properly the center of the person and the 
center of free choices and, although conditioned by sentient causality and 
directed by motives, it nonetheless retains its distinctiveness.  The 
personal realm is not utterly independent of the other levels (they provide 
conditioning influences); it is nonetheless relatively independent.48   
It is at this personal level that the human will is evident.  Because of this will, 
Stein deems that a range of possible, reasonable actions can emerge, but never be 
determined in advance.  Though the human person gathers information through all four 
levels and knows the effects of both causality and motivation, he/she is free to choose 
action.  It is this freedom of the human will that leads Stein to conclude that deliberate 
human action can never be predicted.  In her final work on Saint John of the Cross, The 
Science of the Cross, Stein states this idea succinctly:  “The soul has the right to make 
decisions that concern herself.  It is the great mystery of personal freedom, before which 
God himself comes to a halt.”49  For Stein, personality, a unique expression of an 
individual person, emanating from the personal level, manifests free will and the dignity 
of each human person.  This free will is seen in the action that the person chooses. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Borden, Edith Stein 35-36. 
 
49 Edith Stein, The Science of the Cross as found in John Sullivan, Edith Stein:  Essential Writings 
(Maryknoll:  Orbis Books, 2002) 148.   
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An Example       
Marianne Sawicki suggests thinking of the phenomenal levels as “porous and 
blending into one another.”50  Sarah Borden gives a concrete example of this blending 
causality, motivation, and will operating within the four levels.  Borden explains: 
Suppose that I slice my finger with a knife while preparing a salad.  The 
cut itself occurs on the physical level.  When I register the event a few 
moments later as I see blood glistening on the blade of the knife, I gasp 
and shudder quickly.  The cut has registered on the sentient level.  I may 
then think to myself, “You knew that this knife was too sharp to use for 
this, and especially when you are in a hurry.”  I would thus register the 
event on the mental level, making intelligible how and why the event 
occurred.  And, finally, I might make the free decision to sit for a minute, 
calm myself down, find a bandage, and continue making dinner with a 
different knife.  The final decisions were not necessary ones — I could 
have cried and abandoned the meal — but rather decisions arising from 
the personal realm.51  
The physical and sentient levels operate under the laws of causality.  On a physical level, 
the law of causality ordains that a knife drawn against skin cuts; broken skin bleeds.  
Causality on the sentient level leads to a gasp and shudder; the injured person feels pain.  
But while causality on the physical and sentient levels leads to the thought of using a 
smaller knife, meaning — and not causality — holds sway at the mental level.  The 
                                                 
50 Marianne Sawicki’s Introduction to Stein, Finite and Eternal Being xv. 
 
51 Borden, Edith Stein 33-34.  Sawicki uses a similar example in her Introduction to Stein, Finite 
and Eternal Being xii. 
133 
 
 
rational motivation on the mental or intellectual level can lead to an action on the 
personal level, but action on this level is not predictable causally, is not absolutely 
determinable — until the person acts.   
 Reflecting the influence of Scheler, Stein posits that an act at the personal level, 
made through an individual’s free choice, displays a value essential to that individual’s 
soul.  Thus, the person who cuts him/herself while preparing a meal can either quit or 
continue after getting medical attention.  [The person who continues to prepare the salad 
unaware of the hurt may be limited, for whatever reasons, on the physical and/or sentient 
levels.  Perhaps the chef has nerve damage to his/her hand or is engrossed in thought and 
unaware of what he/she is doing.]  The physically and emotionally sound person who 
continues to prepare the salad, ignoring the wound and not stopping the flow of blood, 
seems “unreasonable,” and his/her action can be deemed beyond the bounds of rational 
behavior.  The person “conditioned by sentient causality and directed by motives”52 is 
able to choose, and his action of quitting can show his choice of the value of 
pain/pleasure; if he continues, he shows the value of spirit and determination.   
 Stein’s idea that an act reveals a value of one’s personal essence will be 
considered in Chapter Four.  For now, we recognize that an “act” of the person emerges 
from the interplay of physical, sentient, and mental influences in conjunction with free 
will at the personal level.  These four phenomenal layers are intertwined in what Husserl 
and Stein refer to as the “life stream.” 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Borden, Edith Stein 36. 
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THE CURRENT OF THE LIFE STREAM 
Stein describes, in Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, a person’s 
move from perceiving the sensuous world to constituting the world in consciousness.    
We note Stein’s confidence both in the world as a touchstone for truth and in the ability 
of consciousness to clarify truth, as we find it, in the life world.  Evidencing her training 
in phenomenology, Stein writes:    
We are led back from the thing of nature that is one and the same for all 
individuals who encounter it, toward the thing as it presents itself to the 
individual encountering it at the moment.  We can separate from the fully 
material thing the “phantom,” the sensuously filled-in spatial pattern 
without real-causal properties, of which in turn the bare sight-thing, the 
purely visual, is constituted.  Multiple “adumbrations” correspond to this 
according to the placement of the viewing subject.  Each visible quality — 
color, shape, and so forth — represents itself in adumbrations, to be sure.  
Finally, as the bottom layer of the correlates of consciousness, we find the 
data of sensation, which aren’t yet interpreted as characteristics of a 
thingly carrier.  To all these “noematic” manifolds correspond “noetic” 
ones:  the life proper of consciousness.  Consciousness occupies itself 
(“occupation” understood in a very broad sense) with each step in a 
different manner.  Owing to this busy-ness of consciousness, the noematic 
unities of the lower steps turn into manifolds in which the unities of the 
higher steps are constituted.  If we keep on going back, we come finally to 
an ultimate constituting consciousness that doesn’t busy itself anymore 
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with constituted unities:  the original current of consciousness or 
experience-current.  With that we want to start our reflections.53 
 As Stein states, a “thing of nature,” a tree, for the purpose of illustration, presents 
itself in “multiple adumbrations . . . according to the placement of the viewing subject.”  
This thing of nature “is one and the same for all individuals who encounter it.”  Through 
the phenomenological reduction, there is a move from the outer, natural world to the 
inner world of consciousness as these sensuous qualities of color and shape give way to 
acts of consciousness.  Just as the “thingly thing” (the tree, for example), is one and the 
same for individuals who encounter it, the process of constituting the object in 
consciousness is the same, too.  We see in Stein, then, a double confidence:  1) a 
confidence that the world is real and a touchstone for how things really are, and 2) a 
confidence in the ability of the human person to constitute objects in consciousness that 
clarify and augment the natural world.  This is precisely where Stein remains a 
phenomenological realist and refuses to make the transcendental move of Husserl.  In 
Finite and Eternal Being, Stein speaks of this acceptance of the world: 
In human sense perception, the things and events of the external world are 
given in order to be accepted.  It is in people’s power to move closer and 
closer toward these things and events and also to use other means which 
may aid them in acquiring more exact knowledge.  But when we use the 
word “acceptance” we think not so much of the efforts connected with 
gaining exact sense knowledge, but rather of what is implied in the word 
                                                 
53 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 8.  Stein notes that she is deviating from 
Husserl’s Ideas in that he includes the noetic and noematic in his manifold of consciousness.  Stein is going 
to separate the noetic side of consciousness from the noematic and consider it as a “flow.”  Husserl 
considers time in terms of “flow” or movement.   
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assent or belief (in the broadest, non-religious sense of the term, such as 
the English word belief has):  I am to believe or give credence to what I 
see or hear.  And in view of the inescapable obtrusiveness with which the 
things and objects of our immediate environment urge themselves upon 
us, it appears hardly possible to refuse assent to what is “given” in this 
manner.54 
Stein’s phenomenology, founded on the natural world, accesses truth which is confirmed, 
understood, and enhanced by consciousness, while Husserl founds his later 
phenomenology on transcendental consciousness which constitutes the world.     
 Turning her regard from the noematic, meaning-side to the noetic, or actively 
constituting side of consciousness, Stein follows Husserl in defining consciousness in 
terms of a “current” or a “flow” that is pure becoming; experiences or phases within this 
flow move together and form “one undivided and indivisible continuum.”55  Experiences 
within this current are “unities in the current that start up new in one phase, propagate, 
remain alive while they are running, reach an end at last, yet preserve themselves after 
that conclusion.”56  These experiences can come about simultaneously so that a number 
of experiences occur at the same time.  Stein gives the example of hearing a tone, seeing 
a color, and feeling contentment at the same time.     
 Yet what distinguishes and joins these different kinds of experiences?  Each 
person, each “I” possesses a stream of consciousness.  Stein states that the “I” is the unity 
                                                 
54 Stein, Finite and Eternal Being 401.  
 
55 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 9. 
 
56 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 11. 
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of this stream of consciousness and that the soul is the “bearer” or sustaining support of 
this consciousness and the experiences of which it is made.  Recall the concept of soul, 
described previously in this chapter, as a sharing in the pure essence that permeates all 
levels of the human person.  While the soul connects individuals to God and other 
ensouled individuals, the soul also unifies the physical, sentient, mental, and personal 
levels that structure the psychophysical individual.  It is the soul that supports the stream 
of experiences within the life stream. 
 As Stein’s life developed, so did evolve her thoughts on the soul.  In her first 
phenomenological work, On the Problem of Empathy, Stein describes the “I” as the unity 
of the stream of consciousness.  After her conversion to Catholicism, Stein describes the 
soul in scholastic terms:  the soul is the substantial form, the animator, of the body.  
Later, in her last phenomenological work, Stein refuses to separate the body and soul, 
viewing the distinction as artificial.  For Stein, the soul permeates all layers of the 
psychophysical human being. 
 In unfolding the ontic core, a blueprint known to God but discovered at the 
innermost depths of a person while in relationship to God, self, and others, it seems as if 
there is limited freedom.  God has determined the ontic blueprint and it is each person’s 
responsibility to discover it and live it out, thus bringing about a redeemed order.  Stein’s 
understanding of creation plays a significant answer in addressing this riddle.  Stein, 
recognizing herself as created, identifies God as creator.  Made in God’s image and 
likeness by virtue of a share in the pure essence, Stein considers each individual person as 
a co-creator with the ability to bring about the redeemed order.  Thus, while God may 
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have a design for each person, that person has free will to co-create with God, in a loving 
relationship.  Steinian scholar Sarah Borden explains:   
Because our individual form lies at the level of soul, Stein in no way 
denies human freedom.  She says, “[t]he human being is a spiritual person 
because he stands freely opposite not only his body but also his soul 
(Seele), and only so far as he has power over his soul has he also power 
over his body.”  We are free because, although having a particularly 
formed soul, we also have power over our souls, and we may choose 
which psychological (seelische) traits and tendencies to act upon.  We can 
refuse, for example, to entertain envy or we may cut short an aggressive 
action or thought.  Our traits – both bodily and psychological ones – need 
not dominate our being.  We retain an independence and power, albeit not 
complete, over them.  The freedom to choose among the possibilities 
available to us, is central to all personality.57 
Stein’s posits the body, soul, and mind as weaving together to form the life stream.  
Though created by God and directed in part by God, Stein asserts the freedom of each 
ensouled body.    
This exposition emphasizes Stein’s concept of the current of the life stream.  Stein 
writes:  “You can say the current is one because it streams forth for one I.  Because what 
lives into the future out of the past, what feels new life bursting out of itself every 
moment, what carries the whole trail of bygones with itself — that’s the I.”58   
                                                 
57 Sarah Borden, Edith Stein 112-13. 
 
58 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 13. 
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It is within this current of consciousness — this life stream — that Stein’s 
phenomenological realism, understanding of the soul, and four levels of the 
psychophysical person mesh.  The psychophysical person comprised of body and soul, 
perceived as and perceiving as physical, sentient, mental, and personal being, carries past 
and present experiences together as it unfolds its ontic blueprint.  From this synthesis 
come actions that reflect the human person’s values which in turn shape an ethical life.  
 
A RECONSTRUCTION OF STEIN’S ETHIC 
 Stein tried on several occasions to connect the scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas 
with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.  In a 1929 special issue of the Jahrbuch für 
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Stein’s tribute to the seventy-year-old 
Husserl took the form of an imagined meeting, captured in her written gift, “What is 
Philosophy?  A Conversation between Edmund Husserl and Thomas Aquinas.”  Because 
the editor of the special edition, Martin Heidegger, asked Stein to tone down the 
imaginative conversation, she reworked the dialogue into standard paragraph form.  The 
revised work, “An Attempt to Contrast Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. 
Thomas Aquinas” changed in format but not in intention.59  Stein’s attempt to unite 
scholasticism and phenomenology surfaced again in 1931 when she tried unsuccessfully 
to gain a university position.  In her Habilitationsschrift for the University of Freiburg, 
“Potency and Act,” Stein again attempted to show the compatibility of the two 
                                                 
59 Dr. Lucy Gelber explains this revision in her Introduction to Knowledge and Faith, a 
posthumously published work that contains Stein’s religious and phenomenological works.  Knowledge 
and Faith contains Stein’s original, imagined conversation between Aquinas and Husserl, as well as the 
revised essay.  See Edith Stein, Knowledge and Faith, trans. Walter Redmond, (Washington:  ICS, 2000) 
xx. 
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approaches.  Six years later, from within the walls of the Cologne cloister, Stein 
submitted a much expanded version of the former Habilitationsschrift, now called “Finite 
and Eternal Being” for publication.  This work treated “the fundamental ontological 
questions in the comparison between scholasticism and phenomenology.”60  Perhaps it is 
not in these published attempts but in Stein’s ethic, never written but suggested and lived, 
that she most clearly meshes scholasticism and phenomenology.  Stein’s adherence to 
Aquinas’ theory of body and soul and natural law as well as Husserl’s privileging of the 
subjective view and conscious openness to new horizons is reflected in her search for 
truth in theory and practice. 
 So what might an ethic that combined scholasticism and phenomenology look 
like?  We go to Stein for a glimpse of such an ethic, reconstructing her moral plan from 
her philosophical, autobiographical, and personal writings.  The “maxim” or rule of 
conduct61 for Stein’s Christian, phenomenological ethic might well be the passage from 
the Gospel of John (8:32):  “. . . you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.”62   
This search for truth is the foundation of Stein’s ethic.  In addition to this ever-present 
search for truth, I posit that Stein’s ethic would contain four intertwining elements:  1) a 
perceiving of the phenomenon of truth; 2) an honoring of relationships; 3) a 
responsibility to unfold one’s ontic blueprint; and 4) openness to new horizons. 
 These components of Stein’s ethic take place as the life stream moves toward 
truth.  Before exploring these four components, we will consider Stein’s “being toward 
                                                 
60 Steven Payne’s Foreword in Stein, Finite and Eternal Being xv. 
 
61 “Maxim,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 1996 ed.  Immanuel Kant used the word 
maxim in referring to his ethical system based on duty, free will, and the categorical imperative. 
 
62 The New American Bible, Catholic Biblical Association of America (New York:  Catholic 
Book P, 1970). 
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truth” — her allowance for the subjective search for universal truth.  Three concepts 
regarding truth are intertwined:  1) human beings naturally seek truth; 2) truth is 
accessible to human beings; and 3) human beings search for truth in a subjective way.  
First, we consider the universality of the search for truth.  
 
Allowance for Universal Truth 
 Stein’s blending of scholasticism and phenomenology allowed for universals, that 
is, laws that hold for all people, at all times, in all circumstances.  The ultimate universal, 
for which Stein searched, was truth.  She pursued truth intellectually and experientially.  
This quest brought Stein to the study of psychology, to philosophy, and eventually to 
faith.  She was so sure of the reality of truth, accessible to rational human beings living in 
the life world, that she claimed:  “God is truth.  All who seek truth seek God, whether this 
is clear to them or not.”63 
 Initially, Stein thought that Husserl and phenomenology answered her search for 
truth. We have already mentioned her response after being introduced to Husserl, being 
immersed in phenomenological literature and the Göttingen Circle:  “[W]hat I had 
learned about phenomenology . . . fascinated me tremendously because it consisted 
precisely of such a labor of clarification and because, here, one forged one’s own mental 
tools for the task at hand.”64  Stein was impressed by Husserl’s search for truth and his 
manner of approaching it.  As Husserl’s student and assistant, she must have heard and 
observed many times the move to greater clarity in search of truth.      
                                                 
63 Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 272, #259.  
 
64 Stein, Life 222.  
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 Stein found fellow searchers for truth in Max Scheler, Adolf Reinach, and Teresa 
of Avila.  Scheler’s sharing of his theories on ethics, the hierarchy of values, and the 
primacy of the human person moved Stein toward truth.  She claims that because of 
Scheler’s influence “the barriers of rationalistic prejudices with which I had unwittingly 
grown up fell and the world of faith unfolded before me.”65  In her colleague Adolf 
Reinach, Stein found a kindred searcher for truth, a person who, as Hildebrand described 
him, was known for his “unconditional love of truth.”66  In Teresa of Avila, Stein 
recognized a religious woman who also called this universal truth “God.”  Stein studied 
with and was attracted by people whose search for truth gave irrefutable evidence that 
universal truth existed and that human beings sought truth. 
 This search for and dedication to universal truth was also familiar to Thomas 
Aquinas.  In his treatise, On Truth (Questiones diputatae de veritate, 1256-1259), a work 
that Stein translated from Latin into German, Aquinas confirms this universal truth as he 
states:  “The first truth must be one for all things.”67  Stein agreed with Aquinas that the 
first truth is God.  Stein also found truth especially in two of Aquinas’ concepts:  the 
natural purpose of all of creation, and the natural law.  Thomas, crediting Aristotle in his 
“Treatise on Happiness” in Contra Gentiles, explains the idea of natural desire:  “Natural 
desire cannot be empty, since nature does nothing in vain.  But nature’s desire would be 
                                                 
65 Stein, Life 260. 
 
66 Qtd. by Karl Schumann and Barry Smith, “Adolf Reinach:  An Intellectual Biography” in K. 
Mulligan, ed., Speech Acts and Sachverhalt:  Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology.  
(Dordrecht:  Nijhoff, 1987) 13. 
 
67 Thomas Aquinas, Truth, ed. Robert W. Mulligan, vol. 1 (Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1952) 
25, Q. I, Art. 5.  
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empty if it could never be fulfilled.  Therefore man’s natural desire can be fulfilled.”68  
Stein also agreed with Thomas’ adherence to natural law in his Treatise on Law.  Natural 
law, based on divine law which orders the universe, is written in every human heart.  
Aquinas is characteristically succinct:  “Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is 
to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided.”69  Stein seems especially drawn to 
the ordering of our natural inclinations as rational human beings, who, Aquinas explains 
have a “natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society.”70  Stein’s 
natural inclination and desire for truth, according to natural law, cannot and should not be 
thwarted.  Her desire for harmony, for the redeemed order, is also in keeping with natural 
law.  Stein’s search for truth and her desire for harmony are not passing fancies; they are 
written in her heart and they seek expression.    
 Stein came to the realization of universal truth gradually, but once she embraced 
this truth, it set into motion the rest of her philosophical and theological queries.  She 
joined her mentors in the search for universal truths, but she forged her own way in 
discovering and expressing this truth.      
 
Recognition of the Subjective Search for Universal Truth 
 Aquinas, Teresa of Avila, Husserl, Reinach, and Scheler searched for universal 
truth and Stein realized that each person’s path to that universal truth was relative to the 
individual person.  This acceptance of the subjective search for universal truth is 
                                                 
68 Thomas Aquinas in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas,  ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. 2 
(Indianapolis:  Hackett, 1997).  Summa Contra Gentiles 86, Q. 48.  
 
69 Thomas Aquinas in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. 2 
(Indianapolis:  Hackett, 1997).  Summa Theologica 774, Q. 94, Art. 2. 
 
70 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 775, Q. 94, Art. 2. 
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especially in keeping with Husserl’s phenomenological privileging of the subjective point 
of view.  While Husserl is not a subjectivist or relativist, he does allow for the experience 
of the individual as a threshold to consciousness.  His project remains the elucidation of 
the essential structures of consciousness.71 
 In allowing for the subjective search for truth, Stein also incorporates the thinking 
of Max Scheler.  In Chapter Two, we considered Scheler’s “ethical absolutism” whereby 
there is an ordered hierarchy of values given a priori in immediate intuition to the human 
person via the emotive sphere.  Scheler allows for personal and communal moralities 
whereby a person or community’s choices and actions show a preference for certain 
values.  For Stein, as for Scheler, the truth is universal, but each person’s path to the truth 
is relative to that person.  Rather than promoting Scheler’s concepts of personal and 
communal moralities though, Stein stresses that universal laws (do good; avoid evil) 
exist, but that the psychophysical person is capable of acquiring and acting in accordance 
with this truth, despite the milieu.  Knowledge of truth is influenced by time, history, 
culture, and other circumstances — but truth remains universal and universally 
accessible.  Stein searches for truth in the given world with the confidence that this truth 
exists and is accessible to the human person. 
 For example, Stein accepts the universal truth of a higher power.  She personally 
refers to God as Pure Essence; she refers to God as “Truth.”  But in her writings and in 
her lived experience, as exemplified in her acceptance of the beliefs of others, Stein 
allows for a broader definition of God.  As mentioned in the first chapter of this work, 
when Stein was informed of Husserl’s death, she wrote to Sister Adelgundis 
Jaegerschmid who had tried to bring Husserl into the Catholic faith:  “I am not at all 
                                                 
71  I am grateful to Dr. Eleanore Holveck for this distinction. 
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worried about my dear Master.  It has always been far from me to think that God’s mercy 
allows itself to be circumscribed by the visible church’s boundaries.  God is truth.  All 
who seek truth seek God, whether this is clear to them or not.”72  When her mother, Frau 
Augusta Stein, died in 1936, Stein, again showing her broad definition of God, allows for 
different expressions of faith as she rejects resoundingly her mother’s rumored 
conversion from Judaism to Catholicism:  
The faith and firm confidence she [Frau Augusta Stein] had in her God 
from her earliest childhood until her 87th year remained steadfast, and 
were the last things that stayed alive in her during the final difficult agony.  
Therefore, I have the firm belief that she found a very merciful judge and 
is now my most faithful helper on my way, so that I, too, may reach my 
goal.73 
For Stein, the search for universal truth is the privilege and dignity of each 
psychophysical person.  Access to these universals is relative. 
 Thus, the relative search for universal truth forms the foundation and motivating 
force in Stein’s Christian, phenomenological method to action.  In the combined 
traditions of Aquinas and Husserl, Stein allows universal truths to be searched for 
relatively, acquired, and applied.  Stein’s ethic reflects this “being toward truth” as the 
psychophysical person experiences a perceiving of the phenomenon of truth, honors 
relationships, unfolds his/her ontic core, and is open to new horizons.  We will consider 
each of these components of Stein’s ethic. 
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73 Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 238, #227.  
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A Perceiving of a Phenomenon of Truth  
 As Stein describes significant events in her life, she often begins by stating that 
there is a phenomenon of something “new.”  For instance, when Stein describes a 
colleague’s words of farewell that indicate her condescending attitude toward others, (as 
noted in Chapter Two), she explains: “The words stunned me.  [. . .] these words of 
farewell from a man whom I esteemed and loved caused me acute distress.  I was not 
angry with him for saying them.  Nor did I shrug them off as an undeserved reproach.  
They were for me a first alert to which I gave much reflection.”74  In another example of 
this component of perceiving a phenomenon of truth, Stein describes Scheler’s influence 
on her:  “This was my first encounter with this hitherto totally unknown world.  It did not 
lead me as yet to the Faith.  But it did open for me a region of “phenomena” which I 
could then no longer bypass blindly.”75  Stein uses similar language in describing her 
faith encounter with the grieving widow Anna Reinach and her words, “This is the truth” 
after reading the life of Teresa of Avila indicate a similar “perceiving of the phenomenon 
of truth.”  These “first alerts” can involve a new idea, a new realization, a new approach.  
Stein’s ethical choices involve a “first alert” by which she perceives the phenomenon of 
truth in a new or clearer way.  This first alert or perceiving of the phenomenon of truth 
augments Stein’s foundational search for truth.  This discreet moment of truth confirms 
Stein’s confidence that truth exists and is accessible to the psychophysical person. 
 
 
                                                 
74  Stein, Life 196-97. 
 
75 Stein, Life 260. 
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An Honoring of Relationships 
 In Stein’s ethical system that is reconstructed here, relationship to self, with God, 
and with others fosters an attendant threefold responsibility.  It is not enough to recognize 
or to be alerted to truth:  truth must be sought and expressed in self, with God, and with 
others.  Before considering how relationship fosters responsibility, we will look at how 
relationships, for Stein, help to disclose truth.  
 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Stein described the human person in terms of 
the physical and living body.  She saw no separation between body and soul and she 
defined soul as a sharing in the “pure essence” — that essence that comes from “Pure 
Essence,” God, and animates the physical body into a living body.  Through her exposure 
to Christian ideas, especially through Scheler, Reinach, and Teresa of Avila, Stein 
realized that God was more than animator, more than distant Pure Essence.  Stein came to 
know God as a personal God. 
 A phenomenon from Stein’s life world impressed this personal relationship with 
God at her core.  We recall Stein’s chance visit to the Frankfurt cathedral wherein she 
witnessed the woman who “stopped in” as if to have a personal conversation with God.  
Stein’s words signal the perceiving of a phenomenon of truth and illuminate this need for 
a personal relationship:  “[H]ere was someone interrupting her everyday shopping 
errands to come into this church, although no other person was in it, as though she were 
here for an intimate conversation.  I could never forget that.”76  In witnessing this 
woman’s personal relationship with God, as well as observing Scheler, the Reinachs, and 
                                                 
76 Stein, Life 401. 
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Teresa of Avila in relationship with God, Stein began to develop her own personal 
relationship with the Lord.  Objective truth took on a personal nature. 
 For Stein, the relationship with God is developed at the psychophysical person’s 
core level and is the provenance of the individual person and God.  Stein fostered her 
own relationship with God through prayer, silence, scholarship, and sacrifice.  She 
encourages others to take time, to make time, to foster this relationship with God.  To 
Sister Callista Kopf, OP, Stein offers this advice:   
The only essential is that one finds, first of all, a quiet corner in which one 
can communicate with God as though there were nothing else, and that 
must be done daily.  It seems to me the best time is in the early morning 
hours before we begin our daily work; furthermore, [it is also essential] 
that one accepts one’s particular mission there, preferably for each day, 
and does not make one’s own choice.  Finally, one is to consider oneself 
totally as an instrument, especially with regard to the abilities one uses to 
perform one’s special tasks, in our case, e.g., intellectual ones.  We are to 
see them as something used, not by us, but by God in us.77 
 In addition to establishing contact with God, Stein also fostered relationships with 
others and thought that being with others disclosed truth to the person in a new way.  
Recall her dissertation, in which she treats empathy as a way of knowing others at the 
sentient and mental levels.  In her work on empathy she writes:  “The ‘I’ does not become 
individualized because another faces it, but its individuality . . . its selfness is brought 
                                                 
77 Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 54-5, #45. 
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into relief in contrast with the otherness of the other.”78   Through another person, an 
individual learns about self as a new world perspective is gained and feedback is given to 
the person about him/herself. 
 There is a hindrance to looking at another person in order to define self, though.  
In Immanuel Kant’s terms, to use another human being for self knowledge would be to 
treat a person as a means to an end (self knowledge), not as an end in him/herself.79  
Stein’s concept of the psychophysical person prevents this error, however.  Each human 
person has a personal core and is uniquely responsible for unfolding one’s ontic destiny.80  
Realization of each human being’s personality and ontic destiny reflects Stein’s 
adherence to scholasticism which defines human beings as made in the image and 
likeness of God.  Stein allows another human being to disclose truth about self, but this is 
not the primary focus or function of the other.  In relationship with God and knowing self 
as a physical, emotive, mental, and personal being, a psychophysical person contributes 
his own gifts to the building up of community.   In agreement with Kant, Stein’s 
psychophysical person may never be used merely as an object.  In agreement with 
Aquinas and Husserl, another psychophysical person is not an object for self knowledge 
but a unique rational being, a subject in the world.     
 Stein envisions this relationship with others as flowing from the relationship with 
God.  Stein, in the same letter to Sister Callista, states:   
                                                 
78 Stein, On The Problem of Empathy 38. 
  
79 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York:  Macmillan P, 1990) 
46.  Kant expresses the categorical imperative:  “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.” 
 
80 Dr. Fred Evans makes the point that in terms of Kant’s maxim, God would be unethical 
(seemingly) as he uses persons who unfold their ontic cores to bring about the redeemed order.  Stein 
asserts that God is Creator who makes all things good.   God is creator; God is good.  He who makes all 
things good, and who is himself good, would not use another person as a means to an end.     
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Immediately before, and for a good while after my conversion, I was of 
the opinion that to lead a religious life meant one had to give up all that 
was secular and to live totally immersed in thoughts of the Divine.  But 
gradually I realized that something else is asked of us in this connection to 
the world.  I even believe that the deeper one is drawn into God, the more 
one must “go out of oneself”; that is, one must go to the world in order to 
carry the divine life into it.81 
The truth, revealed by God and/or through another human person, is not a private affair.  
In going “out of oneself,” the person carries truth to others. 
 For Stein, recognizing our relationship to God, self, and others helps us to see the 
significance of the harmony that belonged to the created order and is promised in the 
redeemed order.  Stein posits that the redeemed order is realized when psychophysical 
persons honor their relationships by developing their own natural gifts and sharing them 
with the world. 
 
A Responsibility to Unfold One’s Ontic Blueprint 
 Stein posits that within each psychophysical person, there is an ontic blueprint, a 
specific, individualized plan, known to God but revealed to the individual.  This ontic 
plan needs to be discovered and unfolded through a process that takes place naturally, 
through the development and growth of the physical, emotional, and mental levels of the 
human being.  However, it is especially at the personal core, in silent reflection, where 
this ontic blueprint is recognized and revealed.  It is for this reason that Stein, in her later 
years, advocated spending time with God, as evidenced in her letter to Sister Callista.  
                                                 
81 Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 54, #45. 
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When a person becomes aware of his or her natural gifts; when this person sees 
difference and sameness in other human beings; when this person succeeds and fails 
through experiences in the life world — then the ontic blueprint unfolds.  
 Stein deems the human person capable of recognizing and developing one’s 
natural gifts.  She also regards the human person capable of developing relationships with 
God and other human beings, thereby deepening one’s self awareness.  Stein therefore 
holds the individual responsible to unfold his/her ontic blueprint.  Personal self-
examination, reflection, and interaction with others reveal the truth about oneself.  Aware 
of “fallen” human nature, though, Stein also knows the possibility of atrophy and the 
squandering of human gifts.  Reflecting the influence of Aquinas and the scholastics, 
Stein allows human efforts to be enhanced by God’s intervention as “Grace perfects 
nature.”82   
 A story bears out Stein’s understanding of how the ontic blueprint unfolds.  When 
Stein and her older sister, Erna, were invited to their uncle’s house after Erna’s 
graduation from high school, Edith knew that their relative would try to impose a 
profession on both of them, but especially on Erna.  Stein explains that her uncle “hoped 
to prevail on both of us to choose the medical profession; and in his mind’s eye, he 
already saw us, each with a different specialty, working hand in hand in a joint private 
clinic.”83  When the sisters were alone at night, Edith would challenge Erna:  “Don’t let 
yourself be influenced.  Do what you, yourself, consider right!”84  Erna acquiesced to her 
                                                 
82 Stein expresses this maxim in differing ways.  In one talk to women she expresses this idea thus:  
“Only the power of grace can uproot and form fallen nature anew; it happens from within, never from 
without.”  Stein, “Ethos,” Essays on Woman 48.   
   
83 Stein, Life 64. 
 
84 Stein, Life 64. 
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uncle’s wishes however, and she began to study medicine.  Two years later, Edith, now 
the graduate, was again invited to visit her uncle’s house in Chemnitz.  She recounts:   
I accepted with joyful thanks but immediately added that my profession 
had already been chosen85 and that the matter was no longer open for 
discussion.  Uncle capitulated in the face of this declaration.  He refrained 
from making even the slightest attempt to change my decision.  Several 
months later he remarked to my sister that, possibly in his old age, he 
might have to doff his hat to me but for the present it was beyond him how 
one could choose a profession solely according to one’s personal talent 
and inclination.86 
Choosing a profession solely according to one’s personal talent and inclination is 
precisely what Stein has in mind when she advocates the unfolding of one’s own ontic 
blueprint.   
 In her work on empathy, Stein posits that a human being can unfold his/her 
personal core, or kernel.  Stein is sure that this unfolding is visible in others and she 
comments:  “As my own person is constituted in primordial spiritual acts, so the foreign 
person is constituted in empathically experienced acts.”87  Stein adds:  “Accordingly, a 
single action and also a single bodily expression, such as a look or a laugh, can give me a 
glimpse into the kernel of the person.”88  Erna’s action, then, gives Edith a glimpse into 
                                                 
85 Stein planned on attending the University of Breslau to study literature and philosophy.  She 
also had a keen interest in psychology.  Stein, Life 172.    
  
86 Stein, Life 65. 
 
87 Stein, On the Problem of Empathy 109. 
 
88 Stein, On the Problem of Empathy 109. 
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her sister’s soul.  Edith’s strong recommendation to Erna to choose for herself went 
unheeded, lending credence to Edith Stein’s conviction that the personal core is the 
provenance of the individual and God.  Erna’s actions manifest her personal core — an 
area known to Erna and God alone — and an area, thinks Stein, wherein God respects the 
person’s free will.   
 Like God, Stein concedes that persons should respect one another’s free will, too.  
For example, Stein clearly disagrees with her sister Erna’s decision but recognizes her 
free will.  The younger Stein writes:   
I do not believe that Erna ever regretted her decision.  She finished the 
strenuous program of studies, under varying trying physical difficulties at 
times; and she became thoroughly familiar with her profession.  Later, 
when I assisted her occasionally during her office hours, I was quietly 
happy to note with what calm assurance she conducted her practice.  (She 
in no way displayed this calm and assurance to the same degree in her 
personal life.  That demonstrated to me for the first time in my experience 
the effectiveness of a thorough educational foundation.)89 
This anecdotal story highlights the last component of Stein’s ethic:  “an openness to new 
horizons.”    
 
Openness to New Horizons 
 In unfolding the ontic blueprint, a person must be open to new truths as they are 
discovered and encountered.  A newly perceived phenomenon of truth and the unfolding 
of the ontic core bring about a new horizon, a new perspective from which the 
                                                 
89 Stein, Life 64-65.  
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psychophysical person now views the world.  Attention to one’s gifts, the development of 
the psychophysical levels throughout time, and human and divine interaction facilitate the 
unfolding of the ontic core and of a new horizon.   
 Education, for example, provides a way by which new horizons are broached.  In 
the story recounted earlier, Erna, while not naturally suited (in Edith’s opinion) to the 
study of medicine, learns to be a capable and caring physician through education and 
training.  Erna’s newfound profession unfolds on the human level as she develops new 
skills and latent talents.  Although she did not make the decision that Edith wanted, Erna 
nevertheless moved forward in her pursuit of her new profession:  her decision brought 
about a new landscape, a new view of the world.  Erna carries her talents, temperament, 
and past experiences with her as she acquires new knowledge and develops new skills.  
But her decision to study medicine ushers in a new set of experiences and possibilities. 
  In Edith Stein’s schema, the moral person, moving toward truth, recognizes all 
levels of the psychophysical person and exercises free will.  Stein’s uncle imposes his 
will on Erna, no doubt looking out for her best interests, which included financial 
security:  Erna capitulates.  Edith does not condemn her sister; she allows Erna the 
exercise of her free will, though compromised by their uncle.  However, faced with a 
similar situation, Edith Stein foregoes financial security to develop the gifts she has by 
nature.  Edith Stein’s decision to forego her uncle’s influence and follow her own 
inclinations brings her to a new horizon.  Stein’s choice of a career based on her gifts and 
desires better defines some of the possibilities open to her; at the same time it diminishes 
other courses of action.  For instance, Edith’s decision to study philosophy rather than 
pharmacology precludes a joint private clinic with Erna.  The perception of a 
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phenomenon of truth, an attendant action that honors relationships and unfolds a person’s 
ontic core, brings about a range of possibilities, a new horizon from which new 
phenomenon of truth may be experienced.       
 For Stein, the quest for truth is universal, real, and in keeping with the capability 
and possibilities of the psychophysical person.  An attendant decision based on this newly 
perceived truth, honoring of relationships, and unfolding of one’s ontic core brings with it 
a new horizon.  But Stein allows for a divine unfolding of horizons, too.  Stein writes:   
The believer knows that One exists whose vision is not limited by any 
horizon.  There is one who embraces and is present in everything.  He who 
lives in the certainty of this faith, honestly feels that his own knowledge 
can no longer satisfy him, however vast that knowledge may be.  He must 
necessarily strive to know what is just in the eyes of God.90 
Erna, for example, makes a decision that honors her uncle’s will more than it develops 
her own gifts and desires.  This mistake, in Edith Stein’s opinion, bears fruit in Erna’s life 
— she becomes a well-qualified and compassionate doctor.  God, “whose vision is not 
limited by any horizon” and “who embraces and is present in everything” is able to help 
Erna unfold new or perhaps latent gifts.  The movement toward truth, however halting, 
ushers in new possibilities, new occasions for greater truth and growth. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 According to Stein’s schema, the ontic blueprint is from God and its unfolding 
contributes to His plan for the natural ordering of the world.  With a vested interest in the 
                                                 
90 Edith Stein, The Science of the Cross. Eds. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven (Washington:  ICS, 
2002) quoted in Edith Stein:  Thoughts  (Eugene:  Carmel of Maria Regina, 1982). 
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unfolding of each person’s potential, God can intervene and bring harmony, even when 
decisions wreck havoc and stunt a person’s natural unfolding.  In a talk to women in 
Switzerland, delivered in 1932, Stein speaks of a “life in which all faculties come to 
development.”91  In another essay, the “Spirituality of the Christian Woman,” (1932) 
Stein reiterates this point:  “I believe . . . we will always find fundamentally the 
compulsion to become what the soul should be, the drive to allow the latent humanity, set 
precisely in its individual stamp, to ripen to the greatest possible perfect development.”92 
An openness to new horizons, human and divine, allows the psychophysical person to 
continue to search for truth.     
 The process of living the ethical life is ongoing and requires a willingness to 
change, despite the personal cost.  In the next chapter, we will see how ongoing growth 
and adherence to truth cost Stein physically, emotionally, and mentally — ultimately 
demanding a rendering of her total self.   Three events from Stein’s life will be used to 
substantiate my claim that Stein’s ethic would have included a search for truth, in 
relationship, responsibility, and openness to new horizons — a stance that meshes 
phenomenology and faith.  We will consider whether the ethical choices that Stein faced 
in 1933 helped her to know the truth—and whether that truth set her free. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 Stein, Essays, “Mission of the Catholic Academic Woman” 268. 
 
92 Stein, Essays, “Spirituality of the Christian Woman” 94. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  EVIDENCE OF AN ETHIC 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Stein’s awareness of Hitler’s rise to power and the inevitable demise of the Jews, 
as well as the effect on Catholics, then all Germans, and ultimately the wider world 
population was gradual but definite.  Having been elected Chancellor of Germany on 
January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler immediately began enacting the first wave of his Aryan 
policies.  On April 1, 1933, two months after Hitler took control of Germany, Stein 
witnessed the boycott of Jewish-owned businesses.1  On April 5, 1933, she wrote to her 
friend and fellow philosopher, Hedwig Conrad-Martius.  Part of the letter reads:   
My relatives in Breslau are obviously very upset and depressed.  Sad to 
say, as far as the family [lumber] business is concerned, it has not 
mattered for some time now whether it is open or not.  Also, my brother-
in-law expects his dismissal any day. . . .  Every letter contains more bad 
news.  My relatives in Hamburg do not seem to have been affected so far.  
I, personally, have been assured by everyone that I need not fear for my 
position. . . . Tomorrow I will travel to Beuron and remain over Easter, 
returning here again about the 19th [of April].2  
It became increasingly clear to Stein that she must respond to the changes within her life 
world in some way.  In this response, Stein will perceive a phenomenon of truth; honor 
                                                 
1 Historical dates and facts are taken from Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland:  Women, the 
Family and Nazi Politics (New York:  St. Martin’s, 1987) 190.  
 
2 Edith Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters, 1916-1942 (Washington:  ICS, 1993) pages 138-39, letter  
#139, hereafter noted as Self-Portrait in Letters,138-39, #139. 
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relationships with God, self, and others; unfold her ontic blueprint; and remain open to 
future phenomena of truth, new possibilities — new horizons.  Stein’s ethic enables her 
to respond to the life world as it changes around her. 
 In the nineteen months between January 1932 and October 1933, Stein initiated 
three actions by which she personally responded to Hitler’s move to power.  These 
actions had no effect on Hitler and National Socialism, but they reflected Stein’s attempt 
to seek truth while honoring her relationships and responsibilities.  These three actions,  
Stein’s writing of a letter to Pope Pius XI, her decision to enter the Carmelite Order, and 
her authorship of a personal description of Jewish life — were all reasoned attempts to 
match her thoughts and beliefs with her actions.  These phenomena give evidence of 
Stein’s ethic which drew from a life-stream that mingled reason and faith. 
 Some background information will help to situate Stein before these events are 
described.  From 1925-1933, Stein taught high school girls in Saint Magdalena Teacher’s 
School in Speyer.  Despite her doctoral degree and eighteen-month internship as 
Husserl’s assistant, Stein had been denied access to any university teaching position, 
presumably because women were then restricted in the world of higher education.  By 
1933, Stein had been a practicing Catholic for eleven years.  Ever since reading the life of 
Teresa of Avila in the summer of 1921 and her conversion to Catholicism in 1922, Stein 
had yearned to enter the religious Order of Discalced Carmelites.  Her spiritual advisers 
thought that Stein’s offerings as a lecturer were more important, however, and they 
discouraged her entrance into Carmel.  Stein’s success as a speaker for the Catholic 
Women’s Movement had earned her prestige and had precipitated her moving from 
Speyer to Münster, where she accepted a post at the Catholic Pedagogical Institute.  
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While teaching at the Institute in Münster, Stein continued her speaking engagements and 
collaborated with other professionals on a curriculum specifically designed for Catholic 
women.  
 An incident that made Stein consciously and irrevocably aware of the fate of the 
Jewish people and of herself under Hitler’s new regime occurred in 1933 while she was 
living at the Collegium Marianum (a dormitory for religious sisters who were studying at 
the Institute).  Stein was locked out after attending a conference.3  A Catholic teacher and 
his wife, recognizing Stein’s predicament, invited her to their home for the evening and 
she accepted.  While the professor’s wife prepared Stein’s room, the host “related what 
American newspapers had reported concerning cruelty to which Jews had been 
subjected.”4   Stein, who usually apprised people of her Jewish heritage, refrains in this 
case:  “It would have seemed to me like a breach of their hospitality if I had disturbed 
their night’s rest by such a revelation.”  Stein’s inward response, though purposely 
concealed, was immediate:  “True, I had heard of rigorous measures against the Jews 
before.  But now a light dawned in my brain that once again God had put a heavy hand 
upon His people and that the fate of this people would also be mine.”5   
 Some commentators take exception to Stein’s refusal to claim her Jewish heritage 
in this encounter.  Stein’s reference to God putting a “heavy hand upon His people” is 
                                                 
3  It is unclear why Stein was locked out of the building.  Stein writes:  “I don’t know whether I 
had forgotten to take my house key or whether there was a key stuck in the lock from the inside.  At any 
rate, I could not get in.  I tried to lure someone to the window by ringing the bell and clapping hands, but in 
vain.  The women students who lived in the rooms facing the street were already away on vacation.”  Stein 
attributes no malicious intent to her being locked out.  Stein’s account, “How I Came to the Cologne 
Carmel” is found in Susanne Batzdorff, Edith Stein:  Selected Writings (Springfield:  Templegate, 1990) 
15.  Subsequent references to the essay will be noted as:  Stein, “Carmel.” 
  
4 Stein, “Carmel” 16. 
 
5 Stein, “Carmel” 16. 
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also troublesome because it implies that the persecution of the Jews is God’s action or at 
least God’s permissive will.  Stein’s critics stress that it was predominantly Christians 
who promulgated the Aryan laws against the Jews,6 and they accuse Stein of accepting 
the Catholic Church’s thinly-veiled anti-Semitism that once held that the Jews were 
responsible for the death of Jesus.7  These debates are important but are better left to 
other studies.  What is critical in the retelling of Stein’s story here is the “first alert” 
wherein she became acutely aware of the insidious evil and breadth of Hitler’s plan and 
of her need to act in some way against it. 
 Stein’s wording, “a light dawned in my brain,” signals a coming to consciousness, 
the awareness of a new phenomenon.  She was faced with a concrete ethical dilemma: 
How would she, a Catholic of Jewish descent, soon to be deprived of any livelihood as a 
teacher or lecturer, live an ethical life within the confines of the Third Reich?  How 
would she continue to develop her relationship to God, self, and others while unfolding 
her own ontic blueprint in these newly-revealed life situations?  This chapter will focus 
on Stein’s ethical response to this problem as seen in three actions:  1) the writing of a 
letter to Pope Pius XI; 2) the decision to enter the Carmelite Order, which prompted her 
visit to Breslau to inform her mother and family of her decision; and 3) the writing of 
Life in a Jewish Family.  These actions, mentioned in Stein’s essay, “How I Came to the 
Cologne Carmel,” testify to Stein’s struggle to live in a way true to her reasoned beliefs.8 
                                                 
6 See Never Forget:  Christian and Jewish Perspectives on Edith Stein, editor Waltraud Herbstrith, 
trans., Susanne Batzdorff (Washington:  ICS, 1998) and Harry James Cargas, ed. The Unnecessary Problem 
of Edith Stein Vol. IV of Studies in the Shoah  (New York: UPA, 1994). 
  
7 Charges against the Catholic Church’s anti-Semitism continue today as witnessed by the recent 
controversy caused by Mel Gibson’s 2004 film, The Passion of the Christ. 
 
8 Maria Amata Neyer, Curator of the Edith-Stein-Archiv, Carmelite Monastery “Maria vom 
Frieden” in Cologne, attests to Stein’s conscious living of the examined life.  Regarding Stein’s account of 
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THE EVENTS OF 1933 
As she mentioned in her April 5, 1933, letter to Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Stein 
planned to visit Beuron for retreat (a time of prayer and quiet) during Holy Week, the 
week leading up to Easter.  Since 1928, Stein had been traveling each year to the 
Benedictine Abbey at Beuron to participate in the Holy Week liturgies and spend time 
alone in silent prayer.  But the events of 1933 brought an added sense of urgency to her 
time of retreat.  In her autobiographical sketch, Stein relates:  “This time a special reason 
drew me there.  During the past weeks I had constantly given thought to whether I could 
do something about the plight of the Jews.  Finally I had made a plan to travel to Rome 
and ask the Holy Father in a private audience for an encyclical.”9   Stein decided to travel 
to Rome to speak with the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Pius XI,10 and to 
tell him in person about the worsening conditions in Germany, but first she sought the 
permission of her spiritual director.   
Stein’s plans for the Holy Week retreat in Beuron and the occasion to speak to her 
spiritual director about a visit to the Pope were postponed, however.  She traveled to 
Cologne overnight to instruct a former student, Hedwig Spiegel, née Hess, who was 
preparing to be baptized in the Catholic Church.   The two women attended a Holy Hour 
                                                                                                                                                 
her entrance into Carmel, Neyer writes:  “It [this essay] is the moving testimony of a human being who has 
rendered to herself an account of her life’s course, and who knows within her heart that this course will 
continue.”  Qtd. in Batzdorff, Selected Writings 9-10. 
 
9 Stein, “Carmel” 16.  An encyclical is a papal letter to the bishops of the Catholic Church, who, in 
turn, relay the contents of the letter to the faithful.  See “Encyclical,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary, 1996 ed. 
 
10 Pope Pius XI, Ambrogio Damiano Achille Ratti, was Pope from 1922 until his death on 
February 10, 1939.  
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commemorating the Passion of the Lord at the Carmel in Cologne-Lindenthal.  Stein 
wrote of the occasion:  
He [the priest] spoke beautifully and movingly, but something other than 
his words occupied me more intensely.  I talked with the Savior and told 
Him that I knew that it was His cross that was now being placed upon the 
Jewish people; that most of them did not understand this, but that those 
that did, would have to take it up willingly in the name of all.  I would do 
that.  He should only show me how.  At the end of the service, I was 
certain that I had been heard.  But what this carrying of the cross was to 
consist in, that I did not yet know.11 
Stein traveled to Beuron on Holy Saturday and inquired about the feasibility of her 
planned trip to Rome to speak with Pope Pius XI.  Further consideration rendered the trip 
impractical, however, since 1933 had been declared a Holy Year, honoring the nineteenth 
centennial of the death of Jesus Christ.12  Stein writes:  “Through my inquiries in Rome I 
ascertained that because of the tremendous crowds I would have no chance for a private 
audience.  At best I might be admitted to a ‘semi-private audience,’ i.e. an audience in a 
small group.  That did not serve my purpose.”13 
Stein adjusted her plans and on April 12, she wrote a letter to Pope Pius XI urging 
him to write an encyclical, a letter to the world, denouncing Hitler and the National 
                                                 
11 Stein, “Carmel” 17. 
 
12 A Holy Year is a time of celebration and prayer designated by the Pope to commemorate a 
special occasion within the Roman Catholic Church. 
 
13 Stein, “Carmel” 17.  
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Socialist regime.14  Following papal protocol, Stein sent her letter to the Pope via her 
spiritual director, Archabbot Raphael Walzer.     
 
1933:  Stein’s Letter to Pope Pius XI 
In her letter to Pope Pius XI, Edith Stein describes herself first as “a child of the 
Jewish people who, by the grace of God, for the past eleven years has also been a child of 
the Catholic Church.”  She expresses her intent:  “I dare to speak to the Father of 
Christendom about that which oppresses millions of Germans.”  Stein, as a 
phenomenologist, knows the importance of words and descriptions; she is exact in her 
word usage.  Her use of descriptors is therefore fully intended:  she is Jewish, Catholic, 
German, and as a “daughter” of all three groups, Stein knows of what she speaks.  She 
highlights, however, not the plight of the Jews but the oppression of millions of Germans, 
specifically Catholic Germans, for whom the Pope is responsible.  As the contents of the 
letter unfold, Stein focuses first on the Pope’s duty to Catholics and then broadens the 
scope of his responsibility to embrace all of humanity. 
Early in Stein’s letter she describes the conditions in Germany:  
For weeks we have seen deeds perpetrated in Germany which mock any 
sense of justice and humanity, not to mention love of neighbor.  For years 
the leaders of National Socialism have been preaching hatred of the Jews.  
                                                 
14 The letter that Edith Stein wrote to Pope Pius XI in April 1933 was later mentioned in her 
autobiographical sketch, “How I Came to the Cologne Carmel” (1938) but the actual letter was not made 
public until February 15, 2003, when articles from the Vatican Library archives were released.  Josephine 
Koeppel, translator of Stein’s works;  Susanne Batzdorff, niece of Edith Stein; and John Sullivan, editor of 
the Carmelite Studies series, collaborated on the English translation of the letter, originally written in 
German.  Information concerning this letter was gleaned at a lecture by:  John Sullivan, “The Edith Stein 
Letter of 1933 to Pope Pius XI,” The Museums at the Pope John II Cultural Center, Washington, 9.  Aug. 
2003.  Stein’s letter to Pope Pius XI can be found in Susanne Batzdorff, Aunt Edith:  The Jewish Heritage 
of a Catholic Saint, 2nd ed.  (Springfield:  Templegate, 2003) 226-27.  Subsequent references to this letter 
will be taken from Batzdorff’s book and hereafter referred to as “Letter to Pius XI.” 
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Now that they have seized the power of the government and armed their 
followers, among them proven criminal elements, this seed of hatred has 
germinated.  The government has only recently admitted that excesses 
have occurred.  To what extent, we cannot tell, because public opinion is 
being gagged.  However, judging by what I have learned from personal 
relations, it is in no way a matter of singular exceptional cases.  Under 
pressure from reactions abroad, the government has turned to “milder” 
methods.  It has issued the watchword, “no Jew shall have even one hair 
on his head harmed.”15    
After describing the conditions within Germany and mentioning that pressure from 
foreign countries has imposed some restraint on the Nazis, Stein emphasizes the despair 
of the people, evidenced in the growing number of suicides.     
But through boycott measures — by robbing people of their livelihood, 
civic honor and fatherland — it drives many to desperation; within the last 
week, through private reports I was informed of five cases of suicide as a 
consequence of these hostilities.  I am convinced that this is a general 
condition which will claim many more victims.  One may regret that these 
unhappy people do not have greater inner strength to bear their 
misfortune.16   
Through candid description, Stein has alerted the Holy Father to the deteriorating 
conditions within Germany.  While it seems as though Stein barely mentions the 
sufferings of the Jewish people, I propose that her purpose was not to minimize the ill 
                                                 
15 Stein, “Letter to Pius XI” 226. 
 
16 Stein, “Letter to Pius XI” 226. 
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treatment of the Jews but to emphasize the Pontiff’s responsibility.  Stein appeals to Pope 
Pius XI by stressing the sufferings of the Catholics so that he, as head of the Roman 
Catholic Church, might publicly and legitimately denounce Hitler.  Ultimately, the Nazi 
regime would deprive Catholic Germans of livelihood, civic honor, and fatherland:  
denouncing Hitler for these imminent injustices would be within the Pope’s domain. 
 
Analysis of Stein’s Letter 
 Evidence of Stein’s four-fold movement toward an ethic can be seen in her 
composition of a letter to Pope Pius XI.  Stein seeks to live ethically, that is, she works to 
match her internal thoughts and beliefs with her external actions.  This ethical movement 
toward truth, this expression of internal thoughts and beliefs through concrete actions, 
provides the underpinning and motive of her attempt to see the Pope in person, and later, 
to write a letter to him.  As evidenced by her autobiographical sketch, Stein recognizes 
Hitler’s rise to power on an emotive as well as on a mental level, and she wills to act 
against this evil.   
 If Stein’s movement toward an ethical response is to be valid for her, if her 
movement against Hitler and evil is to be authentic, she must incorporate the truth of her 
personal core.  She has grown in awareness of her gifts of nature and grace through 
prayer, self-examination, and trial and error in life circumstances.  Stein realizes that she 
must respond in a manner that reflects her unique gifts as scholar, phenomenologist, and 
Catholic of Jewish descent.  She relies on written communication — a vehicle that she 
has learned to respect — to express her perspective of the situation in Germany.  In this 
letter, Stein acknowledges her relationship with God and others while signaling her 
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relationship with her own personal core.  She reflects an understanding of self as she 
writes:  “During the past weeks I had constantly given thought to whether I could do 
something [. . .].”17  Aware of her inherent gifts and having ascertained the most effective 
use of these gifts, she addresses Pope Pius XI as an intercessor for Jews, Catholics, 
Germans, and in reality, for all members of society.   
 In her personal letter to Pope Pius XI, Stein, hoping to elicit a reply, presents her 
points as questions.  The ultimate response she hopes for is papal renunciation of 
National Socialism.  Through a series of questions, Stein reminds the Holy Father of his 
duty to all of Christendom, to the Jewish people, and to the world.  She questions the 
appropriation of Christian terms to serve Nazi needs.  She wonders with alarm at the 
flagrantly heretical Nazi policies that idolize the Aryan race and the National Socialist 
government.  She confronts the Catholic thinking of the time that holds the Jewish people 
responsible for the death of Christ by calling attention to Jesus’ forgiving of his 
persecutors from the cross.  Stein’s presentation of the facts reveals signs of deep 
reflection on truth; her manner of presentation is consistent with an unfolding of her 
personal core as she uses her unique gifts as a philosopher, a phenomenologist, a 
Catholic:   
Everything that happened and continues to happen on a daily basis 
originates with a government that calls itself “Christian.”  For weeks not 
only Jews but also thousands of faithful Catholics in Germany, and I 
believe, all over the world, have been waiting and hoping for the Church 
of Christ to raise its voice to put a stop to this abuse of Christ’s name.  Is 
not this idolization of race and governmental power which is being 
                                                 
17 Stein, “Carmel” 16. 
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pounded into the public consciousness by the radio open heresy?  Isn’t the 
effort to destroy Jewish blood an abuse of the holiest humanity of our 
Savior, of the most blessed Virgin and the apostles?  Is not all this 
diametrically opposed to the conduct of our Lord and Savior, who, even 
on the cross, still prayed for his persecutors?  And isn’t this a black mark 
on the record of this Holy Year which was intended to be a year of peace 
and reconciliation?18 
Stein’s questions are meant to promote thought and provoke action.  She reports to the 
Holy Father from her vantage point, clearly and forcibly describing the truth as she sees 
it.  The neutral position that the Vatican has taken will not serve the purposes of God, His 
people, His Church, or His creation.  Possibly projecting her own ethical decision to do 
something, Stein states a truth she has discovered personally: silence is no longer a viable 
option.   
 On a less lofty plane, the reputation of the Church is at stake, and Stein stresses 
that Catholics as well as those of other faiths know fully, “with open eyes,” what is taking 
place.  She writes: 
We all, who are faithful children of the Church and who see the conditions 
in Germany with open eyes, fear the worst for the prestige of the Church, 
if the silence continues any longer.  We are convinced that this silence will 
not be able in the long run to purchase peace with the present German 
government.19 
                                                 
18 Stein, “Letter to Pius XI” 226-27. 
 
19 Stein, “Letter to Pius XI” 227. 
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Stein’s letter takes on an urgency that John Sullivan refers to as “prophetic 
intervention”20 as she predicts the course of action that the Nazis will take:     
For the time being, the fight against Catholicism will be conducted quietly 
and less brutally than against Jewry, but no less systematically.  It won’t 
take long before no Catholic will be able to hold office in Germany unless 
he dedicates himself unconditionally to the new course of action.21 
Stein has stated the facts:  Hitler’s National Socialism has overtaken the German 
government and is slowly but surely winning the minds, hearts, and consciences of the 
German people.  The new government, under the guise of being “Christian,” has gained 
respect and support from the people.  Jews are openly attacked and Catholics will become 
the next target of hatred.   
 Stein’s advice as to the action that Pope Pius XI needs to initiate is both precise 
and pointed:  he must speak out publicly against Hitler and National Socialism.  Since 
public opinion was being gagged in Germany through the Nazis’ control of the radio and 
press, the German people were easily hoodwinked into believing the propaganda.  Stein 
indirectly provides the Pope with a way to get his message to the people — via radio.   
 In her work, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics, 
historian Claudia Koonz deems Hitler a mastermind of modern technology and 
communication.  Koonz explains that “to enable all citizens to hear their Führer's magic 
voice, the government subsidized the production of radios (called volksempfanger — 
                                                 
20 Sullivan used this phrase in a presentation about Stein’s letter to Pope Pius XI.  John Sullivan, 
“The Edith Stein Letter of 1933 to Pope Pius XI,” The Museums at the Pope John II Cultural Center, 
Washington, 9 Aug. 2003. 
 
21 Stein, “Letter to Pius XI” 227. 
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literally, ‘people’s receivers’).”22  Stein mentions the radio as the means by which the 
“idolization of race and governmental power” is “being pounded into the public 
consciousness.”23   Although it is speculation on my part, I believe that Stein’s mention 
of the radio is no accident, as it hints at one means of communicating a papal 
pronouncement.  The German people would be forbidden, under punishment of death,24 
to listen to foreign government broadcasts; nevertheless, occasional BBC reports did get 
through.  Even if the Pope’s message were not transmitted but merely denounced by Nazi 
officials during the approved broadcasts, a public denouncement of it would signal to the 
people that the Pope had spoken.  Stein was convinced that “this silence will not be able 
in the long run to purchase peace with the present German government.”25  A 
pronouncement from the Pope via radio — be it via BBC or via a denunciation of the 
Pope’s message by the Nazi government — would have been one way of ending the 
papal silence. 
 Stein used the gifts at her disposal:  she unfolded her personal core in addressing 
Pope Pius XI.  While Stein referred to herself as a German, a child of the Jewish people, 
and now a member of the Catholic Church, she communicated with the Pope as a 
daughter of phenomenology and of faith.  She alerted the Holy Father to the phenomenon 
of Hitler; she described conditions in Germany clearly and in great detail; she prompted 
                                                 
22 Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland 223. 
 
23 Stein, “Letter to Pius XI” 226. 
 
24 The November 2, 1939, issue of the New York Times reported that in Berlin, Germany, a decree 
was issued that forbad listening to any foreign radio station, under penalty of death for spreading false 
foreign radio news.  See Chronology of World War II.  Ed. Ken Polsson.  10 Feb. 2005 
<http://www.islandnet.com/~kpolsson/ww2hist/>.  Stein’s mention of Nazi propaganda via radio, six years 
before this formal decree, confirms that Stein realized the immanent danger posed by Hitler.  
 
25 Stein, “Letter to Pius XI” 227. 
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reflection and dialogue and attempted to effect a change in the Pope’s silence through 
questions.  Finally, she reminded the Pontiff of the truth that “the responsibility must fall, 
after all, on those who brought them [the victims] to this point and it also falls on those 
who keep silent in the face of such happenings.”26 
 Another facet of Stein’s ethical movement is her honoring of relationships.  
Stein’s identification of herself in the letter to the Pope as a Jew, Catholic, German, and 
instructor indicates her relationships with and her qualifications to speak on behalf of 
these various groups.  However, Stein signals a deeper relationship as she exercises her 
right as an individual person within the cosmic community.  In her treatise, On the State, 
Stein draws a connection between the individual, the community, and the state, insisting 
that the state is at the service of the individuals who comprise the community.  According 
to Hitler’s scheme, as seen by his demands, (such as sworn allegiance to the Führer, 
compulsory participation in rallies and groups), the people were at the service and 
disposal of the Nazi state.  Knowing that her words would be ineffectual to Hitler or to 
his government, Stein appeals to the legitimate head of another group to which she 
belongs.  She reminds the Pope that he is the Servant of the People, responsible for 
individuals in this life and as Christ’s mediator on earth, for life after death.  Stein’s 
reference to suicide is powerful because at that time, taking one’s own life was 
considered a grave sin that merited the loss of salvation.  To attest to the gravity the 
Catholic Church ascribed to this act, those who committed suicide were denied burial in a 
                                                 
26 Stein, “Letter to Pius XI” 226. 
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Catholic cemetery.27  Stein reminds the Pope of the responsibility he bears to the people 
entrusted to his care: 
[. . .] within the last week, through private reports I was informed of five 
cases of suicide as a consequence of these hostilities.  I am convinced that 
this is a general condition which will claim many more victims.28   
 Stein knew her place in the Jewish community, in the German community, and in the 
Catholic community.  She reminds the Pope of his responsibility only after she had 
realized and accepted her responsibility as an individual person within the cosmic 
community. 
 A new horizon presents itself for Stein as she faces Hitler and the evil he 
perpetuates.  Stein breaks her own silence and there is no turning back. Her action of 
writing to the Pope attests to the truth, new to her, that to be silent is to share guilt.    
Whether Pope Pius XI issues an encyclical or not, Stein can no longer retreat in silence.  
She will continue her practices of prayer and sacrifice, but her life stream takes on new 
urgency and new direction as she voices a truth that poses new possibilities — even 
death.  We witness Stein’s encounter with a new horizon in her determination to move 
                                                 
27 The Catholic Church still holds suicide as a grave matter and denounces the act of taking one’s 
life.  The Catholic Catechism (1994) states:  “Everyone is responsible for his life before God who has given 
it to him.  It is God who remains the sovereign Master of life.  We are obliged to accept life gratefully and 
preserve it for his honor and the salvation of our souls.  We are stewards, not owners, of the life God has 
entrusted to us.  It is not ours to dispose of” (#2280).  However, the advancement of the social sciences, 
especially psychology, has impacted the Church’s teachings.  The Catechism now includes this teaching:  
“Grave psychological disturbances, anguish, or grave fear of hardship, suffering, or torture can diminish the 
responsibility of the one committing suicide” (#2282).  “We should not despair of the eternal salvation of 
persons who have taken their own lives.  By ways known to him alone, God can provide the opportunity for 
salutary repentance.  The Church prays for persons who have taken their own lives” (#2283).  Catholics 
who commit suicide now are buried with the rites of the Catholic Church and within Catholic cemeteries.  
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger and the Interdicasterial Commission for the Catechism of the Catholic Church, 
Catechism of the Catholic Church (San Francisco:  Ignatius P, 1994) 550.   
 
28 Stein, “Letter to Pius XI” 226. 
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forward despite the Holy Year, the lack of a personal audience with the Pope, etc.  Stein 
is no longer content to await the approval and consent of her spiritual directors.  She sets 
out, with God, into uncharted waters. 
 Stein’s letter to Pope Pius XI regarding the evil of Hitler and National Socialism 
was futile in spurring him to speak.  The silence of Pope Pius XI is well-documented and 
will be debated into the future.  What is important to this study is that Stein uses reason 
and faith, incorporating her four-fold movement toward an ethic, as she writes to Pope 
Pius XI.  Stein recognizes multiple truths:  Hitler is on the rise to power and threatens 
human life; she must give expression to this truth that she has come to realize; and to 
remain silent in the face of evil would be to deny the truth.  Unwilling and unable to be 
silent any longer, Stein unfolds her personal core and shares her skills as a philosopher, 
writer, and teacher in urging the Pope to act.  Stein honors the relationships that she has 
forged as a Jew, German, Catholic, and scholar.  Above all, she honors her relationship 
and responsibility as a member of the cosmic community.  She carries her newly 
expressed truths and her willingness to stand up for the safety of others as she moves 
forward in her life world.  Later, Stein would tell a friend about this letter to Pope Pius 
XI: 
I know that my letter was delivered to the Holy Father [Pope Pius XI] 
unopened; sometime thereafter I received his blessing for myself and for 
my relatives.  Nothing else happened.  Later on I often wondered whether 
this letter might have come to his mind once in a while.  For in the years 
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that followed, that which I had predicted for the future of the Catholics in 
Germany came true step by step.29 
   That Stein’s letter went unnoticed is regrettable, but her act of writing evidences 
an ethic — a meshing of thought and belief with action.  Aware of the truth of the rise of 
Hitler to power and of her need to do something, Stein uses her gifts and unfolds her 
unique personal core.  She honors the relationships she has been given and which she has 
fostered throughout her life.  The Pope’s response or lack thereof signals a new horizon 
that calls for another ethical response. 
 
1933:  To Carmel  
After retreat and before returning to her job in Münster, Stein asked her spiritual 
director, Archabbot Walzer, what she should do if her job were terminated.  Walzer’s 
reply indicated the level of incomprehension that some people had regarding Hitler’s 
intentions.  Stein records:  “He [Walzer] found it totally unbelievable that that could 
happen.”30 
On the train back from retreat in Beuron to Münster, Stein read a newspaper 
article about a recent National Socialist convention which members of religious teachers’ 
organizations were compelled to attend.  Stein records her sense of impending doom:  
“The Institute in which I worked was purely Catholic, co-founded and supported by the 
                                                 
29 Stein, “Carmel” 17.  
  
30 Stein, “Carmel” 18. 
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Catholic Teachers’ Organization.  Thus its days were probably numbered.  All the more I 
would have to reckon with the termination of my short career as a college instructor.”31   
On April 19, 1933, an administrator at the Institute advised Stein to do some quiet 
research during the summer months, instead of planning any lectures.  He assured Stein 
that the situation would be over by autumn when she could resume her teaching 
activities, and he commended her for taking the news so well.   The chairwoman of the 
Catholic Teachers’ Organization suggested a similar course of action and apprised Stein 
of a teaching position in South America.   
When Stein’s job at the Pedagogical Institute was terminated because of her 
Jewish origins, she interpreted her dismissal as permission from God to enter Carmel.  
Certain of this permission at her personal core, Stein did not wait for the consent of her 
spiritual director.  She broached a new horizon and began the process to enter the 
Discalced Carmelite Order.  
When Stein had been baptized in 1922, she had refrained from telling her mother 
of a desire to enter religious life, since it would have been too hard on Frau Stein.  
Reflecting on this delay and on her current situation, Stein writes: 
It [entrance into Carmel] was denied me with reference to my mother and 
because of the effectiveness which my work had had in Catholic circles in 
recent years.  I had yielded.  But now the walls that had stood in my way 
had crumbled.  My effectiveness was at an end.  And surely my mother 
                                                 
31 Stein, “Carmel” 18. 
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would prefer me to be in a convent in Germany rather than a school in 
South America.32 
 Two weeks after writing her letter to Pope Pius XI and having been dismissed 
from the Pedagogical Institute for reasons of race, Stein sought more time for reflection 
on her situation.  On April 30, 1933, celebrated as Good Shepherd Sunday, Stein went to 
Saint Ludgar Church.  At the Mass the Gospel account of Jesus laying down his life for 
his sheep was read.  Thirteen hours of prayer had been specially planned for this 
important Church feast.  “I went there late in the afternoon and said to myself, ‘I’m not 
leaving here until I have a clearcut assurance whether I may now enter Carmel.’  After 
the concluding blessing had been pronounced, I had the assurance of the Good 
Shepherd.”33 
Stein wrote to Archabbot Walzer for the required permission to enter Carmel, but 
she knew that her letter would sit unopened in Beuron until his return from Rome.  Stein 
proceeded, without his permission.  One week later she met with Dr. Cosack, a colleague 
who was connected with the Cologne Carmel.  Stein describes their honest dialogue: 
I told her what I had in mind.  I immediately added what might be held 
against me:  my age (42), my Jewish descent,34 my lack of means.  She did 
not consider any of it important.  I told Miss Cosack enough about my 
                                                 
32 Stein, “Carmel” 19. 
 
33 Stein, “Carmel” 19. 
 
34 Stein, well-versed in the life of Saint Teresa of Avila, knew that the foundress of the Discalced 
Carmelites was herself of Jewish ancestry so Stein’s being Jewish would not necessarily be held against 
her.  Stein possibly refers to the danger that would be posed to the Carmelites if she entered.  They could be 
perceived by the Nazis as harboring a person of Jewish descent which was against Aryan laws.  
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background for her to form an opinion about my vocation as a Carmelite.  
She then proposed on her own that we should pay a visit to the Carmel.35 
Stein then met with the Carmelite Subprioress and the Mistress of Novices.   Her 
written account shows that once again, description and dialogue were integral parts of her 
approach.  Stein’s account tells of her affection for and affiliation with other religious 
orders but of her inability to join them because of an apparent lack of inner harmony:     
I explained once more by what road I had reached this point, how the 
thought of Carmel had never left me; I spent eight years as a teacher with 
the Dominican nuns in Speyer, was intimately connected with the entire 
convent, and yet was unable to enter; I considered Beuron the 
antechamber of heaven, yet it never entered my mind to become a 
Benedictine nun; it always seemed to me that the Lord was saving 
something for me in Carmel which I could find there and nowhere else.36   
 Stein returned to Münster and spent much time in that city’s cathedral.  She 
needed a reply from the Carmelites:  “Encouraged by the Holy Spirit, I wrote to Mother 
Josepha and pleaded urgently for a prompt answer, because in my uncertain situation I 
had to find out what exactly I had to reckon with.”37  After another meeting with the 
Carmelite authorities, a conference with the Vicar for Religious, and an interview with 
the Chapter Sisters who would vote on Stein’s acceptance, a telegram arrived reading: 
                                                 
35 Stein, “Carmel” 20.  
 
36 Stein, “Carmel” 21. 
 
37 Stein, “Carmel” 21. 
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“Joyful assent.  Regards, Carmel.”  With the consent of the Carmelites, the formal 
application process was complete.   
Stein proceeded in the discernment process as she spent a month in the extern 
quarters of the Cologne Carmel, learning the Carmelite customs, and participating in the 
daily schedule.  Discussion continued to be part of the discernment process for the 
Carmelites as well as for the new aspirant.  Stein writes:  “All questions that came up I 
submitted to Mother Josepha; her decision always coincided with what I would have 
done on my own.  This inner agreement made me very happy.”38  Stein’s personal core 
resonated with life as a Carmelite.  She prepared to make permanent arrangements to 
enter Carmel while the Carmelites prepared to receive her.  But there was one group that 
Stein needed to face who would not agree with her decision to enter Carmel.  She 
traveled home to Breslau to explain her decision to her family. 
 Stein is deliberately vague about her decision to enter Carmel in her message to 
her family in Breslau:  “To my family I had only written that I had found a place to stay 
in Cologne with a group of nuns and would move there for good in October.  They 
wished me good luck as one would for a new job.”39   As she gradually told her relatives 
that her new job included her permanent entrance into Carmel, she met with a gamut of 
reactions.  Her sister Rosa, herself desiring to convert to Catholicism, accepted Stein’s 
decision easily.  Stein’s sister Erna did not dissuade her but was visibly shaken by her 
younger sister’s decision.  Erna offered Edith a place to live and a share in whatever her 
family had for as long as they would have it, as did her sister Else.  Stein’s mother tried 
to deny the reality of her daughter’s apparent defection at a time when the family needed 
                                                 
38 Stein, “Carmel” 23. 
 
39 Stein, “Carmel,” 23. 
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her most.  Her brother-in-law (Hans Biberstein) tried to reason with Edith two days 
before her departure.  Stein recalls:  “What I was planning appeared to him to draw the 
line between myself and the Jewish people more sharply than before, and that just now, 
when they were so sorely oppressed.  The fact that I saw it very differently he could not 
understand.”40  No one, not even her mother, could persuade Stein not to enter Carmel.     
 
Analysis of Stein’s Decision to Enter Carmel.  Visit to Breslau.  
 Initially, Stein’s ethic seems effective in discerning whether the action of entering 
Carmel represents authentically her thoughts and beliefs.  Stein’s ethic with its 
components of truth, relationships, personal core, and new horizons knits together and 
seems coherent.  But when Stein informs her family of this decision to enter Carmel, her 
ethic seems to unravel.  She can not, truthfully, tell her relatives of her plans to enter 
cloistered life.  First, we consider how Stein’s ethic seems to work. 
 Stein experiences positive and negative “first alerts” of truth as she discerns her 
next ethical move.  The negative alerts or denials of truth (Walzer’s assurance that Stein 
would not lose her job; the administrator’s advice that the threatening situation would be 
over by autumn) confirm Stein’s accurate perception of the phenomenon of truth.  When 
she reads about the mandatory attendance of Catholic Teachers at the National Socialist 
convention, she experiences a positive first alert or confirmation of her initial intuition 
that “days were probably numbered.”41  Despite Archabbot Walzer’s incomprehension of 
Stein’s precarious situation as well as the Münster administrator’s assurance that Stein’s 
loss of a teaching position was a temporary measure, Stein accurately accesses the truth 
                                                 
40 Stein, “Carmel,” 28. 
 
41 Stein, “Carmel,” 18. 
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of her life world.  With her dismissal from the Münster Pedagogical Institute, Stein 
realizes that she, a Jewish convert to Catholicism, is without a job and without any 
promise of livelihood in Germany where Hitler and his philosophy are gaining ground.  
She has long been drawn to the Carmelite way of life and now that her effectiveness as an 
instructor and a speaker of the Catholic Women’s Movement is ended, she actively 
considers the feasibility of life as a Carmelite.   
 Stein has kept her desire to enter Carmel hidden from all but her spiritual 
directors.  She recognized this desire to be a Carmelite within her personal core at the 
time of her conversion in 1922.  Eleven years later, prodded by life circumstances, and 
affirmed by personal dialogue with God and others, Stein continues to unfold her 
personal core, her ontic blueprint, but now in a more overt way.  She discerns the truth of 
her decision to enter the Carmelites through hours of reflective prayer at St. Ludgar’s 
Church, evidencing a personal relationship with God, wherein she has confidence that she 
speaks directly to Him and He with her:  “‘I’m not leaving here until I have a clearcut 
assurance whether I may now enter Carmel.’  After the concluding blessing had been 
pronounced, I had the assurance of the Good Shepherd.”42  Through her relationship with 
God, Stein is able to ascertain that her perception of truth is correct:  she proceeds in 
confidence and applies formally to become a Carmelite.  
 Stein tests her action toward truth in dialogue with Dr. Cosack and the Carmelite 
authorities.  She clearly and honestly lays before them the reasons that she is a dubious 
candidate for Carmel:  her Jewish ancestry, her age, and her lack of a dowry to help 
support Carmel.  Again, Stein seeks harmony between her personal core and her decision 
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to unfold it.  For example, she reports that the inner agreement between herself and 
Mother Josepha made her very happy.43  By her own admission, Stein feels confirmed in 
her truth as Dr. Cosack and Mother Josepha work with her to make her entrance into 
Carmel a reality.   
 When Stein travels to Breslau to inform her family of her decision, however, her 
ethic seems to break down:  she is unable to tell her relatives that she is entering the 
cloister.  She withholds the full truth and allows them to think that she has obtained a job 
with the Sisters in Cologne: “To my family I had only written that I had found a place to 
stay in Cologne with a group of nuns and would move there for good in October.  They 
wished me good luck as one would for a new job.”44  An ethic characterized by a 
perceiving of the phenomenon of truth, an honoring of relationships, an unfolding of 
one’s personal core, and openness to new horizons seems breached by this apparent 
deception. 
 Stein returns to Breslau on August 15, 1933, two months before her departure for 
the Cologne Carmel.  Her confidence that her action to enter Carmel rightly reflects her 
inner thoughts and beliefs seems to founder.  Stein does not seem to honor her familial 
relationships either; she does not confirm her movement to truth with her mother and 
siblings as she did with Dr. Cosack and Mother Josepha.  Stein describes her own 
awareness of her miscommunication: 
When she [my mother] got home from work, she liked to sit down next to 
my desk with her knitting and to talk about all her domestic and business 
worries.  I also let her tell me again her reminiscences of the past, as a 
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foundation for a family history which I started at that time.  This cozy 
togetherness was really good for her.  As for me, I kept thinking:  If only 
you knew!45 
Stein knows that she is withholding important information and she deliberately continues 
to do so, not seeking the input of her family. 
 Whether for fear of facing her already disappointed mother or of being labeled a 
“defector” at a time when her family needs her most, Stein does not disclose her intention 
to enter Carmel.  Initially, this apparent deception signals avoidance of conflict with her 
family.  Stein knows that by entering Carmel she will lose her family’s (especially her 
mother’s) love, acceptance, and support, at least for a while.  Her decision exacts a toll on 
her physically, emotionally, mentally, and spiritually and she aptly refers to this time of 
her life as a “dark night of the soul” — a phrase she is familiar with from reading the 
works of the sixteenth century mystic and poet, St. John of the Cross.  On a deeper level, 
however, Stein’s inability to tell her family indicates an ethical dilemma at Stein’s 
personal core.  She must choose between two apparent and valid truths:  her truth that 
Carmel is an authentic expression of her ontic blueprint, and her family’s truth, that Edith 
is abandoning them at their time of greatest need.         
 Stein’s decision to enter Carmel indicates three tensions within her ethical 
structure.  First, there seems to be a tension in Stein’s component of honoring 
relationships as she privileges her relationship with God over her familial relationships.  
Second, Stein’s choice privileges the unfolding of her ontic core over her honoring of 
relationships.  Third, Stein’s choice highlights a problem of relativism:  if truth is 
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universal but subjectively acquired, are Frau Stein and Edith Stein both in possession of 
truth and if so, is truth relative to each person? 
 Concerning the first tension between relationships, Stein seems to privilege her 
relationship with God over her familial relationships.  Scheler’s influence is seen in 
Stein’s decision as she perceives a hierarchy of values.  She does not take the separation 
from her family, especially her mother, lightly.  Rather, she sees in her consecration to 
God a relationship that supercedes, yet incorporates, all relationships.  She “abandons” 
her family to live fully her relationship with God, a relationship that she privileges and 
guards above all others.       
 The second tension exists as Stein seems to privilege the unfolding of her ontic 
core over her action of honoring relationships:  she seems determined to do what she 
wants; ignoring the heartache and misunderstanding she is evidently causing her family.  
Stein’s respect for the psychophysical person and her insistence that each person must 
develop or unfold his/her ontic core is at work in her choice.  We recall that Stein 
postponed her pursuit of a life in Carmel for eleven years because she was unwilling to 
add to her mother’s sadness over her conversion from Judaism to Catholicism.  Stein’s 
decision to enter Carmel truly reflects the matching of her personal core with the life 
world, despite the fact that her family would think her wrong. 
 The third tension, the question of relativism, indicates, I think, the most important 
aspect of Stein’s ethic, one that reflects both the influence of Aquinas’ scholasticism and 
Husserl’s phenomenology:  the subjective access to universal truth.  According to 
Aquinas, truth is universal; in Husserl’s phenomenology, the subjective view is 
privileged.  Reflecting both influences, Stein posits truth as accessible to all people, in all 
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times, but access to that truth is subjective.  Each person must search for and approach 
truth on his/her own and in his/her unique manner.  If Stein understands truth as 
accessible to all people, yet subjectively acquired, she must allow for her mother’s 
understanding of truth in this circumstance.  In recognizing subjective access to truth, 
Stein attests to the reality of disharmony, conflict, and tension. 
 Stein is partially right; she is called to Carmel and must respond in an effort to 
unfold her ontic core.  Frau Stein is partially right; she is being abandoned at a time of 
great need.  Believing that complete knowledge of truth is available only in heaven, Stein 
allows opposite subjective truths to exist and to develop.  Almost three years after 
entering Carmel, Stein confirms the tension that still exists between her mother and 
herself.  While Stein, as a Carmelite, would write to her mother each week, as was the 
mother and daughter’s custom, Frau Stein refused to write to her daughter.  In a letter to 
Mother Petra Brüning, OSU, Stein gives evidence of her belief that acquisition of truth is 
gradual; dialogue aids truth; and total truth is attained only in heaven.  Stein writes: 
[. . .] I was never able to make Mother comprehend either my conversion 
or my entrance into the Order.  And so, once more, she is suffering greatly 
because of our separation, and I am unable to say anything significant.  I 
can only build on the childlike confidence she has had in God all her life 
long, and on the fact that it was a life of sacrifice.  And precisely this 
separation from her youngest child, whom she has always loved 
especially, and the small indications that I dare to make sometimes, will 
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bring about some debate in the depth of her soul of which nothing 
surfaces.46 
Stein’s acceptance of her mother’s perspective reflects her confidence in the 
phenomenological method.  Stein grants the validity of Frau Stein’s subjective view; her 
daughter is deserting her.  Stein nonetheless speaks her truth, opposed as it is to her 
mother’s viewpoint.  Dialogue had positive effects for Stein earlier, when she conversed 
with Dr. Cossack and presented all the obstacles to entering.  Dr. Cossack’s response 
allayed Stein’s concerns.  Frau Stein’s stony silence does not lend itself to dialogue, but 
Stein allows the essence of this situation — conflict — to exist.   
 This decision to leave Breslau for Cologne also reflects Stein’s belief, mentioned 
in Chapter Three, that there is a redeemed order to creation.  The fallen order, 
characterized by misunderstanding and discord, is reflected in Stein’s disagreement with 
her mother.  Stein abides the misunderstanding of her mother and family members, 
knowing that in the redeemed order, all will be rejoined in harmony. 
   Just as the outcome of her letter to Pope Pius XI affects no results, Stein’s ethical 
action of entering Carmel brings no solace to her family.  God, Dr. Cosack, and the 
Carmelite authorities agree that Stein should enter Carmel; Stein’s mother and relatives 
disagree.  Stein chooses Carmel.  While Stein awaits the day of her departure for 
Cologne, she makes another ethical move, perhaps in response to her family’s claim that 
she is abandoning them.  She will use her gifts as a writer and phenomenologist to tell the 
truth of life in a Jewish family as she has experienced it.  
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1933:  Life in a Jewish Family 
While Stein made the necessary arrangements and waited to enter Carmel on 
October 14, she thought of another action that she could take to help the Jewish people.  
A priest had once suggested that she write down her memories of childhood as a way of 
explaining, first-hand, life in a Jewish family.  Recalling this project and taking 
advantage of the time with her mother, Stein began to record Frau Augusta Stein’s 
reminiscences of the past.     
The first line of the memoir describes the phenomenon that prompted Stein to 
undertake this endeavor:  “Recent months have catapulted German Jews out of the 
peaceful existence they had come to take for granted.”47  Stein explains that an 
opportunity to form relationships with Jews, to enter into friendship with them, to attempt 
to understand them and their customs had been denied by the racial hatred being 
promoted by the National Socialist government.  The youth of Germany, Stein maintains, 
were particularly deprived since they were especially vulnerable to Nazi propaganda.  
Stein underscores the responsibility she felt to counteract this deliberately distorted 
portrayal of the Jewish people and urges others to consider their responsibility:  “To all 
who have been thus deprived, we who grew up in Judaism have an obligation to give our 
testimony.”48  In the Foreword to the book which became Life in a Jewish Family when it 
was published posthumously, another glimpse of Stein the phenomenologist is seen:  “I 
would like to give a straightforward account of my own experience of Jewish life as one 
testimony to be placed alongside others. . . .  It is intended as information for anyone 
                                                 
47 Edith Stein, Life in a Jewish Family (Washington:  ICS, 1989) 23.  Hereafter referred to as Life.  
 
48 Stein, Life 24. 
 
186 
 
 
wishing to pursue an unprejudiced study from original sources.”49  National Socialist 
laws banning the publication of Jewish works would have inevitably thwarted Stein’s 
plan to disseminate her message to the German public.  Undaunted, she worked on these 
reminiscences until May 1935 when she discontinued the project to work on her 
philosophical publication, Finite and Eternal Being. 
Leah Hargis, O.C.D, posits that Stein deliberately concluded Life in a Jewish 
Family with a description of her life as it was in 1916.  Disagreeing that the work is 
incomplete and that Stein had no time to finish it given her busy schedule in Carmel, 
Hargis explains that in 1916 at age twenty-five, Stein had effectively stopped living a 
Jewish life.  Stein writes no more beyond 1916, thinks Hargis, because she no longer 
believed or acted as a Jewish woman at that time.   
I subscribe to Hargis’ theory as it lends credence to the idea that Stein tried to 
harmonize her thoughts and beliefs with her actions. Between 1906 and 1916, Stein’s 
religious beliefs and practices were in flux.  In 1906,50 after spending time away from 
school and having lived with her married sister, Stein makes a conscious decision to stop 
praying; she declares herself an atheist.  This proclamation is in agreement with Stein’s 
steadfast determination to speak and live the truth as she perceives it.  In the ten year 
period between 1906 and 1916, however, Stein meets people who profess various beliefs 
and who practice their respective faiths in differing degrees.  As a phenomenologist, 
Stein respects her colleagues’ viewpoints and does not try to influence them by her 
perception of truth as she experiences it.   
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50 See the chronology found in Florent Gaboriau’s The Conversion of Edith Stein, trans. Ralph 
McInerny South Bend:  St Augustine’s P, 2002) 13-19. 
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This respect for other faiths is seen, for example, in her relationship with her 
friend, Eduard Metis.  Stein writes:  “Metis had one attribute which set him apart from all 
my other companions:  he was an orthodox and observant Jew.  We spoke little about it:  
I let him have his own way; and he made no attempt to influence me.”51  While Stein did 
not try to influence Metis, she did, however, draw some conclusions from his religious 
observances.  For example, she is critical in her judgment when she hands Metis her 
suitcase to hold one Sabbath, and he stands, immobilized, in the doorway.  When, 
remembering the Jewish practice of doing no work on the Sabbath, Stein apologizes for 
her thoughtlessness, Metis replied:  “I haven’t done anything forbidden . . . only on the 
street is one not to carry anything; it’s allowed in the house.”52   In her memoirs, Stein 
writes:  “For that reason he had remained in the entrance-hall, taking care not to put even 
one foot into the street.  This was an example of the Talmudic sophistry which I found so 
repugnant.  But I made no comment.”53  Observing the actions of others, Stein 
reformulates her thoughts on the practice of religion. 
While Stein had distaste for the perceived sophistry of Metis, she was inspired by 
the religious convictions of others.  Of Max Scheler, for example, Stein writes:   
 His influence in those years affected me, as it did many others, far beyond 
the subject of philosophy.  I do not know in which year Scheler returned to 
the Catholic Church.  It could not have been long before I met him.  In any 
case, he was quite full of Catholic ideas at the time and employed all the 
brilliance of his spirit and his eloquence to plead them.  This was my first 
                                                 
 51 Stein, Life 212. 
  
 52 Stein, Life 213. 
  
 53 Stein, Life 213. 
188 
 
 
encounter with this hitherto totally unknown world.  It did not lead me as 
yet to the Faith.  But it did open for me a region of “phenomenon” which I 
could then no longer bypass blindly.54 
Reflecting on the same time period wherein she met Scheler (1913-1914), Stein writes of 
the transformative power of the example of some of her associates: 
Persons with whom I associated daily, whom I esteemed and admired, 
lived in it [this world of faith.]  At the least, they deserved my giving it 
some serious reflection.  For the time being, I did not embark on a 
systematic investigation of the questions of faith; I was far too busy with 
other matters.  I was content to accept without resistance the stimuli 
coming from my surroundings, and so, almost without noticing it, became 
gradually transformed.55  
Based on these written accounts, I support Hargis’ theory that Stein concluded 
Life with her account of her life as it was in 1916.  The question can be raised as to 
whether Stein should have ended Life with a description of personal events in 1906 when 
she publicly voiced her atheism.  But in 1906, at age fifteen, Stein was still living in a 
Jewish household and was strongly influenced by her mother and relatives.  Stein is an 
atheist by her own admission but still an adolescent in her mother’s Jewish household.  If 
Hargas’ theory is correct, then from 1906 until 1916, Stein still considers her testimony 
of Jewish life as authentic, despite the crisis of faith that she is undergoing.  Six years 
before her formal conversion and baptism as a Catholic in 1922, Stein experiences newly 
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founded belief through her encounters with Christians at the University of Göttingen.  
Her ending of her account of Jewish life in 1916 reflects authentically this reality.  Stein 
never shuns her Jewish heritage, indeed, she builds on it.  To Fritz Kaufmann she 
explains:  “Whoever enters Carmel is not lost to his own, but is theirs fully for the first 
time; it is our vocation to stand before God for all.”56 
While Stein urges all Jewish people to give testimony to offset the rise of National 
Socialism,57 she gives testimony only as far as she can.58  Her personal account of Jewish 
life stopped because in 1916, Stein stopped living life as a Jewish believer. 
 
Analysis of Stein’s Ethic in Life      
 Stein’s writing of Life is valuable to this study because it gives evidence of the 
author’s ethic.  First, Stein evidences her conviction that there must be a movement 
toward truth.  Stein realizes that Nazi propaganda is distorting the truth of Jewish life; she 
confronts this distortion of Jewish life by writing her own account.  As her letter to Pope 
Pius XI shows and as she came to realize in her final visit to Breslau, the truth of the 
goodness and ordinariness of Jewish life must be communicated in some way, whether in 
writing, speech, or in action.  It is not enough to perceive the truth and to feel one’s 
movement toward that truth; one must act in truth.  Clearly, criticism can be leveled at 
Stein by all those Jews who claim her to be a defector to the faith.  Despite this criticism 
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(a criticism she knew first-hand), she describes her experience of Jewish life up to 1916, 
when she moved toward Christianity; and then she is silent. 
   Second, Stein honors her relationships in the writing of Life, even though she 
does not always favorably portray her family and friends.  She offers one perspective of 
life in a Jewish family but she honors other Jewish people and their unique perspectives 
by reminding them of their dignity as searchers and proclaimers of truth.  Always aware 
of her relationship to God, self, and other persons, Stein appeals to other Jewish people to 
write their memories and to speak of life as Jews in Germany.  She appeals to other Jews 
to contribute their truth to the cosmic community that is vastly out of kilter.  This sharing 
of personal experiences may contribute to a greater harmony among all people and build 
that harmony reflective of the redeemed world. 
 Third, in writing Life, Stein unfolds her personal core by using her gifts as 
scholar, phenomenologist, and teacher.  Through vignettes, she is “teaching” others how 
life in a Jewish family is like life in most German families of the time.  In her 
descriptions, she approaches essences, reminders that life in any family has similarities 
and differences that are readily identifiable by all human beings.  In addition to moving 
toward truth and enunciating that truth, honoring relationships, and unfolding her 
personal core, Stein is open to new horizons and the very real possibility that her work 
might never be published.  What is important is that she has spoken truth as she has 
known it as a Jew, for as long as she was a practicing Jew.  While she would hope for 
publication, the act of writing, not of publishing, bears the mark of Stein’s ethic.   
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CONCLUSION      
Stein writes these memoirs as she awaits her entrance into Carmel.  On October 
14, 1933, Edith Stein bade farewell to her mother and family in Breslau and boarded a 
train for Cologne.  Her decision to enter the Carmelite Order saddened many of her 
family members and friends, particularly her mother.  In a letter from the Cologne 
Carmel to her friend and colleague Fritz Kaufmann, Stein succinctly outlines the 
nineteen-month period between January 1932 and October 1933 wherein she struggled to 
ascertain what she “could  do. . .about the plight of the Jews.”59  Recounting the steps that 
brought her to Carmel, she writes:    
The Umsturz [Hitler’s coup] was for me a sign from heaven that I might 
now go the way that I had long considered as mine.  After a final visit with 
my relatives in Breslau and a difficult farewell from my dear Mother, I 
entered the monastery of the [Discalced] Carmelite nuns here last Saturday 
and thus became a daughter of St. Teresa, who earlier inspired me to 
conversion.60 
While the Stein family certainly interprets Edith’s entrance into Carmel as defection, 
Stein does not.  Calling the explanation of this decision her “secret,” Stein enters Carmel 
to stand with the Carmelites in intercession for all people before God.  She did not expect 
her family to agree or to understand, but she felt she must express truth as she found it at 
her personal core.  In the actions of writing to Pope Pius XI requesting an encyclical 
against National Socialism, in deciding to enter Carmel, and in writing her memoirs, 
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Edith Stein gives evidence of her ethic that privileges truth, relationships, responsibility, 
and new horizons.  
 When, in 1933, Edith Stein became aware of the escalating persecution of the 
Jews by the Nazis, she moved to act.  She thought that the Holy Father needed a personal 
account of the sufferings of the Jewish people in Germany and a warning about the effect 
that the Catholic Church’s silence would have on people throughout the world.  
Recognizing her relationships and attendant responsibilities as a daughter of Judaism, 
Germany, Catholicism, and of the cosmic community, she wrote a letter urging the Pope 
to speak out against the evils of National Socialism.  She used her gifts as a 
phenomenologist, writer, and teacher but when that action proved futile, Stein broached 
the next horizon. 
 Dismissed from her job at the Pedagogical Institute because of her Jewish 
ancestry, Stein sought to enter the Carmelite Order.  This move to Carmel would fully 
express Stein’s ontic core as, relieved of her responsibilities as a teacher and speaker for 
the Catholic Women’s Movement, she could now wholeheartedly abandon herself to life 
with Christ — a desire that she had harbored for eleven years.  Her action was seen by 
her relatives as an act of abandonment of them.   Stein was convinced, however, that in 
serving God, she would honor her relationships to all humankind by interceding with God 
for the needs of the world. 
 While Stein waited for the day of her entrance into the Carmelite Order, she 
began writing her reminiscences, meant as a true account of Jewish life to counter the 
anti-Semitic propaganda of the National Socialists.  Again, she used her gifts as a 
daughter of Judaism and as a writer to tell the truth of Jewish life from her perspective. 
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This work would not have been published in Nazi Germany, but it evidences a movement 
toward truth and action.   
 By many accounts, Stein’s efforts against National Socialism failed:  her letter to 
Pope Pius XI was ineffectual, her entrance into Carmel was interpreted by her family as 
an act of abandonment, and her memoirs were unpublished.  What is critical for Stein’s 
ethical stance, though, is that motivated by a perceiving of a phenomenon of truth, she 
acted according to her own gifts in honoring her relationships.  She used the natural gifts 
and abilities at her disposal — and then rendered the outcome to God.    
 In a letter sent to her friend Sister Adelgundis in 1931, Stein writes: “God knows 
what is in store for me. I do not need to concern myself about it.”  In the same letter she 
adds:  “Basically, it is always a small, simple truth that I have to express:  How to go 
about living at the Lord’s hand.”61  This “living at the Lord’s hand” was not a pious 
refrain on Stein’s part but the “simple truth” by which she lived the ethical life.  As a 
result of certain relationships in her life to which she paid heed, especially with Husserl, 
Scheler, and the Reinachs, as well as through the influential writings of Thomas Aquinas 
and Teresa of Avila, Stein became aware of her search for truth and her intimate 
connection with God.  This relationship with God placed her in relationship with all 
creation.  She felt herself responsible, not only for Jews, Germans, and Catholics, but for 
all people.   
 Stein placed great emphasis on the natural ability of human beings to come to 
know and use their innate gifts.  In a lecture given in 1931,62 Stein specifically spoke of 
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the vocation of men but her speech encompassed the vocation of all human beings.  She 
pointed to the need for each person to find him/herself in the sense of recognizing his/her 
own gifts and using them for the good of all.  She explains this unfolding of the ontic 
core:  “Now a man’s vocation, i.e., the work which he is destined to accomplish, is 
indicated by his nature.  It will mature and become obvious to others in the course of his 
life, so they can speak of his ‘vocation’ in the happy case that he has found ‘his place in 
life.’”63  Stein reiterates this theme elsewhere:   
God leads each one by a particular way; one person arrives more easily 
and sooner at the goal than another.  What we can do, in comparison with 
what we are given, is always little.  But that little we must do:  that is, we 
must pray insistently so that when the way does happen to be indicated, 
we will be able to follow the grace without resisting.64 
 Stein stresses that these gifts flow from the Creator God, a God whom she had 
come to know through reason and faith.  It is therefore the natural ability to reason that 
Stein relies on first, as is evidenced by her phenomenological approach to action.  As a 
scholar and as an influential speaker within the German Catholic community, Stein felt 
that it was her responsibility to address Pope Pius XI.  Later, when she began her 
memoirs of life in a Jewish family, it was her responsibility and that of all those who 
grew up in Judaism to render testimony against the slanderous propaganda being 
manufactured by the Nazis.  When she told her mother of her baptism in the Catholic 
Church, Stein deliberately postponed mentioning her desire to become a Carmelite nun: 
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“[I]t became clear to me that she [Stein’s mother] would not be able to withstand this 
second blow for the time being.  She would not die of it, but it would fill her with such 
bitterness that I could not take the responsibility for that.”65  In 1933, however, when 
there was no option left, Stein did not spare her mother’s feelings.  After listening to the 
arguments for why she should not enter the cloistered religious life, Stein commented:  “I 
had to take that step in the complete darkness of faith.” 66  She entered Carmel knowing 
that her mother would reject her.  Stein was continuing her movement toward truth as she 
responsibly unfolded her personal core in relationship with God, self, and others. 
 In her autobiographical sketch that she completed on December 18, 1938, Stein 
remarked: “Perhaps I shall leave this house soon after Christmas.  The circumstances 
which have forced us67 to initiate my transfer to Echt (Holland) are strikingly reminiscent 
of the situation at the time of my entrance into Carmel.  It is likely that there is a subtle 
connection between the two.”68  Perhaps Stein alludes to the danger posed by the Nazis in 
1933 and again in 1938.  I propose the subtle connection between the two events was 
Stein’s movement toward truth and her need to act.  Stein acted according to her own 
ethical stance which she had honed using reason and faith.  Always in search of truth, 
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always moving toward truth, Stein acted as a woman in relationship with God and others 
— a woman who used her own natural gifts and was ever open to the possibilities of new 
horizons.  The events of 1933 tested the truth of Stein’s ethical stance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PROBLEM AND PROMISE OF A STEINIAN ETHIC 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 This study, Edith Stein:  Toward an Ethic of Relationship and Responsibility 
began with the eye-witness account of Jewish businessman-turned-Nazi-collaborator, 
Julius Marcan, in which he describes Edith Stein’s caring for others in the Drente-
Westerbork Detention Camp, days before her extermination on August 9, 1942.  
Marcan’s comment:  “Everyone wondered at her goodness,” caused me to wonder at 
Stein’s actions — and the motivation behind those actions.  Prompted by wonder, a 
catalyst to philosophy, this study began with the premise that Stein’s action of comforting 
others signaled a characteristic stance on her part toward the life world.  This stance, in 
turn, suggested an ethic, a system, a manner of acting in the life world.  Using Stein’s 
thoughts and actions, as recorded in her professional and personal texts, I defined “ethic” 
as a harmonious matching of internal thoughts and beliefs with external actions.  In my 
search through Stein’s philosophical, personal, and autobiographical works for 
manifestation of an ethic, I sought evidence of how Stein attempted to match her thoughts 
and beliefs with her lived actions and whether she did so in a systematic way.  It became 
clear that an examination of Stein’s internal thoughts and beliefs would necessitate my 
including her use of reason as well as faith.  In this final chapter, I will summarize how 
this study was conducted, consider the results, make connections to other research, and 
recommend possible areas for future research.     
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SUMMARY OF THE STUDY  
 Convinced that Stein evidenced an ethic in her actions and wanting to determine 
the essence of that ethic, I searched Stein’s writings for ways in which others influenced 
her thought, essential characteristics that comprised her ethic, and examples of how she 
employed an ethic.  These three factors — influences, essences, and evidence — form the 
body of my research.   
 
Influences on Stein’s Ethic  
 To understand better Stein’s thought as expressed in her writings, I looked at six 
people whom Stein indicated had influenced her thoughts, beliefs, and actions.  Chapter 
Two focuses on Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Adolf and Anna Reinach, and Saint 
Teresa of Avila, all of whom had a profound impact on the formation of Stein’s ethical 
stance.  Chapter Three incorporates the influence of Saint Thomas Aquinas.   
  Having been impressed by the phenomenological methodology of Edmund 
Husserl, in 1913 Stein began to apply her intellectual energies to the study of 
phenomenology.  She eagerly approached the search for truth using a method that 
privileged the subjective viewpoint and made allowances for consciousness of the world 
as it unfolded in everyday life.  A confirmed realist, Stein did not agree with Husserl’s 
later turn to idealism, but she always honored Husserl’s rigorous attention to objects as 
they appeared to consciousness and the mind’s manner of coming to meaning.  Husserl 
impressed upon Stein the importance and value of both description and discourse. 
Furthermore, Husserl influenced Stein by honoring subjective experience and recognizing 
the role of intuition in the search for truth.  Stein agreed with Husserl’s vision of 
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philosophy and readily made the love of wisdom and the search for truth her own “quite 
personal affair.”1 
 While studying at the University of Göttingen, Stein came into contact with the 
brilliant and somewhat flamboyant Max Scheler.  Even though she disagreed with his 
apparent disregard for Husserl, Stein was mesmerized by Scheler and his thoughts.  She 
took note of Scheler’s new-found Catholicism and was intrigued by his study of ethics.  
In particular, Stein seems to have employed Scheler’s idea of an inherent movement 
toward love (ordo amoris) and his hierarchy of values in her own system of thought.  
While she agrees with Scheler’s movement toward love, Stein also posits a constant 
movement toward truth that motivates the human person to act in accordance with truth.  
Stein welcomed Scheler’s enthusiasm for the anthropology of the human person, 
considering in her dissertation the sharing of experiences between persons.  She later 
broadened her investigation of empathy by studying the makeup of the psychophysical 
person and the person’s importance in the formation of community.  Stein participated in 
Scheler’s interest in the psychophysical person, and his a priori emotionalism, an idea 
that feeling is experienced prior to thought, resonated with Stein’s experience. 
 In Stein’s encounters with Adolf Reinach, for instance, she “felt” the passion that 
this fellow student of Husserl had for truth and phenomenology before she understood 
this new manner of philosophizing.  Adolf Reinach expressed his passion concretely in 
his tireless preparation for class and his insistence that the material be clearly presented in 
order to be understood — characteristics that Stein incorporated in her own writing and 
teaching.   
                                                 
 1 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 2, §1, 44.  
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 In Anna Reinach, Stein experienced the “feeling” of faith long before she 
understood faith in a cognitive way.  The example of Stein’s visit to the widow Reinach 
illustrates Scheler’s influence in two ways.  First, Anna Reinach gave external expression 
to an internal belief — Scheler and Stein strongly posited the interconnectedness of the 
physical, emotive, mental, and personal levels.  Second, the grieving woman evidenced a 
vibrant and personal relationship with God that Stein had earlier abandoned.  Once seeing 
this higher value embodied in Anna Reinach, Stein sought to attain that value.  Adolf 
Reinach broadened Stein’s understanding of phenomenology with discussion and debate, 
and Anna Reinach introduced her to faith as a lived reality. 
 Stein made the acquaintance of Teresa of Avila and Thomas Aquinas by reading 
their works and while she first (chronologically) experienced these saints through the 
mental exercise of reading, she felt them more powerfully on the emotive level.  After 
reading Saint Teresa of Avila’s autobiography, Stein was convinced that she had found a 
fellow searcher for truth.2  This conviction lends credence to Scheler’s theory of 
emotional a priorism, for Stein experienced Teresa of Avila on an emotional level before 
comprehending the saint or her teachings theoretically.  Moreover, Teresa of Avila 
appealed to Stein, I think, because the sixteenth century mystic sought to match her 
internal thoughts and beliefs with her external actions.  Teresa of Avila was authentically 
both searching for truth and striving to live the truth as she experienced it in her life 
world:  this resonated with Stein’s definition of truth. 
 Stein’s study of the works of Thomas Aquinas began as a scholarly pursuit when 
she translated the Latin De Veritate into German.  At first stymied by the formal 
argumentation of Aquinas, Stein grew in appreciation of the scholar as she found a clarity 
                                                 
2  Stein, Life 420.  
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and rigor reminiscent of Husserl and Reinach.  Stein’s search for truth found resonance in 
the works of the scholastic; she later tried to combine the teachings of Aquinas with those 
of Husserl, as is seen by her final philosophical work, Finite and Eternal Being.  
 With the aid of philosophy and faith, Stein continued her theoretical search for 
truth while striving to reflect the truth in her words and actions.  As exemplified by the 
teachings and example of Husserl, Scheler, and Adolf Reinach, Stein used the methods of 
phenomenology to help her intuit and describe essences in her search for truth.  In the 
faith of Anna Reinach and Teresa of Avila, Stein found companions, models of higher 
values, in her search for truth.  In Thomas Aquinas, Stein found a scholar convinced of 
the power of reason and faith — and she too embraced both.   
 
The Essence of Stein’s Ethic 
 Stein died before formalizing her ethic in writing, but in her philosophical and 
personal works, there are indications of an ethic, references to a personal search for truth 
that harmonizes inner thoughts and beliefs with external actions.  In Chapter Three, “A 
Phenomenological Method to Action,” I describe essential elements of Stein’s ethic.  
These elements reflect the varied influences on Stein’s thoughts and beliefs, and reveal 
something of Stein’s own stance toward the life world.  Elements of phenomenology 
(such as intentionality, intuition, essences, and new horizons) and of faith, (namely 
Stein’s use of the creation story and her understanding of God as Creator and as pure 
essence) contribute significantly to Stein’s ethical framework.   
 Stein defines God as pure existence and pure essence who imparts Himself in and 
through the act of creation.  God, who is fullness of existence and essence, imbues each 
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human person with a soul.  The ensouled person thus participates in God’s pure essence, 
but in a less perfect way than God, the Creator. 
 Stein’s concept of creation plays heavily in her ethic as she sees creation in three 
orders:  original, fallen, and redeemed.  In the original order of creation, Stein thinks, 
human beings shared in a threefold harmony that reflected the right order that existed 
between God and human beings.  First, a harmonious relationship existed between 
Creator and creature.  Second, the human person was in harmony with him/herself as the 
four levels of which he/she was composed (physical, emotive, mental, and personal) were 
in right order and balance.  Third, human beings existed peacefully with each other.  
Stein also accepts a threefold charge placed upon human beings by God.  Human beings 
are to reflect the image and likeness of God; are to procreate (physically and spiritually); 
and are to be stewards who care for the earth.  These principals of God as creator, the 
three orders of creation, and the three tasks of human beings are tenets of the Catholic 
faith that informed Stein’s ethic. 
 Through sin, a turning from God, Stein believes that human beings disrupted the 
original order of creation and ushered in a disjointed and unharmonious fallen order 
characterized by conflict and resentment on three levels.  In the relationship between God 
and the human person, human beings, thinks Stein, manifest an age-old disharmony with 
God, which evidences itself in the desire to be creator and ruler of creation.  Instead of 
stewards of the world, responsible to procreate and to care for creation, human beings use 
(and abuse) creation for their own needs and wants.  Moreover, some human beings 
express an autonomy that denies the existence of God as creator or sustainer.  At the 
interpersonal level of relationships, human beings are no longer companions with each 
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other but are competitors instead.  Competition and supremacy have displaced 
cooperation and care.  Third, the individual person experiences inner turmoil and conflict 
because he/she fails to integrate the physical, emotional, mental, and personal layers of 
which he/she is made.  Consequently, individual persons are unaware of or unwilling to 
use the gifts they possess by nature and grace.  Stein adduces that the cosmic community, 
comprised of individual persons who are in personal, social, and spiritual disharmony, 
reflect the fallen nature of creation.  
 Stein envisions a return to the harmony that existed in the original order, though, 
and it is the responsibility of human beings to co-create this redeemed order through 
living in truth.  Each besouled person, possessing a unique ontic blueprint, has the ability 
to use his/her physical body, emotions, and mental power to unfold his/her own unique 
personal core.  Stein believes that individuals who reflect on their thoughts and actions 
are aware of and are in possession of their personal cores, and thereby contribute to the 
redeemed order wherein relationships and responsibilities are righted.  A person aware of 
and willing to share his/her gifts of nature and grace (Stein does not discount God’s 
intervention) contributes to a universal harmony, a redeemed order that restores the 
original order of creation. 
 I believe that Stein’s ethic is her personal contribution to restoring the original 
order of creation.  First, Stein taps into her insatiable search for truth and discovers that 
this search is not unique to her but shared by all human beings.  Stein finds this quest for 
truth supported within the writings of Thomas Aquinas and in the person of Saint Teresa 
of Avila.  The search for truth is universal; however, the access to truth is subjective and 
depends on the life world, the situation within which the individual person finds 
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him/herself.  This phenomenological approach that honors the subjective acquisition of 
universal truth reflects the influences of Husserl and Adolf Reinach. 
 But Stein’s search for truth is not carried out alone; God and others help her to 
know truth.  Stein’s work on empathy reflects the importance Stein places on others in 
revealing the truth about self and the life world.  Max Scheler’s influence is seen in 
Stein’s hierarchy of values and persons who fulfill certain value types.  Thus, Stein 
allows for others to show us higher and lower values, leaving the individual person to 
choose the greater truth.  The human person may fulfill obligations of higher values and 
contribute to the redeemed order, or deny truth, thus contributing to an embodiment of 
lesser values and the spreading of resentment.  Here, Stein’s explanation of the personal 
core is instructive:  the person not in touch with his/her personal core does not understand 
his/her place in the cosmic community and is unable to contribute to bringing about the 
redeemed order. 
 Thus, the search for truth is not carried out in a vacuum; it has social implications.  
The human person deals with others physically, emotionally, and mentally and by virtue 
of his//her humanness, has a responsibility to others with whom he/she inhabits the earth.  
But the social aspect of Stein’s ethic is interwoven with the search for truth and the 
responsibility to unfold one’s personal core.  Through self-examination, reflection, and 
life experiences, the human person, in interaction with God and others, learns the truth 
about him/herself.  This is why Stein’s notion of empathy is so important.  According to 
her idea of empathy, Stein posits that the human person is able to enter into the 
experiences of another, not primordially, but in a way that brings new meaning, new truth 
to the individual.  So, for example, Stein cannot enter into the sorrow of the widowed 
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Anna Reinach, but she can learn form Anna’s experience.  That Anna finds solace and 
comfort in Christ’s cross instructs Stein.   
 But the ontic blueprint that resides in the personal core is under God’s province 
alone and Stein allows for interaction between God and the human person in unfolding 
this personal core.  Stein is silent about her own entrance to Carmel, designating the 
decision as her secret — just as she is silent after Erna makes her decision regarding her 
choice of profession.  The relationship between God and each person is sacred and not to 
be violated by third parties. 
 Stein posits that the search for truth is universal and is reflected in the natural 
quest of the psychophysical person who, as a reasoning individual, inherently seeks truth 
and strives to live in harmony with other human beings.  Supporting Thomas Aquinas’ 
natural law theory,3 Stein identifies the search for truth as the ontic destiny of human 
beings.  This inherent search for truth, because it is given to all rational human beings, is 
universal, but it is lived out individually, and thus manifests a phenomenological theme 
of subjective access to universal truth.  Thus each person is responsible for unfolding 
his/her ontic blueprint, that is, each person must come to know and use his/her natural 
gifts for the development of self.  The person who develops and shares his/her gifts, 
contributes in a concrete way to the harmony of family, the neighborhood, the state, and 
ultimately, to the cosmic community.  Thus, individuals who exercise their ontic core, 
help to bring about the redeemed order. 
 The movement toward truth and the subsequent unfolding of personal cores never 
remains static and ushers in new possibilities — new horizons.  The person who knows of 
                                                 
 3 Thomas Aquinas in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. 2 
(Indianapolis:  Hackett, 1997).  Summa Theologica 774, Q. 94, Art. 2.   
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and unfolds his/her personal core continues to develop on all psychophysical levels.  
Those persons who share their personal gifts of nature and grace are, however, in 
relationship with other individuals who embrace different truths, different values.  Stein’s 
ethic allows for the acquisition of new truths in relationship with other individuals who 
are searching for truth.  
 Stein’s concepts of the besouled psychophysical person, the order of creation, and 
a universal search for truth, subjectively achieved, shape her ethic.  In this study, I 
characterize Stein’s ethic as having four intertwining aspects:  a perceiving of the 
phenomenon of truth, an honoring of relationships, an unfolding of one’s personal core, 
and openness to new horizons.  These aspects form the essence of Stein’s ethical stance. 
 
Evidence of Stein’s Ethic 
 In Chapter Four, “Evidence of Stein’s Ethic,” the proposal that Stein’s ethic 
consists of four essential aspects is put to the test as I examine a period of Stein’s life that 
she described as “strikingly reminiscent” to another period that involved ethical choices 
and which she felt contained “a subtle connection.”4  I propose that the subtle connection 
that Stein intuited between the events of 1933, when she entered Carmel, and 1938, when 
she fled Germany for the Netherlands, was a need to act ethically.  She needed to 
acknowledge a newly perceived truth, unfold her personal core, honor relationships, and 
                                                 
4 The essay, “How I Came to the Cologne Carmel,” was signed on December 18, 1938, two weeks 
before Stein fled the Cologne Carmel for the Carmel of Echt, Holland.  Stein gave this forty-two page, 
handwritten reflection to her prioress, Sister Teresia Renata de Spiritu Sancto Posselt for Christmas 1938, 
apparently wishing to contribute to the history of the Cologne Carmel and inadvertently adding to her 
incomplete autobiographical sketch, Life in A Jewish Family, which she had begun shortly before entrance 
in 1933.  Cf. Susanne Batzdorff, Edith Stein:  Selected Writings (Springfield:  Templegate, 1990) 15. 
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remain open to new horizons.  In this way, her outward actions would reflect her inner 
thoughts and beliefs. 
 In Chapter Four, “Evidence of an Ethic,” I review the events of 1933, wherein 
Stein faced two truths:  first, that Hitler and National Socialism were on the rise and 
second, that Stein needed to respond to this threatening rise to power in a personal way.  
To this end, she wrote a letter to Pope Pius XI, asking for an official denunciation of 
Hitler and his policies.  She also initiated the writing of her mother’s memoirs which later 
became her own reminiscences, by which she gave witness to the truth of Jewish life as 
she experienced it.  Finally, Stein unfolded her personal core by entering Carmel, offering 
her life as a sacrifice to “stand before the face of God” for all people.  
 The decisions that Stein made in 1933 had little if no impact on Hitler, or the 
situation in Germany.  In seeking universal truth through subjective action, Stein 
emphasizes not the outcome of her actions, but the motivation — the movement toward 
truth.  Like Kant’s “duty,” which is a priori, two factors are universal and necessary in 
Stein’s ethical stance:  an intending toward truth and openness to new horizons.  These 
natural movements toward truth and new horizons, coupled with the honoring of 
relationships and the responsible unfolding of her personal core, motivate Stein to act.   
 In the first example of Stein’s ethical response, the letter to Pope Pius XI, Stein is 
ineffectual in prompting the Pontiff to write an encyclical; however, the inaction of the 
Pope does not diminish nor negate Stein’s ethical action.  Stein’s movement toward truth 
according to her gifts of nature and grace provides critical evidence of an ethic.  This 
movement toward truth is a continuation of previous decisions, actions, and movements 
as Stein has been speaking publicly to German Catholic women’s organizations and 
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teachers’ groups since 1928.  With the termination of her job because of her Jewish 
heritage, Stein is no longer able to use a public forum in urging women to match their 
internal thoughts and beliefs with their actions.  Instead, Stein personally urges a 
prominent public figure, the Pope, to “make the match,” that is, to act ethically.  She is 
adamant in expressing her thought that the Pope’s silence in the face of Nazi practices 
does not convey the truths of the Catholic Church.  The action of writing the letter honors 
Stein’s natural abilities as a writer, teacher, and phenomenologist, but it signals a new 
horizon as Stein uses these natural gifts in a different way and in a new circumstance.  
Stein speaks from her subjective vantage point — as a woman of Catholic, Jewish, and 
German background — as she calls attention to a grave situation.  In doing so, she 
unfolds not only her ontic core through her unique gifts, but she also honors her 
relationship to God and others while contributing to the redemptive order.  She is 
responsible for her gifts of heritage, faith, and intellect — and, she uses them, as is her 
responsibility.  Stein’s dismissal from the Münster Pedagogical Institute signals a new 
horizon which leads Stein to yet another; the action of writing to Pope Pius.  Stein 
broaches a new horizon and voices her new perspective, that is, her unwillingness to be 
silent in the face of evil.  
  In the second example of evidence of Stein’s ethical stance, her entrance into 
Carmel, she discloses a truth that she has kept hidden for almost eleven years:  her desire 
to live as a religious in the spirit of Saint Teresa of Avila.  Stein has deliberately followed 
the wishes of her spiritual advisors in postponing this personal desire but now, she can no 
longer deny this truth.  Waiting neither for her spiritual adviser’s permission nor blessing, 
Stein begins the preliminary inquiries and fulfills the necessary requirements.  In addition 
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to moving toward truth, Stein further unfolds her personal gifts of nature and grace.  
Stein’s prayerfulness, renunciation of self, and confidence in truth find fullest expression 
in life within the cloister.   
 Rather than showing evidence of an honoring of relationships, Stein’s entrance 
into Carmel seemingly severs the relationship with others, particularly with her mother 
and siblings who accuse her of abandoning them.  I propose that this apparent severing of 
filial relationships evidences Stein’s attention to Scheler’s hierarchy of values.  While 
Stein knew that she had a responsibility to her family as well as to God, she privileges her 
relationship to God, which she believes includes all other relationships.  Stein’s action of 
entering Carmel exemplifies, too, the prominence she gives to unfolding one’s ontic core 
and the respect she affords to the process of coming to full truth. 
 Stein reflects Scheler’s influence in a second way as, in entering Carmel, she 
offers herself as a sacrifice for all people.  At first consideration, Stein’s becoming a 
Carmelite seems in keeping with her religious fervor and her determination to intercede 
for the people of the world.  But in addition to expressing religious self-sacrifice and zeal, 
Stein’s entering Carmel (as well as her speaking to the Pope about the sufferings of the 
people) reflects Scheler’s influence, as well.  In his essay, “The Rehabilitation of Virtue,” 
(1913) Scheler contrasts the Greeks’ understanding and appreciation of virtue with what 
Scheler perceives to be “modern bourgeois philosophers’” [for Scheler, Kant’s] 
privileging of duty over virtue.  Scheler writes: 
In contrast, virtue [to the Greeks] was not yet an empty word for them; 
rather it was first the nobility of virtue, dwelling within, that “obliged.”  
This is what determines the extent and the weight of responsibility for 
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one’s possible actions; yet no one bore responsibility for its possession or 
nonpossession.  Its inward weight impelled one to an ever widening 
extension of responsibility, so the person who possessed it to its highest 
degree, that of holiness, quietly felt himself responsible for everything that 
happened in the entire world.”5 
Stein’s decision to leave her family is in keeping with Scheler’s theories of the hierarchy 
of value and the nobility of virtue.  Her decision is also reflective of her religious belief in 
redemption.  Just as Jesus suffered and died in expiation for the sins of humankind, Stein 
believes that her “dying to self” will have positive effects for the cosmic community. 
Embracing these Schelerian ideas and the concept of the redemptive power of suffering 
taught by the Catholic Church, Stein is willing to enter Carmel, offering herself as a 
sacrifice for the needs of all humankind. 
 Stein’s entrance into Carmel also attests to her characteristic confidence in an 
individual human person’s access to universal truths, which incorporates her adherence to 
realism and phenomenology.  In concrete terms, Stein realizes that her understanding of 
truth is not her mother’s perspective of truth:  their difference is irreconcilable.  But Stein 
allows both perspectives of truth to stand as she and her mother move forward in search 
of a greater understanding or clarity of truth.  The movement toward truth is universal.  
Perhaps Frau Stein will someday understand her daughter’s decision or perhaps Edith 
Stein will regret her entrance into cloistered life.  Whatever the many possible outcomes 
to this action, the decision to enter Carmel best expresses Stein’s past, and it most 
authentically reflects Stein’s movement toward truth as she then perceives it.  Stein’s 
                                                 
5 Max Scheler, “On the Rehabilitation of Virtue,” American Catholic Philosophical  Quarterly  
79.1  (2005) :  21-37. 
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decision to enter Carmel now becomes the landscape upon which she builds and moves to 
see the world from a new perspective, a new horizon.  Seen from her mother’s 
perspective, her daughter’s entrance into Carmel is unethical as Edith renounces family to 
save herself.  From Stein’s view, she acts ethically as she brings to Carmel a 
wholehearted renunciation of self and love of God, family, and humankind.    
 In the third example, Stein’s authorship of reminiscences of Jewish life, she again 
offers evidence of her ethical stance.  According to her standard of harmonizing inner 
thoughts and beliefs with outer actions, Stein intends toward truth as she describes Jewish 
life.  While Stein knew, given Nazi laws against publication of works by Jewish authors, 
that the book, Life in a Jewish Family, would never be published, it was important for 
Stein to express her truth in writing.  As the Nazis spread lies about the Jewish people, 
Stein uses her talents as a teacher, writer, storyteller, and phenomenologist to disseminate 
the truth that she has experienced as a Jewish woman.  Stein challenges other people of 
Jewish descent to transcend their sufferings and to dare to tell their stories, as well.  Thus, 
Stein acknowledges her connectedness to all humanity, honors her relationships, and 
contributes, albeit in a small way, to the cosmic community.  Stein reaches back into the 
past, using reminiscences of past family experiences, and counters the then-present 
propaganda, ultimately trying to improve the future.     
 By writing to Pope Pius XI, authoring Life in a Jewish Family, and entering 
Carmel, Stein moves toward truth as she perceives it.  She uses gifts of nature and grace 
while unfolding her personal core and honoring her relationships to God, self, and others.  
In faith, Stein lives at the “hand of the Lord”6 and remains open to new possibilities as 
                                                 
 6 Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 86-87, #89. 
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she leaves the outcome of these ethical actions to God.  Stein employs faith and reason as 
her ethical decisions help to shape her new horizon.  In terms of impeding the rise of 
National Socialism, Stein’s actions are potentially worthless.  To do nothing, though, is 
unethical as it denies the reality of Hitler, the reality of each person’s dignity and value, 
and the reality that “the responsibility must fall . . . on those who keep silent in the face of 
such happenings.”7  
 
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
 As a result of this study, I conclude that:  1) Stein had an ethic, that is, she strove 
to integrate her internal thoughts and beliefs with her external actions; 2) Stein’s ethic 
was informed by reason and faith; and 3) Stein’s ethic is characterized by a perceiving of 
a phenomenon of truth, an honoring of relationships, an unfolding of one’s personal core, 
and openness to new horizons.  I will consider each of these results in turn. 
 
Stein Had an Ethic 
 While Stein never committed her ethic to writing, it became increasingly clear in 
this study that she actively pursued the study of ethics and was fascinated by how she and 
others made ethical decisions.  In a letter to Roman Ingarden, Stein refers good-
humoredly to her “bad habit of seeing ethical conflicts everywhere.”8  When her older 
sister, Erna, who was being coerced by a persuasive uncle, struggled in deciding which 
profession to choose, Edith Stein upbraided Erna, saying:  “Don’t let yourself be 
                                                 
7 Stein, “Letter to Pius XI” 226. 
 
8  Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 7, #6. 
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influenced.  Do what you, yourself, consider right!”9  This confidence in a person’s 
natural ability to consider what was right and to do it was clearly transmitted to Edith 
Stein through her mother, Augusta Stein.  Stein testifies to her mother’s ethical influence 
as she recounts:  “Once [during a time of deliberation], I presented all the pros and cons 
to my mother.  ‘My dear child,’ she said, ‘unfortunately, I can’t advise you.  Do whatever 
you consider right; you are the best judge of what you should do.’”10  In her 
reminiscences, Stein explains this right to choose in more depth:   
I could not act unless I had an inner compulsion to do so.  My decisions 
arose out of a depth that was unknown even to myself.  Once a matter was 
bathed in the full light of consciousness and had acquired a definite form 
in my thoughts, I was no longer to be deterred by anything.”11 
That Stein’s “decisions arose out of a depth that was unknown” even to herself was a 
conditional phase.  Stein went on to explore this unknown depth in her personal research.   
 Stein’s penchant for ethical discussions, combined with her interest in 
psychology, history, and philosophy, are reflected especially in her works on empathy 
and the human person.  After describing the process of empathy, Stein considered the 
levels of the psychophysical person more fully.  She defined the human person as an 
individual comprised of physical, emotional, mental and personal levels.  Using her own 
experiences as well as her understanding of the psychophysical person, Stein would later 
describe the “unknown depth” that she mentioned as the personal core of the human 
person — a level to which the person and God alone had access.  Knowing from 
                                                 
9 Stein, Life 64. 
 
10 Stein, Life 187. 
 
 11 Stein, Life 152. 
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experience that she could tap into her personal core made Stein confident that each 
human person had the ability to know him/herself at the level of the personal core.  This 
confidence in the human person’s ability to reason and act informs Stein’s ethic. 
 Stein’s study of Schelerian ethics confirms her idea that external actions represent 
inner thoughts and beliefs.  Stein returns repeatedly to this internal/external reflection in 
her dissertation on empathy, in her treatises dealing with the exposition of the 
psychophysical human being, and in her personal writings.  In the events of 1933, for 
example, and as described in this research, Stein gives evidence of an ethic whereby she 
matches internal thoughts and beliefs with external actions.  Her actions, namely, writing 
a letter to Pope Pius XI, writing her reminiscences of Jewish life, and entering a 
Carmelite monastery, reflect her personal core.  Stein’s actions match her internal 
thoughts and belief that something must be done to point to the truth of Hitler’s plans.  
 
Stein’s Ethic is Informed by Reason and Faith 
 In some of her philosophical works, Stein attempted to create a dialogue between 
the scholasticism of Saint Thomas Aquinas and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl 
but she never synthesized the two styles.  She intuited a connection between these two 
approaches to philosophy and thus, reason and faith inform her ethic.  Stein credits 
Thomas Aquinas’ writings for many of her ideas, but three concepts are reflected 
particularly in her ethical stance:  Aquinas’ idea of God as Creator, his realism, and his 
acceptance of natural law.   
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 First, following Aquinas’ lead, Stein adheres to God as Creator.  In citing 
common characteristics that determine Thomists, Aquinas scholar Romanus Cessario 
explains:   
Thomists defend the reality of creation, and hold the conviction that from 
the visible things of the universe the human mind can know the existence 
of God.  God enjoys his own subsistent fullness of pure actual being and 
possesses no limitation of any kind, because nothing of potential is to be 
found in him.  No creature enjoys this status of pure act.12 
The acceptance of God as Creator and of human beings as limited creatures informs 
Stein’s ethic in three specific ways.  First, Stein defines the human person as made in the 
image and likeness of God, the Creator, thus affording the human person a dignity that 
honors the Creator God who is Pure Act and Pure Essence.  This Pure Essence, shared in 
each human person’s soul, leads to a second point that Stein draws from Thomas.  Stein 
posits that by unfolding one’s personal core, each human person develops his/her 
potential, thus moving toward plentitude or fullness.  This plentitude is realized when a 
human person cooperates with God in recognizing his/her gifts of nature and grace.  Stein 
develops this concept in her treatment of the personal core and the human person’s need 
to integrate the four psychophysical dimensions (physical, emotive, mental, and personal) 
in achieving “fullness.”  Third, acknowledging God as Creator also substantiates Stein’s 
claim that there are three orders of humanity, which she calls the original, fallen, and 
redeemed orders.  These orders help to explain Stein’s adherence to Thomas’s idea of 
divine and natural law.  Cessario explains this characteristic of Thomists:   
                                                 
12 Romanus Cessario, O.P.  A Short History of Thomism (Washington:  Catholic U of A P, 2005) 
23. 
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In moral philosophy, Thomists agree that by nature man enjoys the right to 
dwell in community and to pursue personal happiness within the common 
good, and that the right conduct of human beings is best described by 
appeal to the virtues of human life, although laws, both natural and 
positive, also legitimately direct human action.13   
Stein insists, in her personal experience and in her philosophical writings, that human 
beings search naturally for truth.  She is confident that God-given desires (given by the 
Creator God) will not be thwarted.  Thus the natural search for truth will yield truth, and 
this truth will allow development of one’s personal core as well as contribute to the 
reintegration that characterizes the redeemed order. 
 When Stein first read Husserl’s work, she was immediately impressed by his 
method of getting to the truth via subjective description of experience and the discovery 
of essences.  She expresses her disappointment with Husserl when he turns toward 
idealism, abandoning his earlier support of realism.  Despite her agreements and 
disagreements with Husserl, Stein employed the phenomenological method in her work 
and in her everyday experiences. 
 With Scheler, Stein accepts that the human person can intuit values prior to 
understanding them.  Also reflecting Scheler’s influence, Stein knows from her 
encounters with Anna Reinach and through literature, with St. Teresa of Avila, that there 
are individuals who personify certain values and virtues.  Stein knows, too, that these 
persons of value can inspire a person to seek a higher level of values.  
 From Husserl, Stein learns the importance of attention to subjective experience in 
coming to truth as well as the certainty that the broaching of one horizon brings yet 
                                                 
13 Cessario, A Short History of Thomism 22. 
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another horizon. From the phenomenologist Scheler, Stein incorporates the hierarchy of 
values and the ability of human beings to intuit, or feel, before they know.  Stein is not 
the person who synthesizes scholasticism and phenomenology but she respects these 
different approaches.  Stein allows the teachings of Aquinas on creation, realism, and 
natural law to coexist alongside Husserl’s privileging of the subjective viewpoint and the 
discovering of essences.  She allows room, too, for Scheler’s hierarchy of values and 
emotional a priorism.  Stein allows scholasticism and phenomenology, faith and reason, 
to inform her ethic.  
 
Characteristics of Stein’s Ethic  
 This study claims, too, that Stein’s ethic is characterized by a perceiving of a 
phenomenon of truth, an honoring of relationships, an unfolding of one’s personal core, 
and openness to new horizons.  It is important to see these four characteristics as strands 
that intertwine and are fluid. 
 Like her description of the life world, Stein’s ethic is fluid and in motion.  Past 
events and memories inform the present and stretch into the future, forming a continuum.  
The human person, according to Aquinas and also to Stein, is in motion, naturally in 
search of truth and able to recognize it.  While Stein affords truth universal status (truth is 
available to all people in all times), she reflects Husserl’s privileging of the subjective 
viewpoint and echoes Aquinas’ belief in the realism and dignity afforded the ensouled 
person in her confidence that each person can come to know truth at his/her personal 
core.  Thus Stein conceives of the human person as capable of knowing the truth after 
finding that truth through his/her gifts of nature and grace and through the life world. 
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 The search for truth constantly motivates Stein, and I consider this movement 
toward truth the hallmark of Stein’s ethic.  The search for truth is enhanced by the 
responsible unfolding of one’s own personal core.  We recall that in Stein’s life, she 
gradually became cognizant of her intellectual abilities, her need for God, her ambitious 
nature, etc.  By means of self-examination throughout the various fluctuations in her life 
world, through encounters with others, and by her personal relationship with God, Stein 
learns about herself.  Armed with this self-knowledge, Stein shares her gifts with others, 
placing them at the disposal of the cosmic community. 
 This concept of the cosmic community reveals Stein’s belief that persons are 
interconnected.  She writes to her contemporary, Fritz Kaufmann:  “The formation of an 
unshakable bond with all whom life brings in my way, a bond in no way dependent on 
day-to-day contact, is a significant element in my life.”14  Maintaining this bond, Stein 
feels, is also her responsibility, part of the development of her personal core as a human 
being.  Thus, acknowledging her relationship to the cosmic community, Stein is able to 
write to her friend, Sister Adelgundis:  “Of course, it is hardly possible to think 
individually of every intention that is commended to me from so many different sides.  
All one can do is try to live the life one has chosen with ever greater fidelity and purity in 
order to offer it up as an acceptable sacrifice for all one is connected with.”15 
 Lastly, Stein’s fluid movement toward truth presumes openness to new horizons.  
The search for truth is ongoing as gifts of nature and grace manifest ever new 
responsibilities and new relationships.  Each new realized truth, each recognized and 
utilized gift of nature and grace changes Stein’s horizon and adds to her perspective on 
                                                 
14 Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 46, #38a. 
 
15 Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters 166, #164. 
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the life world.  These characteristics contribute to an ethic because they reveal Stein’s 
thoughts and beliefs.  Stein tries to live in truth, cognizant of her abilities as well as of her 
limitations.  This sharing of her capabilities contributes to the cosmic community which 
Stein believes is part of her responsibility. 
 This study concludes that Stein’s ethic, her self-conscious project of matching 
internal thoughts and beliefs with external actions, is informed by reason and faith.  
Stein’s ethic is characterized by a fluid and ongoing search for truth while unfolding 
one’s personal core and honoring relationships.  Stein’s ethic allows for the possibility of 
new horizons — new truths — to be discovered and lived. 
 
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER RESEARCH  
 This research contributes to existing Steinian research because it adds to the 
growing body of research about the philosopher, Edith Stein.   
 Research to date has emphasized Stein’s personal life,16 her contributions as a 
woman philosopher,17 and her canonization as a Catholic saint.18  Philosophical research 
                                                 
16 See, for example: Hilda Graef, The Scholar and the Cross:  The Life and Work of Edith Stein 
(Westminster:  Newman P, 1955); Waltraud Herbstrith, Edith Stein:  A Biography, trans. Bernard 
Bonowitz (San Francisco:  Ignatius P, 1992); Pat Lyne, Edith Stein Discovered:  A Personal Portrait 
(Springfield: Templegate, 2000); and Teresia Renata de Spiritu Sancto Posselt, Edith Stein, trans. Cecily 
Hastings and Donald Nicholl (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952). 
 
17See, for example:  Sarah Borden, Edith Stein (New York:  Continuum, 2003); Josephine 
Koeppel, Edith Stein:  Philosopher and Mystic (Collegeville:  Liturgical P, 1990); and D. Q. McInerny, 
“Edith Stein as Philosopher,” Fellowship of Catholic Scholars  26.4  (2004):  17-32. 
 
18 See, for example, Susanne Batzdorff, Aunt Edith:  The Jewish Heritage of a Catholic Saint, 2nd 
ed.  (Springfield:  Templegate, 2003); Harry James Cargas, ed., The Unnecessary Problem of Edith Stein 
(New York:  UPA, 1994); and Waltraud Herbstrith, ed., Never Forget:  Christian and Jewish Perspectives 
on Edith Stein (Washington:  ICS, 1989). 
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has focused on her study of empathy,19 her interpretation and use of scholasticism,20 and 
her phenomenological treatment of the psychophysical person.21  This dissertation makes 
use of works by Stein and about Stein to broach a new horizon as it reconstructs Stein’s 
ethic.  Although Stein never set down formally an ethical maxim, plan, or formula, she 
does make references to ethics -- its importance and application in her own life -- 
throughout her written works.  Without Stein’s having formalized an ethic, this project is 
speculative, but well within the boundaries of phenomenological research, as it seeks the 
essence of Stein’s ethic.  This study considers Stein’s ethical stance and, based on 
essential aspects of her philosophy and distinct experiences in her personal life, adds a 
new perspective to the growing body of research about Stein.   
 This research also connects Stein’s thought on the unfolding of one’s personal 
core with the responsibility to share these gifts with the cosmic community.  Stein’s 
concept of the ontic blueprint includes Aquinas’ theory of the fulfillment of God’s plan 
for a particular person and Scheler’s concept of the unfolding personal core.  Potency and 
act are important to Stein’s understanding of the psychophysical person.  In Stein’s 
schema, the soul, specifically the personal core, individuates the human person.  It is at 
this personal core that God’s gifts of nature and grace are found; a person must recognize 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Angela Ales Bello, “From Empathy to Solidarity: Intersubjective Connections 
According to Edith Stein,” In Life: In the Glory of its Radiating Manifestations, Tymienienka, A.T. ed.,  
Analecta Husserliana  48. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic P, 1996); Michael Andrews, “Contributions to the 
Phenomenology of Empathy:  Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and Emmanuel Levinas,” diss., Villanova U, 
2002; and Kathleen Haney, “Empathy and Ethics,” Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (1994):  57-65. 
 
20 See, for example, Mary Catharine Baseheart, SCN, “The Encounter of Husserl’s 
Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. Thomas in Selected Writings of Edith Stein,” diss., U of Notre 
Dame, 1960 and Sarah Ruth Borden, “An Issue in Edith Stein’s Philosophy of the Person:  The Relation of 
Individual and Universal Form in Endliches und Ewiges Sein,”  diss., Fordham U, 2001. 
 
21 See, for example, Anne Mette Maria Lebech.  “The Constitution of Human Dignity.”  Yearbook 
of the Irish Philosophical Society (2002) and Marianne Sawicki, Body, Text, and Science:  The Literacy of 
Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic P, 1997). 
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and use these gifts if his/her potential is to become a reality.  It is only when these gifts 
are used and shared with the cosmic community that human beings move toward the 
redeemed order wherein all is in right relationship.  
   
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 A project for possible further study is an examination of Stein’s influence on Pope 
John Paul II,22 who knew of Edith Stein and canonized her in 1998 as Saint Teresa 
Benedicta of the Cross, OCD.  Karol Jόsef Wojtyla (John Paul II), a student of both 
phenomenology and scholasticism, completed his doctoral work on the philosophy of 
Max Scheler.23  While Wojtyla knew first-hand the tension that exists between 
philosophy and theology, his writings celebrate the dialogue that can exist between 
reason and faith.  In John Paul II’s writings, we see strands of thought that are 
reminiscent of Stein.  An analysis of Wojtyla’s writings, particularly on the dignity of the 
human person, and Stein’s writings on the psychophysical person would continue the 
dialogue between faith and reason. 
 While teaching ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin, Wojtyla and other 
scholars initiated “The Lublin Project.”  In this project Wojtyla and his colleagues 
adhered to realism about the world and the human capacity to know it and focused on the 
human person and his/her experiences.  The group was committed to the power of reason 
and practiced an ecumenism of time by which they respected the history of philosophy as 
                                                 
22 Karol Jόsef Wojtyla (1920-2005), Pope John Paul II, served as Pope of the Roman Catholic 
Church from 1979 until 2005.  
 
23 Wojtyla’s second doctoral degree was awarded by Jagiellonian University, Poland, in 1954 for 
his dissertation, “An Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the Basis of the 
System of Max Scheler.”  See George Weigel.  Witness to Hope:  The Biography of Pope John Paul II  
(New York:  Cliff Street Books, 1999) 122-144. 
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well as contemporary philosophy.24  Biographer George Weigel explains Wojtyla’s 
philosophical perspective, but his words could be describing Stein’s project as well: 
It was Scheler’s personalism, which rescued moral philosophy from the 
dry abstractions of Kantian ethics and restored the pathos, ecstasy, and 
indeed ethos to human life, that Wojtyla found most attractive.  Wojtyla 
also agreed with Scheler’s claim that human intuitions into the truth of 
things included moral intuitions, a certain “knowledge of the heart” that 
was, nonetheless, real knowledge.  Scheler’s careful analysis of moral 
sentiments, especially empathy and sympathy, was also important, for it 
helped break modern philosophy out of the prison of solipsism — 
empathy and sympathy necessarily involved an encounter with another.  
Perhaps above all, Wojtyla appreciated Scheler’s attempt to ground morals 
in an analysis of the realities of moral choosing, rather than in a formal, 
abstract system like Kant’s.  The question Wojtyla posed in his 
habilitation thesis was whether Scheler (and by extension, the 
phenomenological method) could do for contemporary Christian 
philosophy and theology what Aristotle had done for Thomas Aquinas.25  
Stein would have found herself at home in “The Lublin Project” as well as in the writings 
of John Paul II.  Research on how Scheler influenced Stein and Wojtyla would be 
fruitful.  An analysis of Stein’s influence on John Paul II would enrich scholarship about 
each of these philosophers.  
                                                 
24  Weigel, Witness to Hope 134. 
 
25 Weigel, Witness to Hope 128-29. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study began with the eyewitness account of Julian Marcan who noted Edith 
Stein’s calm presence and her practice of comforting a child in the Drente-Westerbork 
Detention camp.  Whether the account is true or not can be debated.  The account 
triggered a question however:  Did Stein have an ethic and if she did, what was the 
essence of this ethic?   
In this study, the “ethical life” refers to a human being’s conscious existence in 
the physical world and an ongoing reflection on his or her actions, attitudes, and beliefs 
in that world.  It designates the manner in which a person conducts his/her affairs within 
that person’s given life world.  Life world, as used in this study, means “[t]he world 
inhabited by the self . . . within which [one] immediately experience[s] the things around 
[him/her].”26 
As a result of her philosophical and faith developments, Stein sees self as 
possessing pure essence and made not merely of body, but of emotions, intellect, and 
personality.  Stein knows she must unfold her unique ontic blueprint; she must become 
fully herself in the life world in which she finds herself.  She must develop on all levels, 
especially conscious of her own unique personality and gifts of nature.  She is responsible 
for her subjective view of the world and must be willing to share that view with the 
cosmic community, for Stein, like all other human beings, is not an isolated individual.  
As a rational human being she searches for truth in the midst of a society, and she is also 
responsible, in some way at least, to contribute to that society through the use of her 
                                                 
26 Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 2000) 6.  
Sokolowski’s definition of life world is used here in preference to Husserl’s evolving meanings of 
lifeworld. 
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unique gifts.  In knowing and using her gifts of nature and grace, Stein forges a 
relationship with God, self, and others — she allows for the possibility of new horizons. 
  Whether or not Edith Stein comforted a child in the Drente-Westerbork camp, 
she had an ethic.  This ethic was characterized by a perceiving of a phenomenon of truth, 
an honoring of relationships, an unfolding of her personal core, and openness to new 
horizons.  As a philosopher, Stein allowed reason and faith to inform her ethic that 
privileged relationship and responsibility. 
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ABSTRACT 
  
Edith Stein:  Toward an Ethic of Relationship and Responsibility 
    
 The philosopher Edith Stein (1891-1942) never set down formally an ethical plan.  
However, in Stein’s professional and personal texts, “ethic” is defined as a harmonious 
matching of internal thoughts and beliefs with external actions, while always moving 
toward truth.  This dissertation seeks to identify the essential components of Stein’s ethic. 
  A search of Stein’s philosophical, personal, and autobiographical works suggests 
that Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Adolf and Anna Reinach, Teresa of Avila, and 
Thomas Aquinas had profound impact on the formation of Stein’s ethical stance that 
included her use of reason as well as faith.  Elements of phenomenology and of faith 
contribute significantly to Stein’s ethical framework.   
 Informed by reason and faith, Stein’s ethic is characterized by a fluid and ongoing 
search for truth that combines a perceiving of a phenomenon of truth, an honoring of 
relationships, an unfolding of one’s personal core, and openness to new horizons.  
According to Stein’s schema, the psychophysical person is comprised of physical, 
emotional, and mental levels which he/she uses in unfolding his/her personal core or 
ontic blueprint.  The soul, specifically the personal core, individuates the human person.  
It is at this personal core that God’s gifts of nature and grace are found; a person must 
recognize and use these gifts if his/her potential is to become a reality.  It is only when 
these gifts are used and shared with the cosmic community that human beings move 
toward the redeemed order wherein all is in right relationship. 
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 In 1933 Stein wrote a letter to Pope Pius XI, asking for an official denunciation of 
Hitler.  She initiated the writing of her mother’s memoirs, which later became her own 
reminiscences; here she gave witness to the truth of Jewish life as she experienced it.  
Finally, Stein unfolded her personal core by entering Carmel and offering her life as a 
sacrifice for all people.  These actions are evidence that Stein had an ethic by which she 
strove to integrate her internal thoughts and beliefs with her external actions. 
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